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This thesis examines the received wisdom in international aid and state-building debates that 
service provision can improve state legitimacy. It presents an in-depth, historical study of the 
relationship between state-provided university education and processes of state (de-
)legitimation in Sri Lanka. The analysis focuses on three critical junctures when the social 
contract around higher education was being made, broken and defended. The major finding is 
that service provision can matter for state legitimacy, but not in the instrumental sense 
depicted in state-building models. Service provision needs to satisfy certain shared values and 
normative criteria in order to be significant for state legitimacy. When it does, it can express 
and reinforce the key legitimising ideas of the state. Indeed, it can become formative to the 
idea of the state. However, service provision can also undermine legitimacy when it sends 
messages that the state is contravening shared values or acting on the basis of unfair rules and 
procedures. This process is not automatic, but politically engineered by elites who manipulate 
service provision to make legitimacy claims. Services can become tied to state legitimacy at 
critical junctures of crisis and change. These critical junctures can be historically reinforcing 
and institutionalise path dependency not only in the significance of the service for state 
legitimacy, but in the functioning of the service itself. These findings call for an expansion of 
the remit of empirical enquiry into the services-legitimacy relationship in three senses: from 
the material to the non-material, from snapshots to longer-term observations, and from 
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The puzzle of service delivery and state 
legitimacy 
For at least the past decade, understanding how states win and lose legitimacy has been a 
central concern for the theory and practice of state-building. At least part of this concern lies 
in a quandary: state legitimacy is considered both vital and elusive. Legitimate institutions are 
thought to be more sustainable, more effective and ultimately, more likely to bring peace and 
stability (Englebert, 2002). For the same reasons, illegitimate institutions are widely lamented 
as a key driver of one of the primary challenges in global development – the persistence of 
so-called state fragility (DFID, 2010; OECD, 2010). The devastating consequences of 
illegitimacy for instability, incapacity, and conflict reverberate through formative state-
building literature (Kaplan, 2008; Lake, 2007; Rotberg, 2004). Re-building state legitimacy is 
considered central to peacebuilding (Zaum, 2012). At the same time, the widespread failure 
of conflict-affected states to re-build their legitimacy has been described as the most 
disappointing aspect of post-conflict reconstruction (François & Sud, 2006, p. 151). In 
recognition of the significance of state legitimacy, and its apparent elusiveness in conflict-
affected regions of the developing world, the President of the World Bank in 2009 called for 
legitimacy to henceforth become the strategic ‘centre of gravity’ for all state-building 
interventions (Zoellick, 2009, p. 67).  
In parallel, international aid agencies have developed an interest (at least at the rhetorical 
level) in understanding the various sources of legitimacy available to a state, and how 
external aid interventions might seek to influence them. In this vein, there has been a striking 
trend towards framing the provision of vital public services - such as health, education, water, 
and sanitation - as a potential source of state legitimacy. The idea that there is a direct, causal 
link between the provision of such services and state legitimacy has become so widespread 
and entrenched in aid policy literature that recent commentators have labelled it a ‘received 
wisdom’ (Carpenter, 2012). Even a cursory view of high level aid literature suggests this 
label is warranted. In 2011, for example, the OECD (2011, p. 74) issued guidance for 
working in fragile and conflict affected states in which it argued that service provision is a 
14 
 
material expression of the social contract and that aid interventions in this area can therefore 
‘play a major role in enhancing state legitimacy and contributing to more productive state-
society relations’. Around the same time, other agencies began to assign service provision a 
similarly significant role in building state legitimacy. The 2011 World Development Report 
(World Bank, 2011) portrayed service provision as a way for the state to reach out to society, 
demonstrate its commitment to citizens, re-build confidence in government, and in turn, build 
its legitimacy among populations in crisis.  
The idea that service provision can fulfil a dual purpose of improving human development 
and simultaneously building legitimate states is deeply compelling for international aid 
agencies. In an age of austerity, aid is increasingly justified to domestic audiences through its 
contribution to addressing transnational and global problems that spill over borders and, 
ultimately, threaten the national interest of states and citizens. Building international peace 
and stability is foremost among these national-interest goals. Accordingly, aid agencies are 
being called on to make the case for why aid to service provision supports these goals.
1
 This 
case is important to make, not least because the majority of overseas development assistance 
(ODA) to fragile and conflict-affected countries is not allocated to directly addressing 
problems of peace and insecurity. Rather, the largest share of ODA remains tied to traditional 
service sectors such as health and education (OECD, 2014).
2
 Importantly then, if the 
presumed links between service provision and state legitimacy can be substantiated, then by 
extension, a large portion of traditional aid can be re-classified as supporting the goal of 
international stability. 
In the face of this imperative, there is a paucity of research on the link between service 
provision and state legitimacy. Indeed, taken at face value, the notion that service delivery 
can instrumentally enhance state legitimacy appears something of a leap of faith. To the 
degree that social scientists have grappled empirically with legitimacy – the so-called ‘hot 
potato’ of political science – there is no consensus around its origins, other than that these are 
multiple, inter-connected, and context-specific (Gilley, 2006). Whilst a long scholarly 
tradition has unravelled the consequences of legitimacy for the state, much less is known 
                                                          
1 This thesis was partly inspired by my experience of working on the research helpdesk of the Governance and Social 
Development Resource Centre (GSDRC). The helpdesk is funded by a number of bilateral development agencies, including 
DFID, DFAT and the EC.  From 2011 onwards, the GSDRC helpdesk began to receive requests from advisors working in 
these agencies to find evidence for the link between service provision and state legitimacy to support the development of 
business cases for investment in service provision in fragile states. 
2 This OECD (2014 p. 30) review found that ‘in short, there is no evidence that ODA is moving away from traditional 
development areas towards security-related expenditure in fragile states’. 
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about how legitimacy is accrued, and even less about when this isolated, potential source of 
legitimacy – the provision of vital public services – can be identified as a clear contributor 
(Carter, 2011). Although illustrative cases suggest a link between declining or inadequate 
service performance and crises of legitimacy
3
, the reverse proposition - that improved 
performance enhances state legitimacy - is not well established (Brinkerhoff, Wetterberg, & 
Dunn, 2012; Gilley, 2006). The confidence and pervasiveness of the received wisdom, in 
contrast with the apparent paucity of evidence to support it, suggests a pressing research gap.  
This thesis interrogates the received wisdom that service provision improves state legitimacy. 
It steps back from the aid debate and considers it in wider theoretical and academic 
perspective. The research question addressed through the research is: When does service 
delivery support or undermine state legitimacy? This question, the starting premise of the 
thesis, is more neutral than the aid debate in two ways. First, it does not presume any 
relationship between service provision and legitimacy necessarily exists but asks whether and 
if so when it might. Second, it assumes that if service provision does matter for state 
legitimacy then there is no intrinsic reason why its influence should be exclusively positive. 
If service provision can theoretically improve state legitimacy, then it may also theoretically 
undermine it.  
To address this question, the thesis presents an in-depth, historical study of the relationship 
between state-provided university education and state legitimacy in Sri Lanka. The aim is to 
provide a qualitative account of how this specific service has been connected with processes 
of state (de-)legitimation in this single country context over time. The timeframe of the study 
spans more than 60 years, from 1944 to 2013, but the analysis focuses on three narrower, 
critical junctures when the state’s legitimacy was shifting – that is, consolidating or 
contested. To understand what role, if any, higher education played in these legitimacy shifts, 
the study takes an inductive and exploratory approach. The concern is not with quantifying or 
measuring the effect of the provision of higher education on state legitimacy but with 
understanding potential pathways of influence between them. In turn, the intended 
contribution is to develop propositions about when service provision might support or 
undermine state legitimacy that could be tested elsewhere. These defining features of the 
study’s approach – its neutral starting point, historical perspective, and inductive, qualitative 
methodology - depart from the main thrust of research conducted on the relationship between 
                                                          
3
 See, for example, the case of South Africa’s recent service delivery protests analysed by Alexander (2010). 
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service provision and state legitimacy to date. In so doing, as the thesis will show, it provides 
a different perspective that challenges and refines the received wisdom of some aid agencies 
that service provision improves legitimacy.  
The meaning and significance of state legitimacy  
State legitimacy is the core analytical concept applied in this study, and therefore needs to be 
defined from the outset. Of course, the meaning and origins of legitimacy have been the topic 
of a long tradition of scholarly debate which cannot be resolved here. To operationalise the 
concept, the thesis follows leading scholars in defining state legitimacy as the ‘right to rule’ 
(Coicaud, 2002; Gilley, 2009; Holsti, 1996). This right to rule is understood, in the abstract, 
to be based on whether citizens believe the use of power is ‘appropriate, proper, and just’ 
(Tyler, 2006, p. 375). At a fundamental level, legitimacy follows a ‘logic of appropriateness’ 
as opposed to a ‘logic of consequences’ (Easton, 1975). This means that when people believe 
a system of rules is legitimate, this is because they believe it is right and has a morally 
justifiable basis, as opposed to merely because they believe it is beneficial or detrimental to 
their own self-interests. In other words, to be legitimate, an actor or institution has to be 
appointed by, and operate in accordance with, a set of local rules that are normatively and 
morally appropriate in the eyes of their (would-be) followers.  
The state itself is defined here as the set of institutions – or rules of the game – that govern 
the exercise of power by rulers over ruled. It is more than a physical apparatus exerting 
control over a territory (Lemay-Hébert, 2009). It also represents a set of ideas and agreements 
about how power should be exercised, and indeed, what limits should be placed on 
institutions or actors exercising power (Holsti, 1996). Of course, the state transcends any 
individual, government or institution. In the same way, state legitimacy also transcends 
specific support for people, institutions, or regimes. More keenly, state legitimacy implies a 
form of ‘diffuse support’ – that is, support not for any leader, political party, or government, 
but for the underlying rules of the game by which they operate (Easton, 1975). Indeed, 
legitimacy embodies a moral obligation to comply with a set of rules, rather than an 
institution (Lamb, 2014). State legitimacy, therefore, means that people accept the rules for 
organising power irrespective of whether they approve of the leader or political party 
operating (or not) by them.  
Analytically differentiating the state’s right to rule from other indicators of public support for 
an authority is a central challenge for this thesis and for research in this field in general. As 
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noted above, the concept of legitimacy is distinct from popular approval of government 
actions and refers more closely to the acceptance of the normative foundation of rules 
governing power (Migdal, 2001). Reported satisfaction with an incumbent government’s 
performance, in any sphere of policy, is therefore not a marker of state legitimacy. On the 
contrary, citizens may still view the state as legitimate – that is, acting on a rightful basis - 
even when they are dissatisfied with a specific aspect of government performance or policy. 
Legitimacy is also not equivalent to confidence in a regime, or government, because 
confidence refers more specifically to the capacity or will to deliver on promises (Bakke et 
al., 2014). Whereas confidence is based on assessment of capacity, legitimacy is based on 
assessment of the rightfulness of actions. State legitimacy is also analytically distinguishable 
from, though closely related to, trust in the state’s institutions. The concept of trust embodies 
an expectation and probability of an individual, organisation or institution fulfilling its 
obligations (Jackson, 2015). Citizens who trust the state may believe it has good intentions, 
and is likely to carry through on its promises (Levi, Sacks, & Tyler, 2009). But that is not the 
same as believing it has a rightful basis to operate in the first place. While assessments of 
confidence or trust might derive from evaluations of the state’s motivations, administrative 
competence, or capacity, legitimacy stems from a belief that its actions are appropriate.  
Understanding the meaning and origins of legitimacy is important because gaining the right 
to rule is unquestionably beneficial for a state. The positive effects of the accrual of 
legitimacy on capacity to govern and generate development have been empirically 
demonstrated (Englebert, 2002). State legitimacy enhances state capacity because it makes 
citizens more likely to defer to decisions and rules out of a sense of obligation, rather than 
through the threat (or exercise) of punishment or reward (Tyler, 2006).  Whether or not 
citizens believe in the state’s right to rule can also influence their behaviour towards it - most 
crucially, whether or not they are likely to comply with rules or rebel against them (Tyler, 
2006, p. 380). This symbiotic relationship between compliance and legitimacy underpins the 
stability of all political systems, and in turn, through its stabilising effects, enables effective 
governance (Beetham, 1991). Politics cannot be stable where there is no consensus on the 
legitimacy of state institutions, much like a sports game cannot be played where the rules are 
not first agreed upon (Leftwich, 2008). Agreed rules make the task of ruling more efficient. 
They also theoretically create a kind of elasticity in state-society relations because they 
provide a basis for citizens to defer to the state even if it does not always promote their self-
interest in the short term (Easton, 1975). For these reasons, scholars have ascribed legitimacy 
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with various accolades – viewing it for example as a necessary condition for the very survival 
of the state (Leftwich, 2008) or a benchmark against which we can assess its strength 
(Rotberg, 2004). In sum, legitimacy is regarded as significant for building peace and stability 
because it generates compliance with agreed rules. In turn, if service provision can enhance 
state legitimacy, then it can also build compliance, peace and stability.  
Sri Lanka’s paradox of performance and de-legitimation 
Compelling as it may be, the idea that service provision can improve legitimacy and stability 
is challenged by cases where effective service performance has apparently not coincided with 
increased legitimacy and stability. Indeed, historical examples of European states that were 
effective and yet legitimacy has been contested have previously been identified by prominent 
legitimacy scholars (Lipset, 1984).
4
 Sri Lanka presents a more contemporary paradox, and 
one from the developing world. Since its independence in 1948, Sri Lanka has demonstrated 
exceptional performance on measures of service provision and citizen welfare, while at the 
same time experiencing multiple and prolonged crises of state legitimacy among certain 
sections of its population. In this way, Sri Lanka appears to be an outlier case
5
 that, on the 
surface at least, contradicts the received wisdom. Moreover, since welfarism has been such a 
defining characteristic of the state transformation process, it raises an alternative possibility - 
that the provision of services not only failed to improve state legitimacy, but is somehow 
connected to state illegitimacy among certain groups in society. 
For a large part of its post-colonial history, Sri Lanka was characterised by exceptional 
performance in delivering basic services, and correspondingly high levels of citizen welfare. 
In 1981, Amartya Sen wrote what would become a much-referenced article identifying Sri 
Lanka as among the top global performers on several human development indicators. Using 
data from World Development Reports up to 1979, he drew special attention to Sri Lanka’s 
remarkable success, both in absolute terms and relative to its Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 
on measures of life expectancy, infant mortality and adult literacy. By 1960, for example, Sri 
Lanka had achieved a life expectancy of 62 – a feat which many richer countries would not 
achieve until much later, in 1979 (Sen, 1981, p. 295). Sen concluded that ‘for a poor country, 
with incomes comparable with (only a little higher) than India and Pakistan, Sri Lanka’s 
record in removing poverty and providing a higher quality of life is quite remarkable’ (Sen, 
                                                          
4
 Lipset (1984) for example classified the German and Austrian republics in the 1920s as having high performance but 
contested legitimacy. 
5
 That is, one that appears anomalous to theoretical assumptions (George & Bennett, 2005). 
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1981, p. 301). This superior performance was attributed to Sri Lanka’s extensive provision of 
social welfare programmes  - from food subsidies, to free education and healthcare - under a 
post-colonial state that was ‘taking social development seriously’ (L. Jayasuriya, 2010). 
Modelled on British colonial social policy and enabled by early democratisation, this welfare 
state prospered under favourable economic conditions – including a successful colonial 
export economy in tea, rubber and coconut (L. Jayasuriya, 2010; Kelegama, 2000). Well into 
the 1980s, Sri Lanka was envied as a ‘model third world democracy’ and characterised by a 
politically literate electorate and a high standard of living (Bush, 2003, p. 29). 
Albeit an exceptional welfare performer, the legitimacy of the Sri Lankan state has been 
violently contested on at least two fronts. On the one hand, the state has faced a significant 
challenge to its legitimacy from sections within its core, majority constituency of Sinhalese-
Buddhists. This has taken the form of two insurrections orchestrated by the Marxist Janantha 
Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP). The first, in 1971, temporarily brought the machinery of the state 
to a halt and, though unsuccessful, both took it by surprise and represented a significant 
challenge to its authority. This was followed by a second insurrectionary attempt, between 
1987-1989, which resulted in less intense but longer-lasting conflict (Moore, 1993). 
Alongside these challenges from within the core, majority constituency, Sri Lanka has also 
experienced a more protracted, violent war between the state and sections of its Tamil 
minority population. This culminated in armed conflict between the state and the separatist 
armed group, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). This devastating war germinated 
after independence, escalated after 1983, and reached a climax with the military defeat of the 
LTTE by Sri Lankan military forces nearly 30 years later in 2009.  
Sri Lanka’s history of welfarism alongside conflict was shaped by its colonial heritage and 
independence struggle. For more than four centuries, Sri Lanka was colonised by the 
Portuguese, Dutch and British.
6
 Partly a legacy of colonialism, modern Sri Lankan society is 
delineated along multiple religious, ethnic, caste and linguistic lines. The vast majority of the 
population are Sinhalese Buddhists (some 74 per cent
7
) and are concentrated in the central 
and south west regions of the island. The largest minority constituency of Sri Lankan Tamil 
Hindus (some 11 per cent
8
) largely live in the north and along the eastern coast of the island. 
                                                          
6
 Beginning with Portuguese colonisation in 1517, through to independence from British rule in 1948. 
7
 Between the first census in 1921 and the last in 2012, the recorded per centage of the Sinhalese population has increased 
from 69 and 74 per cent. Figures from Department of Census and Statistics, Sri Lanka: http://www.statistics.gov.lk/  
8
 The recorded percentage of the Sri Lankan Tamil population has been consistent over time, hovering between 11 and 12 
per cent. Figures from Department of Census and Statistics, Sri Lanka: http://www.statistics.gov.lk/ 
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Sri Lanka is also home to a minority of Christians (both Sinhalese and Tamil), Muslims, 
Moors, Malays and Burghers who are decedents of European colonisers. A minority of Indian 
Tamils were settled by the British to work in the colonial plantation sectors and represent a 
distinct ethnic group.  
A major process of state transformation began after Sri Lanka – then known as Ceylon - 
achieved dominion status and independence from British rule in 1948. Sri Lanka’s post-
independence parliamentary system was thereafter dominated by two main political parties: 
The centre-right United National Party (UNP), whose leadership comprised the elite upper 
classes who were associated with the bureaucracy of the former colonial powers, and a new 
centre-left Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), a breakaway from the UNP, which sought to 
forge a national power base in Sri Lanka’s Sinhalese majority (L. Jayasuriya, 2010). The 
ascendance of a two-party, Sinhalese polity paved the way for what the prominent historian 
K. M de Silva (K. M. De Silva, 1981, p. 510) has termed the ‘triumph of linguistic 
nationalism’. After 1956, what had been a multi-ethnic state was increasingly moulded to 
serve the Sinhalese-Buddhist constituency, including through the highly divisive change of 
the official language from English to Sinhalese.
9
 The following two decades saw resurgent 
Sinhalese and Tamil nationalisms develop alongside Tamil calls for a separate state. 
Competing nationalisms in the political arena spilled over into social life, where ethnic 
tensions between these groups turned increasingly violent.  Ethnic riots in 1983 – infamously 
known as ‘black July’ - were an important turning point in the escalation of violence, and 
marked the consolidation of open military conflict between the state and Tamil separatist 
forces (Bush, 2003).  
The salient feature of both the insurrection and separatist conflicts – and the associated 
contestation of the state’s legitimacy - was that that they were state-society conflicts. The war 
between the LTTE and the state has been described as a conflict of ‘state formation’ – that is, 
between the state and an identity-based opposition confined to a specific territory (Walton, 
2015). Though they were not comparable to the war in scale or duration, the insurrections 
were also manifestations of grievances from within a specific section of society - the 
Sinhalese rural poor – who were agitating for their own incorporation and representation in 
the institutions of the state. In this way, Sri Lanka’s history presents an opportunity to explore 
why the vertical relationships between state and society – as a basis of state legitimacy 
                                                          
9
 The Sinhala Only Act of 1956 changed the official state language from English to Sinhalese but did not confer any official 
status to the Tamil language. 
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(Holsti, 1996) – can come to be contested and more specifically, to study how this 
contestation can evolve alongside a history of welfarism.  
Why higher education in Sri Lanka? 
To examine Sri Lanka’s paradox of performance and de-legitimation, the thesis targets a 
specific service for analysis: the provision of free education at state universities. The rationale 
for adopting this narrow, targeted approach is twofold. First, at a theoretical level, the aim of 
focusing on a specific service is to provide an in-depth examination of the relationship 
between service provision and state legitimacy that can give due account of how and why the 
specific service under scrutiny is significant for that relationship. That is, why a single 
service, perhaps in contrast to another, may or may not matter for legitimacy, at any given 
point in time. The second rationale comes from the specific social and political salience of 
higher education in the history of state transformation in Sri Lanka. Specifically, the 
extension of free education at all levels was foundational to and emblematic of the 
development of a new post-colonial social contract. These rationales – theoretical and 
empirical - are expanded in turn below. 
A key aim of this study is to account for why and how the characteristics of specific services 
affect their significance for processes of state (de-)legitimation. Previous studies, whether 
comparative or historical in a single setting, have tended to bundle together a mixed bag of 
state and market-provided ‘services’ – from food provision, to security, to postal services, to 
social protection – to examine how these affect perceptions of the state’s legitimacy
10
. In this 
way, ‘service provision’ is typically treated as though it were one monolithic entity; a 
conglomerate of goods that are experienced and aggregated in both social experience and 
mind-set. In practice, however, services have quite different characteristics that impinge on 
both. A framework developed by Batley and Mcloughlin (2015) is instructive in this regard. 
For the purpose of this study, it usefully delineates between different services according to 
the types of social problems they address, how they are accessed and used physically by 
citizens, and the wider implications of their distribution and use. Importantly, services are 
accessed differently, both in terms of the physical space (private or public) that entails, and 
the frequency and urgency of access (routinized as in water, or under stress as in the case of 
emergency healthcare). These ostensibly technical and fairly fixed characteristics of the way 
services are accessed means they offer different ways for citizens to ‘encounter’ and therefore 
                                                          
10 An example is (Stel, de Boer, & Hilhorst, 2012). 
22 
 
have an opportunity to judge the state. Another crucial distinction is between services that are 
pure public goods, such as street lighting, where different users cannot easily be excluded 
from the benefits, and those that are ‘targetable’ in the sense that potential users can be 
included or excluded from them. In the latter case, of which education is a primary example, 
political elites can manipulate access by including some but not all groups to service their 
political constituencies of support  (Batley & Mcloughlin, 2015). In another sense, services 
produce different externalities – or positive or negative ‘spillover’ effects - which have social 
implications: for example, poor sanitation can and does exacerbate public health problems, 
whereas individual education has instrumental value for collective national economic 
development. These albeit cursory examples serve to illustrate that treating ‘service 
provision’ as an aggregate function of the state is deeply misleading. Moreover, that these 
service characteristics are clearly not only technical, but also social and political. In the same 
way that services are technically and therefore socially and political distinct, it follows that 
all services may not have the same social and political salience, or therefore significance for 
citizen’s perceptions of the state’s legitimacy.  
The provision of education, whether at school or university level, has a number of specific 
technical and therefore political characteristics that could potentially shape its significance 
for state legitimacy. More than any other state-provided service, education has been assigned 
a key role in nation-building and identity formation (Sercombe & Tupas, 2014). Historical 
and contemporary examples abound where the language of instruction in schools has been 
engineered by the dominant social group to consolidate their power and control over 
minorities in society (Aye & Sercombe, 2014). In terms of their spill over effects, educational 
environments are spaces where values are imparted, history is constructed, and societal 
divisions can be reflected and reinforced. For these reasons, governments have been known 
to seek a controlling influence over them, sometimes in ways that can reinforce social 
inequalities, or perpetuate violence (Harber, 2004). Across contexts, and even in war-torn 
environments where educational infrastructure is targeted and other social functions break 
down, education often survives because it is highly prized for its significance and promise of 
social mobility (UNESCO, 2011). Moreover, in resource constrained environments, 
education at all levels - particularly at the upper levels - is typically highly rivalrous because 
it involves a competitive system of entry. Unlike a pure public good where the benefits are 
diffuse and shared, individuals can be included or excluded from access to education. 
Crucially, as noted above, this also means educational opportunities can be engineered to 
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favour particular groups and political constituencies. Together, these characteristics make 
education socially desirable, politically targetable and politically salient for nation-building.  
Stand alone, service characteristics may provide a framework for understanding the social 
and political significance of different services, but that significance is layered on top of the 
politics and history of any given context. This is not least in terms of the history of state 
provision and the closely related question of citizens’ expectations of what the state should 
provide. The historical and political significance of university-level, state provided, free 
education is particularly stark in the case of Sri Lanka, making it an intriguing case for deeper 
exploration. Historically, the introduction of universal and compulsory free education is 
described by influential historians as a key pillar of Sri Lanka’s coveted post-colonial welfare 
state (J.E Jayasuriya, 1976). The introduction of landmark reforms in 1944 that made 
education free at all levels reflected an egalitarian ideology that underpinned a new period of 
welfarism that came to characterise the resurgent post-colonial state (ibid). Free university 
education was emblematic of the new purpose and mission. This founding significance of 
higher education at the critical juncture of state transformation carries through time into a 
series of post-independence efforts by the state to adopt an increasingly interventionist 
posture towards the sector. In practice, this manifested itself not only in the expansion of state 
universities that would be free to all, but somewhat less benignly in political interference to 
manipulate the social distribution of access. Most notably after 1970, political elites began to 
politically engineer – and therefore politically target - access to higher education to different 
social and ethnic constituencies through the introduction of various quota systems. These 
systems variably assigned different degrees of preferential access, based on the language in 
which the entrance examination was sat, or which district it was sat in. From this broad 
perspective then, the provision of free higher education has been an important outlet for state-
building and was an early mechanisms for state patronage post-independence. Both its history 
and politicisation over time assign higher education a degree of significance for examining 
issues of state (de-)legitimation. 
In another respect, the historical and political significance of higher education in Sri Lanka 
reveals itself in the modern-day functioning of the sector. As elsewhere, contemporary higher 
education is highly desired for the prospects of greater social mobility it offers. At the same 
time, supply is keenly restricted, making access to university highly rivalrous. While the 
sector has grown since the establishment of the first university in 1921, to now 15 centrally 
controlled universities, demand considerably outstrips supply (World Bank, 2009). In the 
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contemporary era, only around 13 per cent of students who qualify to study at state 
universities are actually admitted, with the effect that accessing higher education carries 
significant social prestige (ibid, p. 14). The continued use of quotas for governing entrance to 
university  - which currently take the form of a district quota system that allocates spaces 
according to the assignment of districts as relatively more or less ‘disadvantaged’ – suggests 
a degree of political investment in engineering access continues from the post-independence 
era. 
Universities in Sri Lanka are also a physical and discursive space of violent state-society 
confrontation. Protests, riots, high levels of ragging
11
 and staff and student strikes have been 
a longstanding feature on university campuses since at least the 1960s. Student representative 
groups, including the Inter University Students’ Federation (IUSF), are highly politicised and 
frequently mobilise protests, ostensibly against poor facilities and the perceived threat from 
privatising education. It is not uncommon for these protests to create traffic gridlock and 
provoke a hard-line response from the state, typically involving the use of tear gas or water 
cannon alongside complete campus closures of significant duration.
12
 At the same time, the 
general trend in the sector appears one of gradual decline. High expectations and ideals of 
social justice that characterised a period of post-colonial expansion of access are starkly 
contrasted by contemporary problems of under-investment and deteriorating quality (World 
Bank, 2009). In this way, higher education in Sri Lanka appears to mimic the country’s 
wider, paradoxical transition from welfare to warfare, discussed above. In sum then, higher 
education in Sri Lanka presents an interesting sector through which to examine services-
legitimation relations because it has had historically high social and political salience that has 
carried through time, and because it offers a potentially illuminating window through which 
to observe Sri Lanka’s wider state-society conflicts.  
Structure of the thesis 
The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter II begins by interrogating the received wisdom in 
theoretical and empirical perspective. It develops a novel analytical framework for analysing 
                                                          
11 Ragging is a practice to initiate new entrants into an informal code of conduct. The practice of ‘ragging’ takes many 
forms, from bullying and intimidating, to enforcement of strict dress codes, to violence. It typically occurs between senior 
and new-entry students of rural, Sinhalese background. Research into the causes of ragging has been undertaken elsewhere. 
In this research study, the perspective expressed by a recent graduate - ‘this is the one time you can exercise some control. 
After that, you are a penniless graduate’ – is typical of popular accounts of why ragging happens (Interviews with recent 
graduates, University of Colombo, 18th April, 2016). 
12
 An illustrative, recent example was the ‘Sabaragamuwa University Crisis’ which entailed a sustained campaign of student 
protest and civil resistance between June 2013 and October 2014 prompted by perceived denigration of rights including the 
banning of student’s unions. This crisis periodically provoked student-police clashes, student arrests, and campus closures. 
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the relationship between service provision and state (de-)legitimation in historical and 
political perspective. Chapter III then outlines how this analytical framework was 
operationalised in practice. It provides the rationale for, and explanation of, the methodology 
applied in this study.  
Chapters IV-VI examine the relationship between higher education and state legitimacy in Sri 
Lanka. Each of them focuses on a critical juncture when legitimacy was shifting, and seeks to 
understand what if any role higher education played in those shifts. The first juncture focuses 
on the period of anti-colonial struggle when the right to free education at all levels was 
extended to the masses, and became tied to a wider process of re-nationalising and re-
claiming a new nation-state. This runs from the introduction of radical new reforms to 
education in 1944, through to the consolidation of an ethno-nationalist state between 1956 
and 1966. This period can be characterised as a formative period of ‘making’ of the education 
social contract, when higher education became significant to an ongoing process of state 
legitimation.  
The second juncture, which follows on closely from the first, was characterised by a 
particularly turbulent period in the history of state transformation, and likewise in the sphere 
of higher education. That is the period from 1966 running up to 1973. This period sees the 
emergence and consolidation of a dual legitimacy crisis that was, to a degree, exacerbated by 
earlier changes in the system of higher education. These crises took the form of insurrection 
in the south orchestrated by the majority Sinhalese constituency, and the increasing rejection 
of the state and resort to armed separatism by minority Tamil groups in the north of the 
island. This period can be characterised as a period of ‘breaking’ the education social 
contract, when higher education became significant for an ongoing processes of state de-
legitimation among these different social groups.  
The final critical juncture traces forward to what can be described as the ‘post-war’ period, 
after the end of violent armed conflict between the state and the LTTE. This period, between 
2009 and 2015, saw increasing state authoritarianism and simultaneous crisis in the system of 
higher education, which represented a testing of the education social contract. These threats 
to the social contract provoked dissent in the form of strike action, rallies and student-police 
clashes. This period can be characterised as a time of popular mobilisation for the purpose of 
‘defending’ the education social contract, when the significance of higher education to state 
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legitimacy resurfaced, and the terms of the contract were (and are) being re-negotiated 
between a changing state and changing society.  
These selected junctures are not neat, nor are they incontrovertible: they are not equal in time, 
nor are they equally spaced over time. Inevitably, they bleed into one another. Nevertheless, 
at a broad level, they represent three distinguishable periods when higher education was 
significant for processes of making, breaking and re-forging a social contract as a basis for 
the state’s legitimacy. They also follow the broader trajectory of state-transformation in Sri 
Lanka, from the period of post-colonial state-building, to the emergence of fundamental 
conflict over the form of the state, through to the post-war re-negotiation of a new order and 
new terms of state-society relations. Studying these distinct periods thereby offers a window 
to Sri Lanka’s wider story of post-colonial welfarism, decline into war, and re-emergence 
into a form of (ostensible) relative peace.  
In Chapter VII, the thesis reflects back on these three critical junctures and critically 
examines the utility of the analytical framework for understanding the relationship between 
service provision and state legitimacy. It positions the study’s findings in wider perspective, 
drawing on key propositions from legitimacy theory and historical institutionalism. The final, 
concluding Chapter VIII summarises the empirical, methodological and theoretical 
contributions of this thesis to research on the relationship between service provision and state 
legitimacy, sets out propositions about when services support or undermine legitimacy, and 





Service delivery and state legitimacy: 
virtuous or vicious circles? 
As set out in the introduction, this thesis is motivated by the received wisdom that service 
provision improves state legitimacy13. This chapter interrogates the theoretical and empirical 
basis for this received wisdom. It finds that in contrast to the confidence of aid policy 
literature, in practice few studies have examined the relationship between services and 
legitimacy. Overall, there is a paucity of research that explores this relationship in-depth, or 
over time. More significantly, the limited body of available research suggests that whether 
the state accrues any legitimacy gains from public service provision hinges on certain 
subjective and historically contingent criteria against which citizens are likely to judge 
performance. Specifically, the relationship between a state’s performance on service 
provision on the one hand, and its degree of legitimacy on the other, is conditioned by a 
number of factors related not only to what the state delivers, but to how it delivers them, and 
the types of symbolic and discursive representations of the state that services convey to 
citizens. Moreover, if public service provision can theoretically improve state legitimacy 
when certain subjective criteria are met, then it can also undermine state legitimacy when 
those criteria are not met, or when values and expectations around service provision are 
violated. Yet this reverse proposition, that poor public services might undermine a state’s 
legitimacy and contribute to vicious circles of state de-legitimation, remains relatively 
neglected in both policy debates and the field of research. 
Albeit indicative, the findings support the view that for any given institution to generate 
legitimacy, it must ultimately be justifiable by reference to core social values, and resonate 
with beliefs about what is right for any society (Beetham 1991). These findings challenge the 
dominant institutional model that underlies aid policy, which reduces the role of services in 
(re-)building state legitimacy to an instrumental exchange between material rewards and 
compliance. They call for a more qualified and politically situated account of the effects of 
                                                          
13
 An earlier version of this chapter was published as an article in the journal Governance, entitled ‘When does service 
provision improve state legitimacy?’ See: (Mcloughlin, 2015) 
28 
 
service provision on state legitimacy that starts from an assumption that this relationship is 
not automatic, and could be positive or negative. Such an account would go beyond the 
material to incorporate the subjective, symbolic and relational role of service provision in 
improving or undermining state legitimacy. Central to this is a deeper reading of legitimacy 
theory, and the social construction of legitimacy, that engages with the moral and normative 
criteria by which citizens individually and collectively judge state institutions (Saward, 
1992). 
The chapter is structured as follows. It begins by setting out the key propositions 
underpinning the received wisdom, asking to what extent these are grounded in legitimacy 
theory. The next section goes on to illustrate that, in practice, a number of factors have been 
shown to interrupt any linear, causal relationship between service provision and state 
legitimacy. The chapter then proceeds to consider the reverse idea that if those conditions are 
not met, then service provision might undermine state legitimacy. Based on these findings, 
the conclusion summarises the case for a more political and theoretically-grounded account 
of whether and under what conditions service provision could alter citizens’ perceptions of 
the state’s right to rule than the one propagated in aid policy literature. 
Building state legitimacy via service delivery? Received wisdoms in 
the aid debate 
In prominent aid literature, the binding of states and societies through the exchange of 
services in return for citizen compliance often lies at the heart of state-building models. 
Central to this is the idea that the provision of basic services—a function states are 
universally expected to perform—signals state responsiveness, that is, both the willingness 
and capacity of states to respond to citizens’ basic needs (Whaites, 2008). One particular 
value of service provision is that, as a signal or measure of state performance, it is highly 
tangible, in terms of both its physical apparatus and its acute value in everyday life. 
Accordingly, the OECD (2011) describe public services as the visible link between what 
citizens give the state (taxation) and what they expect in return (a degree of well-being). 
Providing basic services is, in this way, understood as an expected function of any state, and 
a foundation for state-building. 
In some state-building models, not only does service provision have direct effects on state 
legitimacy, but in turn this legitimacy affords the state greater capacity to rule. NORAD 
(2009, p. 9), for example, state that ‘legitimacy is closely linked to the capacity of the state. 
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In fact, capacity and legitimacy are interdependent. Political and administrative capacity 
to serve the major part of population with essential services is likely to improve legitimacy’. 
The UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) (2010) similarly portrays a 
scenario in which states that respond to public expectations, including for basic services, set 
in motion a ‘virtuous circle’ of state-building. In the DFID (2010) model, responsive services 
lay the basis for a more inclusive political settlement, strengthened state–society relations, 
and, over the long term, can address the underlying causes of fragility or conflict. In the 
OECD’s (2008) version of the virtuous circle, states with the requisite capacity to provide 
services in line with expectations are rewarded with increased citizen compliance with its 
laws and rules—crucially, tax compliance—which over time boosts state capacity to deliver 
services more effectively and, in turn, generates more legitimacy. In this way, the cycle of 
capacity, legitimacy and citizen compliance is considered self-reinforcing, and a legitimate 
state is positioned as synonymous with an effective one. 
Another recurring theme in aid policy literature is that service provision falls into the 
category of ‘performance legitimacy’—that is, a type of legitimacy dependent on the state’s 
outputs (OECD, 2011, p. 39). More specifically, performance legitimacy depends on the 
‘effectiveness and quality’ of the goods and services the state delivers (ibid, p. 23). This is 
distinct from other potential sources of legitimacy, whether derived from policymaking 
processes, shared beliefs and norms, or international legitimacy (ibid). Likewise, the World 
Development Report 2011 (World Bank, 2011) treats performance or output legitimacy as 
separate from legitimacy that derives from how the state acquires or exercises power. Writing 
for the Norwegian development agency (NORAD), Bellina et al. (2009) also categorise 
service provision in the discreet category of what the state produces, as distinct from how it 
functions, or the kinds of beliefs and shared community supporting the state’s authority. What 
these examples collectively show is that, to use Weber’s (1962) well-known classification, 
service provision is primarily seen as capable of building legitimacy of the ‘legal-rational’ 
variety - that is, legitimacy derived not from charisma or tradition, but from functioning 
institutions. Performance legitimacy, and the role of service provision in building it, is 
instrumentalised through this categorisation. 
While optimistic about the potential legitimizing effects of service provision, development 
policy literature is usually careful to acknowledge sources of legitimacy are context specific. 
Much of the aid literature adopts what might be termed an empirical definition of state 
legitimacy, one that stresses a regime is legitimate when people believe that no other 
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authority would be superior, while avoiding venturing into the territory of what types of 
values and norms should underpin this belief (OECD, 2010, p. 15). Therefore, rather than 
there being a universal threshold of service access or coverage that can secure a state’s 
legitimacy, it is the alignment between citizens’ home-grown expectations of what the state 
should deliver and the state’s capacity to meet these expectations that matters for any 
legitimizing effects (Bellina et al. 2009; OECD 2008, 2011). This recognition that 
expectations matter goes some way towards contextualising the otherwise unqualified 
received wisdom that services can instrumentally improve legitimacy. 
Questioning the received wisdom 
The key propositions in the aid debate set out above find only limited support in wider 
academic theories and research on the origins of state legitimacy. At one level, the first 
obvious qualification to the received wisdom is that the role of performance in legitimacy is 
elsewhere nearly always understood as relative to other potential sources. Following Weber’s 
(Weber, 1984) seminal demarcation of ‘sources’ of legitimacy as traditional, charismatic, and 
legal-rational, classification systems have proliferated in both policy and academic literature. 
Some scholars separate geographic (territorial jurisdiction), constitutional (agreement on the 
formal rules for organizing power) and political legitimacy (the procedural fairness of 
elections) (Leftwich, 2008, pp. 136-138). For Lipset (1984), legitimacy derives from a 
combination of effectiveness, the organization of political power, and how societies have 
historically resolved divisive issues. While most classifications of sources of legitimacy 
include some element of performance or output, they assign different degrees of significance 
to performance relative to the other norms, qualities or actions of an actor or institution in the 
accumulation of legitimacy.  
The effects of performance on legitimacy may also be relative in a more temporal sense. 
Processes of legitimation can be thought of as the accrual of ‘goodwill’ or loyalty to the state, 
which varies at any given point in time. A reservoir of legitimacy arguably affords the state 
better prospects of riding out periods of poor performance, without eliciting the withdrawal of 
consent (Gibson, 2004, p. 289). From this perspective, whether or not a state’s performance 
on service provision affects its legitimacy may depend on the degree of legitimacy, or 
goodwill, it possessed in the first instance. Where a state has a resilient source of legitimacy 
outside of the provision of public services or need to satisfy expectations for service 
performance, public services may be less likely to weigh significantly on the state’s 
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legitimacy. While some maintain a chronic or acute breakdown in effectiveness would even 
endanger the stability of an otherwise highly legitimate state (Lipset 1984, p. 91), it is 
conceivable that at any given point in time, the status of the wider legitimacy reservoir and 
the significance of alternative sources of legitimacy are likely to affect the significance of 
performance for legitimacy.  
A final, broad-level qualification to the received wisdom is that whether or not performance 
matters for legitimacy may ultimately depend on who is doing the evaluating. In other words, 
there is a deeper question about whose views really count. Lipset (1984) argued that either a 
majority of the population, or the more powerful groups within it (e.g. military, business), 
must be satisfied that the basic functions of government are being performed in order for a 
state to be considered legitimate. Lake (2007, p. 13) counters that ‘the larger the proportion of 
the community that accepts its authority, the stronger the state’. Overall, states may face a 
choice between legitimacy via the majority, or legitimacy through special favour to powerful 
interest groups, at the expense of other groups who cannot so easily advocate for or 
politically manoeuvre this leverage (Rothstein, 2009). Since studies do not disaggregate 
citizens’ perceptions of the state’s performance along these lines, this group-level distinction 
is largely neglected empirically. In a rare exception, Carter’s (2011) research in South Africa 
observed how people’s perceptions of state legitimacy differed according to race, age, and 
gender, between urban and rural populations, and by their ‘lived experiences’ of apartheid. 
Through this albeit isolated study, attention is drawn to understanding the heterogeneity of 
evaluations of performance among different groups. It suggests that in practice, citizens’ 
perceptions of the state, and its performance, can rarely be aggregated. 
The theorised connections between performance and legitimacy – the so-called virtuous 
circle – are also questionable in more specific ways. As the introduction noted, one side of 
the virtuous circle posited in state-building models is fairly well established in the field; that 
is, the proposition that legitimacy enhances capacity by improving compliance with rules. An 
absence of or deficit in legitimacy can certainly incapacitate a state, precluding it from 
operating efficiently in the extraction of resources or implementation of its goals and public 
policies, including the provision of vital public services (vom Hau, 2011). Legitimacy is 
endogenous to performance in this sense. However, theories supporting the other side of the 
virtuous circle—that capacity necessarily enhances legitimacy—are typically more qualified. 
Situating service provision within a hierarchy of state functions, as an output of an effective 
state apparatus, aligns with what Lemay-Hébert (2009) identifies as the dominant institutional 
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approach to state-building - that is, one that views legitimacy as flowing automatically from 
functioning institutions. In this way, aid literature primarily portrays the role of service 
provision in state legitimacy as instrumental, based on material rewards. This instrumental 
account of how services produce legitimacy runs counter to prominent legitimacy theories, 
however. This includes that put forward by Lipset (1984, p. 88), who firmly argued material 
rewards and legitimacy are unrelated. This is because, as he puts it, ‘while effectiveness is 
primarily instrumental, legitimacy is evaluative’. Steffek (2003, p. 257) concurs that 
‘providing material advantages for citizens surely can help to secure acceptance of rule but it 
will hardly create the ‘prestige of being considered binding’. Both of these propositions 
question whether legitimacy can be based on the material benefits that citizens enjoy, and 
counter that satisfying material interests is not equivalent to normative acceptance of the 
state’s right to rule. These theories likewise challenge the institutional proposal that service 
provision can be a basis for legitimacy merely because it may improve people’s health and 
wellbeing.  
Directly contrasting this, other scholars have argued the state’s performance in the so-called 
‘output’ domain, of which service provision is only one (albeit ubiquitous) category, is the 
primary source of its legitimacy, precisely because of the material improvements it brings. 
Meeting basic needs is the essence of output legitimacy, which, according to Scharpf (1999), 
means ‘government for the people’ that addresses common problems and social concerns. 
Indeed, a recent return to this output domain has grown out of disillusionment with the failure 
of the input domain, ostensibly democratic institutions and processes, to legitimise states 
(Pierre, Røiseland, & Gustavsen, 2011). Positioned clearly in this camp, Rothstein (2011) 
makes the case for the quality of the state’s outputs as the primary source of its legitimacy, on 
the basis that how the state exercises power has a more immediate and tangible impact on 
people’s welfare than how the state acquired it. Others concur that the fulfilment of 
wellbeing, including security and justice, constitutes the primary pathway via which the state 
can earn the right to rule (Holsti, 1996, p. 91). Indeed, according to Leftwich (2008, p. 166), 
the puzzle of the seemingly high legitimacy of repressive but developmental states can only 
be explained by their capacity to distribute the benefits of economic growth, including 
through the provision of basic goods and services. In this reading, the contribution of service 
provision to state legitimacy is primarily via the material rewards that services bring, in terms 
of enhancing citizens’ welfare and opportunities for betterment. 
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Renewed attention to the output domain as a source of state legitimacy also finds empirical 
support in the literature that has proliferated around the ‘local turn’
14
 in peace building 
(MacGinty & Richmond, 2013). Studies of the local attitudes and priorities of conflict-
affected people have concluded that the degree to which the state meets citizens’ everyday 
needs is an important component of their subjective assessment of it. In his ethnographic 
study in Nepal and Timor-Leste, Robins (2012, p. 4), for example, argues that conflict-
affected, vulnerable and marginalized populations who are often deprived of basic services 
often prioritise their restoration. On that point, survey data from Southern Sudan established a 
clear hierarchy of expectations: access to clean water, education, and health (D. Roberts, 
2012). In response to these and other findings, scholars have argued that addressing the 
everyday needs of people in conflict situations is more likely to kick-start a meaningful social 
contract than political institution-building. Roberts (2011, p. 418) for example, asserts that 
‘because it is the population at large that offers or withholds state legitimacy, it is towards 
their needs that the balance of provision must evolve’. In this way, meeting social demand for 
basic services is considered an important source of everyday legitimacy and the lynchpin of 
bottom-up state-building. 
The idea that state services are a visible manifestation of the social contract resonates through 
sociological work that positions service bureaucracy as the primary site where citizens are 
likely to encounter, and therefore subjectively judge, the state. Corbridge’s (2005) seminal 
account of ‘seeing the state’ in India is a widely cited case in point. He argues local services 
provide an opportunity for sightings of the state, and it is through these that people’s 
expectations and interpretations of their broader rights and obligations with regard to the state 
are formed (ibid). Others likewise see the state as meaningful to ordinary citizens when it is 
visible in localized practices (Gupta, 1995). In the hierarchy of political goods, services are 
meaningful for state–society relations because they give content to the otherwise intangible 
social contract between ruler and ruled (Rotberg, 2004, pp. 2-3). Expressed differently, they 
are ‘the glue that binds state and society together’ (Milliken & Krause, 2002, p. 761). From 
this perspective, positive encounters with frontline service officials might feasibly be a source 
of legitimacy for the state, particularly in fragile and conflict-affected situations where the 
state was previously mistrusted, or outright feared (Brinkerhoff et al., 2012, p. 279). These 
                                                          
14
 Marked by a renewed interest in the local aspects of conflict and reconstruction, including the everyday realities, priorities 
and needs of conflict-affected communities. 
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studies support the idea proposed in the received wisdom that the provision of vital public 
services is often considered a physical expression of a social contract. 
Sociological accounts of state legitimacy, which have their origins in social contract theories 
of the state, emphasize not only the material rewards provided by service delivery but also its 
relational role in reinforcing the mutual inter-dependence between state and society. 
According to Levi et al (2009, p. 358), it is intuitive that compliance (a marker of legitimacy) 
should increase where citizens perceive their government is upholding a social contract by 
putting resources into delivering social services. Indeed, legitimacy is considered central to 
the formation of a social contract because, as Coicard (2002) argues, it establishes an accord 
between rulers and ruled, the latter of which accepts an unequal distribution of power in 
return for the assurance of the survival of the group. This is similar to Lake’s (2007, p. 2) 
conceptualization, in which legitimacy fundamentally derives from an exchange between 
‘extractions’ (taxation) and ‘constraints’ (laws that solicit compliance). However, as a caveat, 
Holsti (1996) emphasizes that state legitimacy may depend on the state achieving an 
appropriate balance between extractions and rewards, implying there is also a need for 
reciprocity and shared rules. This also finds support in Migdal’s (2001, p. 6) ‘state in society’ 
approach, in which he argues that ‘societies are not, and cannot be bound only through 
material and instrumental relations’ but also require ‘relational glue’ in the form of common 
rules and meanings. Together, these more relational interpretations position material rewards 
as important for social contract formation, while also emphasising that a social contract is 
itself not entirely instrumental, but embodies rules of reciprocity and exchange. 
More broadly then, the emphasis on service provision as material expression of the social 
contract and the physical space where citizen-state encounters occur potentially neglects the 
possibility that service provision could also be significant for state-society relations because it 
can express the norms and rules that govern the state. Pigeon-holing service provision in the 
discrete category of performance legitimacy, and neutralising it as a matter of bureaucratic 
capacity, underestimates the degree to which services might also conceivably act as a conduit 
for what Gupta (1995) calls the ‘main myths and symbols’ of the state. Empirically, this 
normative role has been demonstrated in respect to health systems, which ‘intentionally or 
not’ may communicate the core values of the state to users, particularly its commitment to 
equity, transparency and accountability (Kruk, Freedman, Anglin, & Waldman, 2010, p. 94). 
Though this is only one isolated example, it indicates that service provision can be viewed as 
more than a question of the state’s tangible functions and outputs, but also, to adopt a 
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sociological perspective, a formative component of what Holsti calls the ‘idea of the state’ 
(1996, p. 83). As argued in the Introduction, state legitimacy - the right to rule – entails more 
than the accrual of physical power. From this perspective, the received wisdom, which 
supposes the influence of services on legitimacy to improvements is via instrumental 
outcomes, appears narrow and reductionist. 
This potential for normative and ideational connections between service provision and state 
legitimacy arguably sits more comfortably with legitimacy theory than a purely interest-based 
or material theorisation. One of the central tenets of legitimacy theory, and what sets it apart 
from rational-choice theories, is that it seeks explanations for thought and behaviour that go 
beyond actors’ interests and preferences (Kelman, 2001)
15
. Rather, the concept of legitimacy 
incorporates an alternative range of social motivations arising from rights, beliefs and 
obligations (ibid). A legitimate institution has to deliver not only what is personally 
beneficial, but what people think is right (Tyler, 2000; T. Tyler, 2011). This opens up the 
possibility that the state’s legitimacy may derive not only from what it does or delivers, but 
from what it is and its deeper meaning to people (Gilley, 2009). Indeed, service provision 
itself is never an entirely instrumental undertaking. It is always driven by and designed to 
satisfy normative criteria derived from conceptions of needs, rights, or entitlements 
(Beetham, 1991). Recognising this, Gilley (2009, p. 75) models the relationship between state 
performance and state legitimacy in a way that combines both its instrumental and normative 
properties. In his model, citizens have to make connections between their fundamental values 
and their positive socio-psychological conditions (e.g. wellbeing, happiness) in order for 
performance to become significant for legitimacy. This incorporation of both the material and 
non-material mechanisms of influence arguably has a have firmer basis in theories of state 
legitimacy.  
The non-linear relationship between services and state legitimacy 
Empirical studies that rigorously interrogate the underpinnings of the received wisdom that 
services enhance state legitimacy remain scant, particularly in fragile and conflict-affected 
states (Brinkerhoff et al., 2012). In part, these limitations reflect the methodological 
challenges inherent in studying legitimacy (discussed further in Chapter III).  
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 Kelman (2001, p. 56) captures this in the following statement: ‘The concept of legitimacy reminds us that there are 
significant aspects of social behaviour, and indeed of social structure, that are determined not so much by interests and 
preferences as by rights and obligations’. 
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To date, research on the determinants of state legitimacy has broadly segmented between a 
group of scholars seeking to uncover its universal correlates and others who maintain that 
legitimacy is more intuitively understood by observing the texture of citizen–state relations at 
the micro level. In other words, legitimacy has been mainly studied from above and below. 
The methodological hallmark of the former approach – from above - has been large-scale, 
quantitative studies that measure correlations between markers of legitimacy and aggregate 
measures of state performance. Opinion surveys have been the dominant methodological tool 
used for studying, or rather ‘measuring’, legitimacy. Examples abound of research that uses 
cross-country, individual-level survey data to examine links between the legitimacy of the 
state and a range of indicators of institutional effectiveness.
16
 However, in quantitative, cross 
country studies, it is often difficult to isolate the specific effects of service provision (health, 
education, water) on state legitimacy independent from a larger set of indicators of 
socioeconomic development. For example, in his analysis of data from 72 countries, Gilley 
(2006, p. 48) concluded that combined indicators of welfare gains, good governance and 
democratic rights, were together ‘important correlates, and probably causes, of legitimacy’.
17
 
While these types of cross-country surveys make important advances in determining which 
ingredients may generate state legitimacy, they are less effective at describing the particular 
transformative effects of each of the individual ingredients, or explaining why they are more 
or less significant across different social settings. 
Overall, the findings from quantitative studies present a mixed picture of the significance of 
service provision for state legitimacy. A recent major DFID-funded study involving surveys 
across five conflict-affected countries found no statistically significant correlation between 
perceptions of the state and access to services (Mallett, Hagen-Zanker, Slater, & Sturge, 
2015). Specifically, baseline data showed that simple measures of access (i.e. distance) to 
services were only weakly correlated with perceptions of government (ibid).
18
 In the same 
way, other surveys have found that satisfaction with government performance, and peaks and 
troughs in material conditions alone, may not necessarily produce greater legitimacy (Sacks, 
2011). Other studies using combined indicators have concluded that service provision does 
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(Seligson, 2002); economic performance (Yun-han Chu, 2008); inputs versus outputs (Lindgren & Persson, 2010); 
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17Gilley (2006, p. 50-51) identifies 34 potential sources of legitimacy including in the socio-economic sphere alone: personal 
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improve state legitimacy, although the relationship may be indirect, mediated by very general 
markers of wellbeing, such as food security (Sacks et al, 2009).  
While quantitative studies may suggest not much more than an indirect relationship between 
‘performance’ writ large and state legitimacy, they invariably conclude more research is 
needed to examine the causal mechanisms that underlie any correlations they find. In part, 
this limitation has its origins in the time-restricted nature of some survey-based research 
designs. For example, Fisk and Cherney’s (2016) survey in post-conflict Nepal compared 
outcome-based versus procedural sources of institutional legitimacy, finding that in post-
conflict Nepal people primarily evaluate institutional legitimacy on the basis of the fairness 
of decision-making and the quality of treatment
19
. However, as the authors themselves note, 
this type of cross-sectional survey is weakened because it cannot track changes in legitimacy 
relative to changes in either procedural justice or service provision over time, which could 
give a more dynamic reading of the relationship between them. Furthermore, where survey 
findings are not situated in temporal political or historical context, they cannot account for 
why certain aspects of performance may have been more or less politically salient and more 
significant for legitimacy at any given point in time. For these reasons, snapshot surveys 
measuring correlations between indicators cannot alone give a full account of why services 
might matter for legitimacy, or what contextual factors might influence any causal 
relationship between them.  
Qualitative approaches are relatively less developed in the field of legitimacy research in 
general, and in research on services and legitimacy in particular. Nevertheless, a small body 
of case studies and mixed methods research indicates that the relationship between a state’s 
performance in service provision on the one hand, and its degree of legitimacy on the other, is 
not linear in the way that some aid literature suggests. In practice, a number of factors 
interrupt any direct, causal relationship between them. Specifically, this relationship is likely 
to be conditioned by shifting expectations of what the state should provide, subjective 
assessments of impartiality and distributive justice, the relational aspects of provision, how 
easy it is to attribute (credit or blame) performance to the state, and the technical and political 
characteristics of the service. Albeit indicative, these findings support the proposition that 
legitimacy is essentially socially constructed (Coicaud 2002; Holsti 1996). As illustrated 
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 Fisk and Cherney (2016) measure procedural fairness through survey questions about respectful treatment, voice and 
neutrality. Distributive justice was measured through questions about whether certain castes or income groups received 
better services than others. 
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below, they suggest the significance of service provision for state legitimacy depends at least 
partly on the locally determined normative criteria by which services are individually and 
collectively judged. 
Shifting expectations 
Citizens’ expectations of what the state should provide appear to interrupt any 
straightforward relationship between objective service outputs and legitimacy gains. 
Highlighting the subjectivity of these expectations, Sacks’ (2011) quantitative study across 
Africa, Latin America, and Asia finds weak correlations between objective measures of 
provision (e.g., the mere presence of facilities) and citizens’ satisfaction with services. In this 
case, citizens’ assessment of performance appeared to depend instead on perceptions of how 
well government was ‘trying’ to improve them. Recent Afrobarometer public opinion survey 
data similarly indicate the mere presence of physical infrastructure is not significant in 
shaping popular views about government performance (Asunka, 2013). Rather, the quality of 
the experience (waiting times, availability of materials such as drugs/textbooks) and the 
accessibility of the service (capacity to pay fees, payment of bribes) are key (Asunka 2013). 
Indeed, perceptible improvements in performance may be more significant than absolute or 
verifiable measures of performance for legitimacy. In his study in Medellin, Colombia, 
Guerrero (2011) finds that a quick upgrading of basic services (infrastructure, health, 
education) in the city’s less favoured districts improved political support for and trust in 
government. Rapid improvements generated greater legitimizing returns than slower, less 
perceptible progress. Collectively, these studies indicate that subjective interpretations of 
quality and effort (rather than objective measures of them) are significant for the relationship 
between service provision and state legitimacy. 
Aligning citizens’ expectations with state capacity, seen as the catalyst for legitimizing 
effects in aid debates, is unlikely to be straightforward in practice. Particularly in fragile and 
conflict-affected states, citizens’ expectations may be low, or non-existent. In the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, researchers identified what they termed a ‘legitimacy threshold,’ 
characterized by very low expectations of the state, and citizens’ aversion to its intrusion into 
their everyday lives (Stel et al., 2012). The study concluded that to improve state legitimacy, 
expectations had to first be ‘stimulated,’ through an initial show of performance (ibid). In 
contrast, citizens might in some cases have high expectations of services, and even be willing 
to pay for improvements, where they cite very low levels of satisfaction with them. This 
finding is made by Brinkerhoff and colleagues (2012) in Iraq, where satisfaction with water 
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services did not correspond with reported levels of trust in the state. These contrasting 
findings—between an absence of any services and an aversion to the state, and poor services 
that have no direct relationship with levels of trust in the state—illustrate context specificity. 
They also signal that a foundational level of services may first need to be established before 
subsequent improvements are likely to affect citizens’ belief in the rightfulness of the state. 
The dilemma is that particularly in post conflict situations, stimulating expectations may have 
to be balanced with the well-known risk of raising expectations above what is feasible, with 
potential negative implications for legitimacy if those expectations are not met (Brinkerhoff 
et al., 2012). 
Expectations have also been shown to shift over time. Recent multi-country research in 
Nepal, Rwanda, and South Sudan indicates that in some fragile and conflict-affected states 
where services are poor or non-existent, expectations can quickly graduate from initial 
concerns over access, to include concerns over quality and cost (Ndaruhutse, 2012). 
Furthermore, there may be a ‘tipping point’ in the legitimating returns from provision, once 
expectations are met. This was recently found in Colombia where, as service provision 
expanded, citizens’ level of satisfaction diminished, partly because once desired 
improvements in one location were achieved, attention quickly turned to another area where 
performance was lagging (Guerrero, 2011). In this case, the relationship between 
improvements in service provision and enhanced state legitimacy appeared U-shaped; an 
initial flurry of trust-generating effects faded over time as citizens came to take service 
provision for granted. These findings nuance the idea that it is the alignment of expectations 
and capacity that produce legitimating effects. They remind us that even where services are 
provided to the full extent of state capacity, expectations may still not be met. Just as 
expectations are something of a moving target for the state, the effects of meeting them on 
state legitimacy may likewise be fleeting. 
Perceptions of impartiality and distributive justice 
Others have argued that certain normative characteristics of performance colour citizens’ 
evaluations of the state, affecting the degree to which services are likely to improve state 
legitimacy. Prominent among these is the issue of perceptions of equity in the distribution of 
services (Ndaruhutse, 2012). Distributive justice implies the costs and advantages of a given 
system for distribution are shared equitably between individuals or groups (Weatherford, 
1992, p. 150). Wang (2003) argues the redistribution of resources among different social 
groups is one of the essential criteria for an effective state, and one that in turn enables it to 
40 
 
maintain its legitimacy. Particularly in post conflict contexts where horizontal inequalities 
prevail, a redistribution of services may therefore be important for (re-)legitimising the state 
among excluded groups, including those alienated through a period of conflict. However, this 
is likely to be a careful, political, balancing act. Citing the case of Iraq, Brinkerhoff, 
Wetterberg, and Dunn (2012) note that the redistribution of services to previously excluded 
groups in the post-war period diminished the state’s overall legitimacy gains. This illustrates 
that understandings of distributive justice are context specific, and that therefore its 
relationship with legitimacy may not be guaranteed. 
In some cases, the degree to which service provision is perceived as procedurally fair has 
been shown to be significant in determining citizens’ view of the state’s legitimacy. In his 
widely cited research, Rothstein (2009) makes the case that because basic service provision 
devolves significant discretion to low level public officials, the impartiality with which 
services are implemented on the ground is of acute significance for political legitimacy. His 
work empirically demonstrates that in developed states, greater impartiality in the exercise of 
state power—including through service provision—is positively associated with higher levels 
of trust in government (Rothstein, 2009). Other studies concur that whether or not services 
are operated through open and transparent practices may be seen as a tangible marker of the 
state’s broader commitment to accountability (Ndaruhutse, 2012). At a minimum, in order to 
solicit citizens’ trust and approval, officials (e.g., teachers, nurses) may need to treat the 
individuals with whom they interact in a dignified manner (Sacks 2011). In this way, 
perceptions of procedural predictability and fairness may mediate the services-legitimacy 
relationship. 
Empirical findings about the importance of procedural fairness are in line with one of the 
central tenets of legitimacy theory. That is, the perceived fairness of the process through 
which authorities and institutions make decisions and exercise authority is a key aspect of 
people’s willingness to comply with it (Tyler 2006). A significant body of research has 
shown that people are more likely to view procedures as fair when they have an opportunity 
to participate, when they consider authorities to be neutral and following impartial and 
objective rules for decision-making, when they trust the motives of those authorities, and 
when they are treated with dignity and respect by authorities (Tyler, 2006, 2010; T. Tyler, 
2011). In addition, there is evidence that people may be more likely to accept unfavourable 
outcomes where those decisions are arrived at through fair procedures (Tyler, 2006). On the 
other hand, Blundo and de Sardan’s (2006, p. 101) attention to the ‘real functioning’ of public 
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services illustrates that corrupt practices - what might be ostensibly evaluated by outsiders as 
‘unfair’ or procedurally irregular - are not necessarily a source of illegitimacy. That is 
because rules and procedures that may appear dysfunctional from a legal perspective may be 
regulated and indeed legitimated through hidden social and cultural logics (ibid). Overall, 
these contrasting findings suggest that while procedural fairness may be significant for 
mediating any link between service provision and legitimacy beliefs, it is best read in the 
context of local rather than universal norms. 
Relational aspects of provision 
How services are organized and managed at the point of provision could also condition their 
(potential) effects on state legitimacy. Cross-country case study research looking specifically 
at multi-stakeholder processes for service provision
20
 concluded it was mainly the 
relationships formed through them that were significant for citizens’ perceptions of the state 
(Stel et al., 2012). In particular, these processes created space for civil society organizations 
to articulate citizens’ demands, and to directly engage with government agencies. They 
presented opportunities to build bridges between the state and social groups (Stel et al. 2012). 
In other isolated cases, co-production has played a formative role in generating positive 
evaluations of the state on the part of citizens. Ethnographic research from China reveals that 
state officials themselves understand the potential legitimizing returns from visible processes 
of coproduction. Tsai  (2011) finds that local state bureaucrats viewed collaboration with 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and local communities to implement local 
infrastructure services as a means of soliciting citizens’ trust in them. Moreover, some 
officials believed collaboration would enhance their capacity to elicit greater overall levels of 
citizen compliance with state policies. Interestingly, it was not the overall increase in outputs 
from services that bureaucrats saw as important for enhancing perceptions of the state’s 
authority, but the co-productive means through which they were delivered. This micro level 
insight into the social contract being ‘articulated’ through service provision highlights that 
services can bring citizens and states together not in a simple supply-and-demand transaction, 
but also in a co-productive one. It recalls the argument that in order to support their 
legitimacy, states require not just productive but also relational capacity (Robinson, 2008; 
Stel et al., 2012). If the relational aspects of provision matter for citizens’ evaluations of the 
state, they may also mediate any link with legitimacy perceptions. 
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 Multi-stakeholder processes entail organisational collaboration or co-ordination between the state, service delivery 
organisations, and/or community groups. This is synonymous with the idea of ‘co-production’. 
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Who is perceived to be delivering a particular service might also influence whether or not the 
state accrues legitimacy from services, though perhaps not in a straightforward way. The 
dominant position in aid policy has been that parallel (non-state) service provision structures 
undermine state legitimacy because they reduce the state’s visibility as provider (Bellina et 
al., 2009). There is some supporting evidence of this from Zambia, where citizens who 
(rightly or wrongly) credited nonstate providers with service provision were found to be 
significantly less likely to have confidence in their government, or to comply with taxes and 
regulations (Sacks 2009). The counter view, however, is that whether or not nonstate service 
provision affects people’s perceptions of the state logically depends on whether people 
expected the state to deliver services directly in the first place (Batley & Mcloughlin, 2015). 
Stel (2014) makes this point in reference to perceptions of service provision in Burundi, 
noting that because people did not expect the state to be involved at the point of provision, 
they were not disappointed when it was not. Indeed, in fragile and conflict-affected situations 
where the state may have been repressive, citizens may not trust the state to deliver services, 
let alone expect it to (Brinkerhoff, Wetterberg, and Dunn 2012). These findings suggest there 
is no universally applicable rule that non-state provision undermines state legitimacy. They 
indicate attention might more usefully be turned to whether forms of provision are seen as 
normatively appropriate for populations, as has been found recently in the case of 
international non-state provision of basic services in areas of limited statehood (S. D. Krasner 
& Risse, 2014). 
Attribution 
Processes of attribution—specifically, how easy it is for people to credit or blame the state for 
the provision of services—may also interrupt any linear causal relationship between service 
provision and state legitimacy. Research has shown that to whom people attribute service 
performance does not always reflect who is actually delivering them in practice. Sacks 
(2009), for example, found that citizens were incorrectly attributing government services to 
non-state actors where multiple other actors (NGOs, churches, and donors) were also 
providing services in the local area. Like others, she argues attribution is primarily a product 
of visibility. In this particular instance, nonstate actors were more effective at branding 
themselves than government (Sacks 2009). Mindful of this potential for misattribution, 
policymakers have called for measures to increase the visibility of the state’s role at the point 
of provision by reducing donor and NGO branding (Teskey, 2012).  
43 
 
Some research indicates that even where the state is not the frontline provider of services, 
citizens are not blind to the less visible, indirect roles it may be playing in the background. 
These can include oversight, regulation, and facilitation. Focus groups have found that 
citizens are aware of, and can evaluate, the indirect role of the state in service provision even 
when it is not the direct delivery organisation (Stel et al. 2012). In Ethiopia, even where 
citizens attributed service provision to non-state actors, they also understood that government 
agencies were likely to be involved in the service design process and, moreover, they could 
differentiate between the quality of the service being provided and the degree to which the 
state was fulfilling its indirect, regulatory responsibilities (Mandefro, 2012). Overall, these 
findings collectively draw attention to understanding how citizens are informed about the 
particular role of the state in provision, whether it is the direct deliverer or not, as significant 
for the potential legitimising effects of services. Crucially, performance may not necessarily 
have to be seen to be heard. Citizens can evaluate the state without seeing it in action. 
How services are attributed to different levels of the state may also be significant for any 
legitimising effects. Isolated studies indicate that improved service outcomes at the local 
level can enhance perceptions of the legitimacy of those agencies directly responsible for 
them. However, there is a paucity of studies that can illustrate how this ‘scales up,’ to affect 
overall perceptions of state legitimacy. Indeed, particularly in patron–client environments, 
reciprocity and exchange may be important aspects of the legitimation of power mainly at the 
micro level, where brokering access to services can serve an important relational function 
between citizens and elites (Chabal & Daloz, 1999). Indeed, the personalised exchange of 
services and favours between individuals and local officials may actually undermine wider 
state legitimacy (Stel et al. 2012). This serves to illustrate that the state is not a ‘coherent, 
integrated, and goal-oriented body’ (Migdal 2001, p. 12) and for the same reason, the 
relationship between service provision and state legitimacy is likely to be multi-layered and 
multifaceted. Bukenya’s (2013) research on health and legitimacy in Uganda finds exactly 
that. He concluded that while good performance improved perceptions of the legitimacy of 
local health clinics, these perceptions were dislocated from and did not automatically 
improve perceptions of the central state. In this way, a link between evaluations of local 
agencies involved in service provision and aggregate perceptions of the broader institutions 
of the state cannot be assumed. At a minimum, therefore, it may be pertinent to consider 
which level of government (if any) people view as responsible for different services, and 
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therefore where they are likely to assign credit (or blame) for more or less effective 
performance (Brinkerhoff et al., 2012). 
Sector characteristics 
The technical and political characteristics of services may also affect their potential as a 
source of state legitimacy. It seems logical that performance has to be seen, experienced, and 
appreciated in order for it to translate into legitimating beliefs. However, it also follows that 
different services offer different opportunities, and ease, for being seen and evaluated. In 
particular, the different degree of visibility and information asymmetry associated with 
different services may affect how easy it is for citizens to assign credit or blame for them to 
the state or other local agencies (Mcloughlin, 2014). In support of this, Guerrero (2011) 
found that services have a greater effect on trust and legitimating beliefs when they are both 
critical (salient) and highly visible to the public. Moreover, his study suggests those that are 
easily measureable (‘as easy as turning the lights or the tap on’) and are experienced 
homogenously by a community in a geographically contained area, are more capable of 
influencing levels of trust in the state than those that are highly heterogeneous, or 
experienced differently by different citizens (e.g., individual encounters with doctors). 
Likewise, to the degree that citizens’ capacity to evaluate the quality of public services 
depends on the degree of information they have about them (Jilke, 2013), then levels of 
information asymmetry may condition the legitimizing effects of performance (Batley & 
Mcloughlin, 2015). As Sacks (2011, p. 5) notes, available information about service quality 
determines whether citizens can make objective assessments of performance, or whether 
instead they rely on subjective accounts.
21
 On the basis of ease of attribution alone, the 
relationship between service provision and state legitimacy is unlikely to be uniform across 
service sectors. 
There are also normative reasons why particular services may be more or less significant for 
state legitimacy in any given context. As noted above, Kruk et al. (2010, p. 91) afford health 
special status because it is universally seen as a ‘super-ordinate value,’ prized irrespective of 
ideology or political affiliation. In her statistical analysis of cross-country public opinion 
data, Sacks (2011) also finds that basic health services potentially have a greater overall 
effect on the approval of the incumbent government, compared to water and sanitation 
services, because of the acute significance of health for people’s daily lives. Education is 
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sometimes singled out as the service most capable of generating ‘social trust’, particularly 
where it can convey shared values of equality and identity or bring young people from 
different ethnic, religious, and social groups together (Rothstein 2011, p. 163). Provision of 
certain services can also reflect historical moves by ruling elites to bring key social groups 
into a social contract and tie them to the state (Mcloughlin, 2014). For example, food security 
has become intimately bound up with the legitimacy (indeed, survival) of regimes in Malawi 
whose political power base was historically concentrated in the densely populated and food 
insecure south of the country. Underlying this is an implicit social contract that government 
will provide citizens with agricultural inputs as a social safety net in times of need (ibid). 
Together, these findings illustrate there is no universal hierarchy of services that are more or 
less significant for state legitimacy. Indeed, the potential for service provision to enhance 
state legitimacy depends on the normative value of different services in specific contexts. 
That significance may not be uniform across groups, space or time, and could be historically 
contingent. 
From virtuous to vicious circles 
While empirical research has begun to qualify the idea of a virtuous circle whereby 
performance enhances legitimacy and legitimacy enhances performance, the reverse 
proposition – that underperforming public services might undermine a state’s right to rule, 
producing vicious rather than virtuous circles – remains relatively neglected. This neglect is 
unsurprising in a policy-oriented field of research that has been primarily concerned with 
identifying, more specifically quantifying, the (positive) effects of external aid to service 
provision on building peace and stability. Nevertheless, the reality in fragile and conflict-
affected states and low capacity environments can look very different to the picture presented 
in state-building models. Service provision in these situations is often beset by weak political 
commitment, group-based exclusion, perceptions of procedural unfairness and minimal or 
exclusive social contracts (Baird, 2010). Empirically then, the driving concern with virtuous 
circles appears far removed from reality. Moreover, it raises the possibility that in such 
contexts, ineffective performance and contested legitimacy are locked into a vicious rather 
than virtuous circle.  
It is not difficult to foresee how a vicious circle of weak state legitimacy and poor services 
might take hold in conflict affected contexts and divided societies. To begin with, a virtuous 
circle may be unlikely to get going where the state is absent, predatory, or unwilling to 
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provide for the basic needs of its citizens. In the same way that social contracts can support 
the provision of specific services to certain groups, they may also theoretically underpin the 
exclusion of marginalised or minority groups from access to vital services. Groups may be 
especially vulnerable to exclusion from access to state resources if the size or power of the 
constituency of support they represent is not requisite for the state to maintain its own power 
and control (North, Wallis, Webb & Weingast, 2007). Exclusion can also have a self-
reinforcing property. This is illustrated in a recent case study from Sudan, which found that 
poor service access may create mistrust, which in turn reduces incentives for politicians to be 
accountable to those communities, which in turn reproduces their exclusion from services 
(Hamilton & Svensson, 2014). The absence of any meaningful social contract between the 
state and marginalised groups can be exacerbated, more practically, by low population 
density, which makes it challenging for the state to create a meaningful bureaucratic presence 
(Wee, Lendorfer, Bleck, & Yaiche, 2014).  
Perceptions of injustice and unfairness in access to vital services can become pervasive in 
divided societies and conflict settings, and are often accompanied by popular disillusionment 
with and detachment from the state (Alexandre, Willman, Aslam, & Rebosio, 2012). When a 
group is excluded from access to services or access to power, services are evaluated in a 
context of wider mistrust and exclusion (Levi, Sacks & Tyler, 2009). Indeed, exclusion from 
access to vital life-saving goods and services can be taken as a clear signal of state neglect 
and remains a key source of everyday grievance in conflict-affected communities (Bleck & 
Michelitch, 2015). Moreover, perceived marginalisation from services can become a major 
source of discontent with the state even where there is no objective inequality in human 
development outcomes. In northern Mali, for example, perceptions of marginalisation among 
underserved populations undermine perceptions of the legitimacy of the state, independent of 
actual measures (Wee et al., 2014). These perceptions arise out of historic grievances and 
continue to fuel cycles of alienation, low legitimacy, and instability (ibid). In turn, the state 
may need to expend more energy responding to grievances and opposition generated by 
exclusion from services through coercive measures. In this way, a vicious circle of weak 
legitimacy, poor performance and non-compliance can become self-reinforcing. 
If services can improve legitimacy when certain subjective and normative criteria such as 
those identified in the previous section are met, it follows that they might also undermine 
legitimacy when those criteria are not met, or outright violated. A perception of, or actual, 
violation of norms and expectations for service provision could in theory exacerbate, and 
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perhaps even catalyse, processes of state de-legitimation. State-building scholars have argued 
that where services consistently favour certain social groups to the perceived detriment of 
others, the implicit bargain on which the social contract rests becomes brittle, and propensity 
to rebellion increases (Holsti, 1996). Indeed, there is some limited, potted evidence of this. In 
Lebanon, for example, deteriorations in service provision at the municipal level following the 
massive influx of Syrian refugees, and concerns over the equity of distribution in light of the 
associated strain on resources, is driving rising social tensions and deteriorations in 
legitimacy (Rocha Menocal, Perera, & Mcloughlin, 2016). Uneven allocations to local 
municipal governments (especially the bypassing of Hezbollah authorities) fuelled by 
perceptions of uneven or biased support has also helped perpetuate instability (Rocha 
Menocal et al., 2016). This has also been demonstrated in South Africa, where recent service 
delivery protests have been partly motivated by perceived structural inequality in access to 
basic services, with the poorest groups in society faring the worst (Alexander, 2010, p. 9). 
Likewise, qualitative research in Liberia, Nepal, and Colombia found that unequal or 
exclusionary access to public goods was detrimental to citizens’ views of the state’s 
rightfulness (Dix, Hussmann, & Walton, 2012). This indicates that perceptions of distributive 
injustice may undermine legitimacy.  
In the same way, there is also some basis for assuming that perceptions of procedural 
injustice may also undermine legitimacy. Surveys across democracies in Latin America 
suggest the norm of corruption has a corrosive effect on legitimacy and can increase support 
for coups d’etat (Booth & Seligson, 2009). The primary reason given for this is that 
corruption undermines citizens’ perceptions of impartiality (Seligson, 2002). Yet here again, 
as noted above, the idea of norms violations may not be clear cut: and universal ideas cannot 
be transplanted into different contexts. The picture painted in Dix et al’s (2012) research in 
Liberia, Nepal and Colombia is more nuanced. It suggests corruption only undermines 
legitimacy when it is used to violently eliminate opponents, or where the benefits are not 
distributed ‘fairly’ between groups. Moreover, certain forms of patronage, such as access to 
state employment, are expected and appreciated and therefore legitimising at the local level 
(ibid). In this way, both norms and their violations appear context dependent. 
As with the critique of the virtuous circle raised above, it is difficult to see how instrumental 
improvements alone at least over the short term could address broken (or non-existent) social 
contracts, plug legitimacy deficits, and break a vicious circle of poor service provision and 
weak legitimacy. Quantitative improvements in service provision may fail to address deeply 
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ingrained legitimacy deficits in the aftermath of conflict, even when those services bring 
tangible improvements to well-being (Krampe, 2016). After the civil war in Nepal, 
marginalised rural communities saw significant improvements in electricity following the 
building of hydropower stations (Krampe, 2016). Yet these communities remained distrusting 
of the state in the face of these improvements. Indeed, they strengthened community 
autonomy and improved perceptions of local authority figures but not of the state (ibid). In 
other cases, the negative effects are more pronounced. In a context of long-term state neglect, 
incursions by the state into neglected or contested territories through the provision of services 
can be actively resisted, and may inadvertently strengthen existing, alternative authority 
structures that are oppositional to the state. In Myanmar’s contested regions, researchers 
found that sudden increases in government services were received as attempts at domination 
and incursion, especially where these regions held long-term aspirations for greater local 
autonomy (Joliffe, 2014). One of the key contributions of these empirical insights is to 
implicate politics in the production of a vicious circle, as discussed further below. 
Politics as the missing link? 
Whether the circle is virtuous or vicious, the relationship between public services and state 
legitimacy is sometimes analysed independently from the prevailing political context in 
which those services are delivered and evaluated – particularly in the case of cross-country 
surveys. At the same time as often omitting political contextualisation from the analysis, 
research strongly indicates, somewhat paradoxically, that the connections between services 
and state legitimacy are indeed conditioned by the political environment. For example, while 
measures of service access and perceptions of government did not correlate in the cross-
country DFID-funded survey, knowledge of the presence of a grievance mechanism, or 
knowledge of or participation in a service-related meeting did positively correlate with 
improved perceptions of the state (Mallet et al. 2015). In South Africa, growing satisfaction 
with services has actually corresponded with a rising number of service provision protests. 
This has been partly attributed to a political problem of unmet election promises (Akinboade, 
Putuma Mokwena, & Kinfack, 2013). In this way, a deeper explanation of survey findings – 
especially apparently contradictory ones - often lies in political history, processes and 
relationships, while at the same time politics hardly ever guides research design. Politics is, in 




The de-politicisation of research on the services-legitimacy relationship is especially curious 
given the fundamentally political origins of legitimacy. Legitimacy has achieved a central 
role in the study of politics precisely because it addresses how actors or institutions accrue 
and maintain power. Studying legitimacy brings us to the heart of understanding the 
circumstances under which the use of power is willingly, as opposed to coercively, accepted 
(Gilley, 2009). It draws attention to the normative foundation of any accord between rulers 
and ruled, or dominant and subordinate, as a basis for addressing the fundamental question of 
why unequal power relations are ever accepted by subordinate groups, and what they might 
expect in return (Coicaud, 2002). Indeed, legitimacy actually confers power (Zaum, 2013). 
For these reasons, legitimacy has been termed ‘the central issue in social and political theory’ 
(Beetham, 1991, p. 41) and ‘the master question of politics’ (Crick, 1993, p. 150). From this 
perspective, studies of correlations between indicators seem detached from the political 
origins of the very concept under scrutiny. 
One consequence of the de-politicisation of research on services and legitimacy is that it 
overlooks the possibility that the state itself - the object of legitimation in one form or another 
– is likely to be one of the primary actors orchestrating its own legitimation. Indeed, 
prominent theorists have argued that if legitimacy is fundamentally a belief in the rightfulness 
of the state’s institutions, then those beliefs might conceivably be stimulated through 
deliberate cues and signals from state institutions themselves (Beetham, 1991). Lipset (1984, 
p. 86) more strongly proposes legitimacy can be engineered by the state, depending on its 
capacity to ‘engender and maintain the belief that existing institutions are the most 
appropriate or proper ones for the society’. At the extreme end of this view, some theorists 
have argued legitimation processes are little more than acts of persuasion on the part of 
power holders. In this reading, legitimacy is merely the internalisation of the norms and ideas 
propagated by powerful elites to justify their dominance (Marquez, 2012).
22
 This latter 
interpretation may be far-fetched in that justifications for power are not exclusively one-way, 
but also conceivably need to find some basis in social needs and demand in order to be 
accepted. On the other hand, it is also naïve to presume that legitimation - the pursuit of 
moral authority and power - is not orchestrated by the powerful (Beetham 1991, p. 9). This is 
not least because in many social contexts, political leaders and state institutions have 
resources at their disposal – such as a rhetorical platform in (sometimes control over) the 
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 Marquez (2012) more directly poses the question: ‘What accounts for the prevalence of justificatory discourses in politics 
(all the ‘legitimating activities’ of political actors), if not the fact that legitimacy is highly relevant to the production and 
maintenance of relationships of domination?’ 
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public sphere, the capacity to conduct participatory processes, or to form patronage 
relationships – at least more resources than ordinary citizens, to execute their acts of 
persuasion. At a minimum, this theoretically opens up the possibility that powerful political 
actors may also influence the relationship between service provision and state legitimacy. 
 
It also seems feasible, following on from the above, that political elites may seek to 
deliberately use the provision of services to strengthen their own legitimacy. Whereas from 
the perspective of aid policy the physical presence of services is seen to signal state 
‘responsiveness’, from this more political perspective services might also form part of the 
state’s coercive, political quest for pre-eminence. Indeed, this more realist interpretation finds 
support in Tilly’s (1992) seminal ‘coercion and capital’ thesis on state-building in Europe. In 
this account, the state’s incentive to deliver basic services derived not from an altruistic quest 
for citizens’ wellbeing, but from the need to pacify them so as to be able extract revenue to 
fund war. Here, the functions of the state grew inadvertently (in an unplanned fashion) as a 
result of demands and expectations placed on the state by citizens, beginning with those 
conscripted to fight for it, and thereafter became embedded through a process of mutual state-
society bargaining. Much later, and in the African context, Migdal (2001, p. 40) similarly 
pitches services as an element of the state’s wider goal to achieve social control, where social 
control means an ability to dictate the operative ‘rules of the game’ in society. This, he 
argues, is because the extension of bureaucratic administration facilitates the process of the 
state becoming not only a physical presence in people’s daily lives but a symbolically 
important part of their everyday survival strategies. Through these effects, service provision 
became an important means of extending the state’s authority, and in achieving compliance 
with norms and rules.  
History also tells us that service provision has been an important commodity in political 
processes of state-building. In reviewing the state-building literature from the 1960s and 70s, 
Van de Walle and Scott (2011) documented how European states pursued service provision 
for the purposes of penetration (establishing presence and visibility), standardisation 
(quashing alternative power sources), and accommodation (creating loyalty, resolving 
disputes). Nineteenth Century state-building in Western Europe was marked by the increased 
visibility of the state through the extension of post offices, hospitals, and schools throughout 
state territories. This physical penetration not only supported processes of territorial 
consolidation, or boundary building, but also socialization into the values of the state. In the 
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same way, standardisation in the form of common standards for administering services (e.g. 
integrated curricula for schools) produced readily identifiable symbols of the state. These 
processes of extending and standardizing public services brought gains to the state because 
they entailed power brokering, dispute settlement and buying the loyalty of alternative, 
competing sources of authority (ibid). Taken together, these insights serve as a reminder that 
processes of legitimation are themselves primarily about bringing order and predictability to 
the power struggles inherent in all societies (Beetham, 1991). Yet these political, coercive 
and controlling dynamics of the formation of social contracts are absent from mainstream 
development policy narratives. At the same time as the social contract is considered vital to 
the services-legitimacy relationship, historical insights into social contract formation are 
neglected. 
This study’s analytical framework 
Taken together, the above findings suggest the connections between service provision and 
state legitimacy are not automatic, and can be both positive and negative. However, there is 
limited theorisation, potted empirical analysis, and no ready-made or comprehensive 
framework for analysing these connections. Each of the factors identified as interrupting any 
linear relationship between services and legitimacy - expectations, impartiality, distributive 
justice, attribution, sector characteristics - could be, and have been, a target for in-depth 
analysis in and of itself. Indeed, previous studies have focused narrowly on the psychology of 
attribution, or the dynamics of relationships between state representatives and citizens at local 
level, for example.
23
 To date though, there is only a small body of theoretically informed, 
empirical studies in the field of development. At the same time, there are few studies that 
examine the relationship between service provision and state legitimacy in fully rounded 
perspective, or over time. By this observation, the potential research agenda is both deep and 
wide. 
The challenge for the present study is to build on and advance this research agenda. To do 
this, it develops an analytical framework for examining the services-legitimacy relationship 
that is grounded in central tenets of legitimacy theory, builds on some of the recurring 
findings from empirical cases, and more purposefully incorporates potentially significant but 
hitherto neglected categories of explanation. It is clear from the above review that whether or 
not services improve or undermine state legitimacy may depend on how citizens evaluate 
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 Examples are found in Sacks (2012) and Bukenya (2013), respectively.  
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them normatively, the history of the social contract, and at a broad level, political actors and 
systems. Yet these categories have not been a focus of empirical enquiry so far. For that 
reason, they form the core of this study’s guiding, inductive analytical framework. How each 
element is understood is outlined below. 
The history of the social contract 
Most studies of the services-legitimacy relationship are ahistorical in that they are not usually 
presented in historical context
24
, and yet history looms large over the literature in the form of 
the intangible ‘social contract’. Both the theory and empirics suggest public services are 
significant for the creation and maintenance of a social contract between states and societies. 
Social contracts are formed when promises of certain rights or material rewards, whether 
safety or wellbeing, are made by states to their (would-be) citizens, in exchange for their 
compliance and support (Coicaud, 2002; Migdal, 2001; Tilly, 1992). There are two 
conceivable roles for service provision in social contracts - material and normative. In the 
material sense, services may provide tangible, social benefits in the form of well-being and 
self-advancement that are a key part of the benefits citizens obtain from the exchange. In the 
normative sense, they might also signal state commitment to protecting the welfare of 
citizens, or to upholding certain rules and moral principles. Put another way, services might 
help embed the state within society materially or morally (Gilley, 2009). For these reasons, 
the present study aims to give a fuller account of the origins and enduring effects of the social 
contract on the services-legitimacy relationship. This implies understanding how public 
services become significant for the state’s legitimacy through historical processes of state 
transformation, and how these processes tie states and societies together and create certain 
expectations around service provision against which performance is later judged. 
Normative justifiability 
A further message from the sum of literature and theory is that the services-legitimacy 
relationship cannot be instrumentalised. That is, service provision cannot be reduced to an 
instrumental process of delivering material goods and benefits between citizens (as 
consumers) and states (as suppliers). Performance is normative in the sense that it is built on 
norms, and conveys them. This study therefore looks beyond the material to this normative 
dimension of service provision. In particular, it is concerned with the moral criteria by which 
citizens’ individually and collectively judge service provision at any given time and in any 
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 An exception is Gilley’s (2009) short, historical account of the relationship between aspects of performance and state 
legitimation in post-colonial Uganda as part of his mixed-methods study of performance legitimacy. 
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given context. In legitimacy theory, this might be termed ‘justifiability’. At a fundamental 
level, irrespective of the content of actions or outcomes, legitimacy is conferred or withdrawn 
based on whether those actions or outcomes can be morally justified against values (Beetham, 
1991, p. 23). Indeed, prominent scholars define legitimacy, at its core, as justifiable rules or 
procedures (Coicaud, 2002; Gilley, 2009). Moral justification is, in Gilley’s (2009, p. 15) 
words, ‘the overarching reason for people to accept the remit of the state’.
25
 The justifiability 
of rules ultimately derives from shared beliefs, either about the qualities of the power holder, 
or the degree to which the power arrangement serves a recognizable common interest 
(Beetham, 1991). Following this theoretical core of legitimacy, it is conceivable that whether 
or not services are significant for legitimacy may depend on whether or not their outcome or 
process is morally justifiable, or not. A key question is whether this justifiability hinges on 
self-interest and material gain, as portrayed in the received wisdom, or whether services also 
need to satisfy certain subjective and normative criteria about what is right for society in 
order to be significant for state legitimacy.  
Political conditions 
A final distillation from the evidence and theoretical interrogation presented above is that the 
relationship between service provision and state legitimacy or illegitimacy is likely to be 
conditioned by the prevailing political environment in which services are delivered and 
evaluated by citizens. Politics is often lurking in the background, usually as explanation for 
unexpected findings. This empirical positioning of politics is particularly surprising given 
that legitimacy is a deeply political concept that speaks to how power is won and lost. To 
bring politics to the foreground, this study considers how political actors use and manipulate 
services for legitimation, and in turn how politics conditions the environment in which 
services are evaluated. It sets out to more closely examine whether and why political 
institutions and actors are significant for the services-legitimacy relationship, and if so, what 
aspects of politics - whether structures or actors – matter. 
                                                          
25 Gilley (2009) uses a combination of behavioural and attitudinal markers to construct three building blocks of legitimacy 
and arrive at an overall legitimacy score. Those building blocks are legality, justification and consent. In his model, 
justification is given a 50 per cent weighting (as opposed to the logical 33 per cent) because of its centrality within the 





The question of when services improve or undermine legitimacy straddles at least two 
disciplinary fields – namely, political science, where legitimacy theories have mainly 
proliferated, and public policy, where studies of service provision tend to cluster. Some of the 
limitations of research on the relationship between services and legitimacy stem from limited 
read over between these two disciplinary fields. One conclusion, therefore, is that research on 
the link between service provision and legitimacy may benefit from a firmer grounding in 
legitimacy theory, and vice versa.  
The paucity of empirical research raises an immediate question over the received wisdom that 
service provision necessarily enhances state legitimacy. Quantitative research, with its 
sophisticated analysis of correlations between services and indicators of legitimacy, cannot 
account for the causal processes through which services might influence citizens’ perceptions 
of the state. In qualitative inquiry, there have been few historical case studies to trace how 
citizens adjust their perceptions of the state, and indeed their behaviour toward it, in response 
to relative improvements in service provision over time. 
In spite of limitations in the body of evidence, it is clear that in practice a number of factors 
interrupt any direct causal relationship between a state’s performance in delivering basic 
services, on the one hand, and its degree of legitimacy, on the other. Specifically, this 
relationship is likely to be conditioned by shifting expectations of what the state should 
provide, subjective assessments of impartiality and distributive justice, the relational aspects 
of provision, how easy it is to attribute (credit or blame) performance to the state, and the 
technical and normative characteristics of particular services. The narrow focus on whether 
non-state provision undermines state legitimacy has arguably masked the more pressing 
question of whom citizens expect to deliver services, and whether forms of provision are 
considered normatively appropriate in particular contexts. Related to this, understanding 
attribution—or how citizens come to credit/blame or reward/sanction the state for relative 
improvements or deteriorations in service levels—is an important though not well-understood 
link in the hypothesized causal chain between services and state legitimacy. To this end, there 
is a need for a more joined up analysis of the localized effects of services on trust in local 
bureaucracies and citizens’ beliefs in the broader state’s right to rule. Attribution is neither 
guaranteed nor always technically correct, depending on the visibility of and information 
available about the state’s role in provision. Likewise, the relationship between service 
provision and state legitimacy is unlikely to be uniform across services, because they offer 
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different possibilities for attributing responsibility for performance to the state, and their 
significance to societies is likely to vary according to local norms, values, and priorities at 
particular points in time. 
Taken together, the above findings call for a less instrumental, more politically situated, and 
historically informed account of the relationship between service provision and state 
legitimacy that starts from recognition that this relationship is not automatic. Three particular 
elements were distilled from the review and form the core of this study’s analytical 
framework. The framework aims to extend beyond snapshots, to examine the history and 
legacy of the social contract as a basis for understanding expectations of service provision in 
the present. It looks beyond material outputs to how the normative justifiability of services 
affects citizens’ evaluations of the state and its legitimacy. Finally, it incorporates the 
temporal political conditions through which the services-legitimacy relationship is formed. 
The next chapter outlines how the present study operationalised these elements in the in-
depth study of the political relationship between higher education and processes of (de-






Methodology: From measuring 
legitimacy to researching the politics of 
legitimation 
 
The previous chapter interrogated the received wisdom that service provision improves state 
legitimacy, finding it both narrowly instrumental and apolitical. It argued this not only 
inhibits a more nuanced account of the services-legitimacy relationship, but is incongruent 
with the political origins of legitimacy. It derived three broad, recurring themes from the 
literature to incorporate into the present study’s analytical framework. Together, these layers 
of analysis - the social contract, the normative justifiability of service provision, and the 
temporal political conditions – advance an approach to exploring the significance of service 
provision for state legitimacy that embraces core elements of legitimacy theory, is concerned 
more directly with legitimacy politics, and seeks to move beyond snapshots to observations 
over a longer time period.26 
The present study applies this approach to examine the relationship between higher education 
and state legitimacy over time in Sri Lanka. The research design has three defining features. 
First, it adopts an empirical (as opposed to normative) position on legitimacy – that is, one 
that seeks to discover rather than pre-judge the basis for legitimacy in context. Second, it is 
macro-analytic in that the unit of analysis is the national-level state. Finally, to incorporate 
the hitherto neglected historical dimension, the design draws on key aspects of historical 
institutionalism. Specifically, it focuses on critical junctures when legitimacy was shifting 
(consolidating or unravelling) and traces the links between them over time. This research 
design was operationalised through archival research, primary and secondary documentary 
analysis and a series of key informant interviews in Sri Lanka.  
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 An earlier version of this chapter was published as a research paper by the Developmental Leadership Program (DLP). 
See: Mcloughlin, 2015. 
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The study does not ‘measure’ legitimacy in the way that surveys have. Rather, it observes 
processes of (de-)legitimation, and analyses the legitimacy politics behind them and the role 
of higher education within them. To do this, it identifies and scrutinises changes in 
behaviours towards the state that can be considered markers of (il)legitimacy, alongside 
public deliberations about the moral rightfulness of the state in the public sphere. The 
rationale for combining both behavioural markers of (il)legitimacy alongside attitudinal ones 
is that neither are a precise measurement tool for capturing the right to rule on their own. 
Collectively, however, they may give a stronger overall reading of legitimacy. Furthermore, 
analysing deliberations about the state in the public sphere can provide an insight into the 
politics of legitimation, which is understood here to involve a process whereby political 
actors make claims to legitimacy based on appeals to moral justifiability and in turn, the 
public evaluation (acceptance or rejection) of those claims. A key empirical question for this 
study is whether and how higher education has been significant for legitimacy claims and 
evaluations over time in Sri Lanka. 
This chapter elaborates on the research design and methodology applied in this study, 
showing how it builds on, but is differentiated from, approaches applied elsewhere. The first 
section outlines the defining features of the research design. The next section elaborates on 
how legitimacy was observed at each of the critical junctures, positioning this within the 
broader debate about the strengths and limitations of using behavioural versus opinion-based 
markers. Finally, the chapter describes how the analytical framework was operationalised in 
practice, including the choice and treatment of data sources in the field. 
(De-)legitimation as a political process  
As the previous chapter showed, measuring legitimacy and its sources at specific points in 
time has dominated the field of enquiry, but can give a static account of legitimacy that is, 
paradoxically given legitimacy’s political origins, sometimes detached from political context 
or explanation. There has been comparatively less emphasis on understanding the politics of 
legitimation - that is, what processes, actors and ideas lie behind any observable changes in  
legitimacy indicators. A key distinguishing feature of the present study is to understand the 
role of higher education in political processes of (de-)legitimation. Distinct from 
understanding or quantifying ‘legitimacy’ – a quality or attribute of an actor or institution - 
this implies observing the process through which legitimacy is acquired or lost. A core 
starting premise of this research is that legitimacy is not a fixed asset, but rather, is 
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continuously claimed and contested between individuals and institutions within and outside 
the state. In effect, whereas legitimacy is a static property, legitimation is the active 
manufacturing of it.   
How can legitimation - the pursuit of legitimacy - be distinguished from other political 
strategies? How is it different, for example, from the mere mobilisation of resources (whether 
armies, laws, rules) in the strategic pursuit of power or authority? It is not inconceivable that 
in practice, legitimation may entail any of these acts. Nevertheless, legitimation can be 
distinguished from them, by two criteria. First, acts of legitimation always entail a moral 
claim to support. Because legitimacy is, by definition, moral approval, legitimation has to 
entail, also by definition, a moral and normative claim – a morally justifiable reason to act. 
The mere distribution of assets without any given justification or explanation cannot be seen 
as a bid for moral support. In this reading then, while legitimation may entail any of the 
power-seeking strategies noted above, such acts can only properly be viewed as acts of 
legitimation if they are accompanied by a moral justification, and are part of a wider strategy 
to construct or fortify a basis for moral approval. The second criterion, logically embedded in 
the first, is that processes of legitimation are purposive. A basis for moral approval has to be 
consciously derived and ultimately, articulated, by actors seeking legitimation. Indeed, 
articulating them entails an attempt to persuade the intended audience to accept a set of rules 
and norms as justifiable (Beetham, 1991). Moreover, in many states, actors seeking 
legitimacy typically have resources at their disposal - whether influence over the media, 
resources, or traditional sources of power – to create and maintain the belief that the system 
they represent is the most appropriate one for society (ibid).  In this way, legitimation is a 
purposive, political process of morally justifying a system of rules for organising power, and 
the purpose of that process is to persuade an audience from whom power is sought that they 
are, indeed, morally acceptable. 
As the above description implies, there are two ‘sides’ of legitimation – the legitimacy claims 
of legitimacy-seekers on the one hand, and how these are received and deliberated by the 
intended legitimacy audience on the other (Zaum, 2013). Empirically, this study addresses 
both. Specifically, the focus is on why higher education provided fertile ground for making 
legitimacy claims and in turn why those claims resonate with citizens (or not), and against 
what criteria citizens evaluate them. This latter, citizen-side perspective is fundamental 
because without acceptance, legitimation claims have no power. Legitimation is not a one 
way street. It entails back and forth moral interaction between justificatory discourse and 
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public evaluation (Kelman, 2001). Leaders may propagate ideas and justifications for a 
certain distribution or mode of delivery a particular service, but those ideas will only supply 
or augment a moral basis for support if they align with citizens values. Since the concern here 
is with state legitimation more specifically, the focus of the enquiry is on the narrative claims 
of political elites, and the deliberations and acceptance (or not) among different sections of 
society.  
Features of the research design 
The research design guiding this study has three defining features. First, it adopts an 
empirical approach to legitimacy. In a broad sense, this implies not making assumptions 
about what sorts of institutions should be legitimate, but instead discovering the underlying 
values that make institutions legitimate, or not, in the selected case setting. This was reasoned 
because a tendency to impose preconceived notions about what values should form the basis 
for legitimacy beliefs from the outside can lead to a fundamental misreading of legitimacy. It 
can, for example, produce false dichotomies between ‘illegitimate’ and ‘legitimate’ regimes. 
An example of this is the Failed States Index, which uses universal principles to arrive at 
measures of state legitimacy. Where these externally set benchmarks are not met, states are 
considered less legitimate.
27
 Yet even regimes that appear overtly repressive or inimical to 
democratic governance may nevertheless enjoy a high degree of legitimacy and resilience in 
practice.
28
 Elsewhere, legitimate systems of power that do not appear to fulfil externally 
imposed criteria have been labelled ‘perverse’ without addressing what local social norms 
and values underpin the justifiability of that authority and make it legitimate.
29
 In contrast, an 
empirical approach deliberately allows for the discovery (rather than testing, per se) of any 
possible reasons why higher education is more or less normatively justifiable to different 
groups of citizens, at different points in time. In other words, it treats the basis of legitimacy 
as an empirical question. 
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 Compiled by The Fund for Peace, the Failed States Index (see: http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/) derives a combined measure of 
state legitimacy from several pre-determined political and social indicators. Among them are levels of corruption, state 
effectiveness, measures of democracy, including boycotted elections, and acts of civil disobedience. However, whether or 
not these indicators are significant for legitimacy perceptions is any given context is an empirical question.  
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 An example is China, which assumes legitimacy in the absence of western-style democracy. See: (Holbig & Gilley, 2010) 
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 A blog released after the publication of the World Development Report in 2015 discussed the ‘perverse legitimacy’ of 
village power structures in Sierra Leone and India. These structures were described as perverse because they did not exhibit 
the expected normative criteria for legitimacy - that is, they were not democratically elected, and did not materially deliver 





An empirical approach also means not pre-judging or overly narrowing the field of enquiry in 
advance. Accordingly, the research design did not rely on complete or binding hypotheses 
from the outset (Yom, 2015). This was also in recognition that, as the previous chapter 
showed, the body of literature on the services-legitimacy link is at a formative stage when 
fully formed hypotheses remain in short supply, particularly those that deal with the 
relationship in the round. Deductive studies have to date tended to operate at the level of 
comparing the relative significance of different sources of legitimacy for legitimacy 
perceptions, rather than developing hypotheses about pathways of influence between specific 
sources and legitimacy. Recent examples include Gippert’s (2016) close examination of 
outputs versus procedures as sources of local legitimacy for international peacebuilding 
operations, Fisk and Cherney’s (2016) analysis of the relative significance of outcome 
favourability versus procedural fairness for the legitimacy of the government of Nepal, and 
Lindgren and Persson’s (2010) study of input versus output legitimacy in EU policymaking. 
By contrast, the question of why outputs might influence legitimacy is under-theorised. At a 
general level, it may depend on whether outputs, including goods and services, satisfy some 
notion of what Scharpf (1999) has called the ‘common good’, or Beetham (1991) the 
‘common interest’. Yet what this common good entails is unclear. Taking a normative 
perspective, one might hypothesise that the common good derives from universal principles 
of participation, accountability, equity or efficiency. Crucially however, these principles may 
mean different things in different settings, based on social and cultural norms (Saward, 1992, 
p. 33). Moreover, there is no intrinsic reason why they should apply universally across space 
or time. An empirical approach remains open to discovering the reasons why services may or 
may not matter for legitimacy rather than testing universal normative principles. 
A second feature of the research design is that it is ‘macro-analytic’, meaning it observes 
large-scale processes of change (Yom, 2015, p. 628). The focus of the analysis is on major 
policy shifts, changes in political regimes and ideologies, dominant political narratives, 
economic conditions and social structures. The essence of this approach is what Charles Tilly 
(1984) describes as the study of ‘big structures and large processes’. Accordingly, as is 
discussed further below, the study largely assesses processes of state (de-)legitimation at the 
national level. Dissenting and consenting behaviours are observed at the collective as 
opposed to individual level, usually on a large scale (e.g. mass protest, insurrection), and in 
the national arena. Likewise, the primary site for observing the politics of legitimation 
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(legitimacy claims and evaluations) is the national public sphere – via widely circulated print 
or online media, which is viewed as an arena of collective social and political deliberation.  
In line with this macro-analytic approach, the study operationalises the state as an aggregate 
set of institutions, and as an idea at the national level. In reality, of course, the state - in both 
its physical expression and in social imagination – could be not one but several objects of 
legitimation. Recognising this, other studies have disaggregated the different physical 
markers or meanings of the state in their legitimacy analyses. Booth and Seligson (2009) 
distinguish between the nation, regime principles, regime institutions, regime performance, 
local government and specific local actors, for example. The political settlement – or the 
ongoing process of (re-)establishing the formal or informal rules that govern how power and 
resources are distributed in society– is another conceivable object of legitimation (Parks & 
Cole, 2010). In contrast, some studies have tended to take a more localised, narrower view, 
focusing on the legitimacy of branches of the state apparatus – for example, the police, or the 
judiciary. As the previous chapter found, any one of these larger or smaller configurations of 
the state might be considered more or less legitimate than another at any given point in time. 
Although often referred to as a single entity, in practice the state’s various institutions are 
unlikely to be cohesive or uniform in their goals or meaning to people (Loveman, 2005). For 
this reason, as illustrated in chapter II, citizens’ views of specific institutions may or may not 
add up to a view of the state’s legitimacy as a whole. The salient point for this study is that, 
as with any social research, phenomena documented at national level of analysis cannot 
provide a basis for drawing conclusions about any associations or causal processes operating 
at another level (Hakim, 2000, p. 162). Since this is a study of the state as a collective set of 
institutions and an idea, it cannot give any account of the legitimacy of specific state 
institutions, different layers of the state, or variations between them.  
Finally, to incorporate the hitherto neglected historical dimension, the design draws on key 
aspects of historical institutionalism. Historical institutionalism is an approach that 
encourages researchers to consider how the timing and sequencing of social and political 
processes can be important determinants of their outcomes (Mahoney, 2015; Pierson, 2004). 
One of its pioneers, Paul Pierson, characterised this as placing the study of politics ‘in time’ 
(Pierson, 2004). The present study aims to do this by tracing connections between state 
legitimacy and higher education over a broad timeframe – some 60 years, from 1944 to 2012. 
This allows for the possibility that the relationship between higher education and state (de-
)legitimation may involve a ‘slow moving process’ that unfolds over an extended time 
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horizon, and also that events and outcomes of significance may be separated across time  
(Pierson, 2004). Nevertheless, the research could not cover the entire political history of 
higher education in Sri Lanka in depth – which spans almost 100 years.
30
 The impetus to give 
a long-term account of the services-legitimacy had to be balanced against the study’s limited 
resources and time. To narrow the scope of enquiry, the study therefore focuses on critical 
junctures when state legitimacy was shifting – that is, consolidating or being contested.  
Critical junctures 
Critical junctures, which originate theoretically from historical institutionalism, are formative 
periods in time when institutions emerge, are rejected, or transformed. This transformation 
typically occurs through and is catalysed by shifting macro conditions - economic change, 
changing cultural norms, heightened or altered ideological zeal - or, on a smaller scale, may 
reflect organisational re-configurations or shifting power relations between individuals. In 
either manifestation, critical junctures can theoretically produce enabling conditions that are 
ripe for actors to exercise agency to change the so-called ‘rules of the game’ (Capoccia & 
Kelemen, 2007). Such periods when the otherwise relatively stable ordering of rules and 
institutions shift are what Baumgartner & Jones (1993), and Krasner (1988) refer to as 
‘punctuated equilibrium’. Applied to social theory
31
, punctuations in the equilibrium may 
manifest as radical shifts in policy, or as high political salience and public attention to a 
particular social problem or issue, as a change in power relations (Hill & Varone, 2017). In 
another interpretation, critical junctures are critical precisely because the changes they 
produce can then have a determinate influence over the future: in theory, constraining 
subsequent institutional choices and institutionalising a form of path-dependency in which a 
new institutional configuration then stabilises over the long term (Pierson, 2004).  
A critical question for the deployment of the theory of critical junctures in this thesis is: What 
is a critical juncture from a state legitimacy perspective? Different criteria might feasibly be 
applied. At the extreme end of interpretation, a sudden or acute state legitimacy crisis is 
arguably most starkly akin to Krasner’s (1988) conceptualisation of ‘punctures’ in the 
equilibrium. That is because such legitimacy crises are often formative events that mark a 
turning point in the configuration of power within the state. During such crises, social 
movements or influential elites mobilise to actively withdraw consent and seek to change 
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 Modern higher education in Sri Lanka dates back to 1921, when the University College Colombo became the first 
institution delivering degree-level courses on Sri Lankan soil.  
31
 The idea of punctuated equilibrium originates from evolutionary biology, but has found wide application in the study of 
public policy and social change. 
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existing power relations, whether by altering the political settlement, or reasserting the 
authority of one arm of the state over another (e.g. military over polity). In practice, the 
withdrawal of consent may physically manifest in mass demonstrations, strikes or violent acts 
of civil disobedience. Alongside these acts, the public sphere may become an arena of 
heightened, perhaps frenzied, public deliberation; a space where discursive contestation over 
the justification for active dissent plays out. Both markers of legitimacy crisis - dissent and 
discursive contestation - are empirically observable. In this way, legitimacy becomes more 
observable precisely during times of crisis – that is, when it is being actively contested 
(Beetham, 1991).
32
 This may account for why legitimacy crises have often been the focus of 
scholarly attention.
33
 In the otherwise normal course of stable institutions – the state of 
equilibrium in-between punctures - legitimacy operates more opaquely as a less observable 
source of institutional continuity as opposed to generating change.  
In the starkest interpretation then, a legitimacy crisis constitutes a clearly observable shift in 
legitimacy and therefore a critical legitimacy juncture. At the same time, even acute 
legitimacy crises are likely to mark the culmination of a longer-term process of contestation 
and change. While incidents of civil disobedience or open conflict are acute and respond to 
proximate triggers, they typically represent a build-up of grievances or perhaps the ripening 
of socio-economic, structural conditions that provide the requisite opportunity or impetus for 
dissent to build and gather momentum. Indeed, the more particular analytical focus of this 
study, as noted above, is more precisely with understanding these longer-term, structural 
processes. Moreover, it is with understanding processes that constitute and are constitutive of 
both legitimation and de-legitimation. From this vantage point, a narrow conceptualisation of 
critical junctures as acute legitimacy crises would be empirically insufficient. Observing 
legitimation and de-legitimation as longer-term, political processes, implies widening the lens 
of analysis beyond acute crises or change, to understand what led up to them, and indeed, 
their after effects.  
Applying this wider perspective – viewing critical legitimacy junctures as slow-moving 
processes of change – means that in practice, the junctures analysed in this study are not short 
time periods, and they are not equivalent. Though historical institutionalists do not tend to set 
arbitrary parameters on how ‘long’ a critical juncture can be, it is worth recognising that the 
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approach applied here goes against one interpretation of them as relatively brief periods of 
institutional flux (Capoccia, 2007). Instead, it aligns with the empirical approach taken by 
macro-level historical institutionalists, who similarly view critical junctures as resulting from 
slow-grown, structural, antecedent conditions rather than from short-term agency within the 
critical juncture itself (Moore, 1966). Like most historical institutionalists, this study treats 
critical junctures not as discreet events, but as phases of events that may actually last a 
number of years (Capoccia, 2007). Critical junctures, then, can be a matter of gradual 
evolution rather than acute change. In line with this interpretation, the focus in this study is 
on analysing relatively extended phases of legitimation and de-legitimation of the state.  
Two primary phases of legitimation and de-legitimation are identified in the post-colonial 
era: the first entails the legitimation or ‘making’ of a new social contract, and the second 
subsequent period its de-legitimation, or ‘breaking’. The first juncture identified (1944-1966) 
is marked by the formation, consolidation and politicisation of the welfare-based social 
contract, of which state-provided university education was a key pillar. While this first 
juncture of legitimation is itself punctuated by shorter turning points – most notably, the 
consolidation of nationalism associated with the important election of 1956 – it nevertheless 
represents a period of relative continuity from the perspective of legitimation. That is because 
this period saw a consistent trend in the expansion and political manipulation of university 
education for the purpose of extending the state into society and increasing its moral basis for 
support. This transformative period set the antecedent conditions for a second, shorter 
juncture of de-legitimation (1966-1973), which was marked by a more acute dual legitimacy 
crisis in the form of insurrection and armed separatism. Both of these acts of dissent signified 
an acute unravelling of the social contract, but their preconditions were established during the 
earlier period of legitimation. The final critical juncture under scrutiny, in the immediate 
post-war era (2009-2015), also focuses on an act of dissent that represented a legitimacy 
crisis. This took the form of mass social mobilisation orchestrated by the Federation of 
University Teachers Association (FUTA) which is analysed here, from a legitimacy 
perspective, as an attempt to ‘defend’ state the education social contract in the face of a 
pressing crisis of underinvestment and state neglect.  
Significant variations in the duration of the selected junctures are notable: the first – of 
legitimation - being a relatively long, slow-moving process (22 years), the second and third 
junctures - of more acute crisis - being relatively short-lived (7 and 6, respectively). This 
variation in duration is itself analytically significant. It indicates the possibility that the 
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duration of critical junctures may vary according to the scale and magnitude of social change 
being observed.  Specifically with regard to legitimacy, it also suggests that while de-
legitimation may appear on the surface to be acute and short-lived, it may be preceded by 
relatively long-term structural processes that set the antecedent conditions for it. Moreover, 
that while legitimacy may (appear to) be brittle and quickly broken, legitimation on the other 
hand may involve a longer-term, more slow-moving process. This highlights two potential 
considerations for the application of critical junctures to the study of (de-)legitimation: first, 
the need to view even what may appear to be short-term legitimacy crises in wider temporal 
perspective, and second, for the same reason, setting arbitrary short-term limits on the 
duration of a critical legitimacy juncture may be empirically misleading.   
Whatever their duration, there are risks associated with carving history into critical junctures. 
One is that only the most significant junctures that illustrate the relationship in question will 
be selected. To seek to address this potential risk, the critical junctures examined in this study 
were identified through a process of consultation with key informants. During the first 
scoping field visit, key informants were asked to talk in a non-directive way about whether 
higher education had been significant for state-society relations in Sri Lanka, and if so, 
when.
34
 The intention was to apply a grounded process for identifying critical junctures that 
could be scrutinised in further depth. The selected junctures were those that were most 
commonly identified by key informants. Nevertheless, the purposive selection of periods to 
study the higher education-legitimacy relationship risks confirmation bias. In other words, 
there is a risk of over-claiming the overall significance of higher education for state 
legitimacy because the research focuses precisely on periods when higher education is most 
likely to be significant for state legitimacy.  
Another, related risk in using critical junctures is that the most significant critical junctures 
may be overlooked, perhaps also leading to unrepresentative findings (Capoccia & Kelemen, 
2007). As it transpired, there was some diversity in the critical junctures identified, and the 
level of significance assigned to them, among different key informants.
35
 This was probably 
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 Key informant interviews did not follow a script, but I asked questions about whether higher education mattered for state-
society relations, what the significant periods were that had shaped the history of higher education in Sri Lanka, whether and 
how the history of higher education reflected the history of state formation and conflict, and whether and why the provision 
of education was a condition of people’s judgements of – and acceptance or rejection – of the state’s authority and right to 
rule. 
35
 For example, some key informants proposed beginning the study earlier, before independence, with the formation of the 
first university and the so-called ‘battle of the sites’, which entailed a dispute over the geographical location of the 
university. Another key event was the 1978 Universities Act, which significantly altered the institutional arrangements for 
state oversight of university provision, including the introduction of a central, University Grants Commission. Though not 
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to be expected, in hindsight, given the initially open timeframe of the research, and the 
diversity of life experience and ethnicity of key informants themselves. Nevertheless, the risk 
remains that they may not, therefore, be the most significant periods for understanding the 
higher education – legitimation relationship in Sri Lanka. Indeed, both of these risks have 
previously been recognised as limitations in studies of legitimacy (Booth & Seligson, 2009; 
Hurrelmann, Krell-LaluhovÁ, Nullmeier, Schneider, & Wiesner, 2009). They reflect the 
wider problem, noted above, of studying a phenomenon whose effects are more visible, and 
observable, when it is absent or in question. It should be reiterated that the aim of this study is 
to understand under what conditions higher education can become significant for state 
legitimacy. For the same reason, the study should not be read as an account of the overall 
significance of higher education for state legitimacy. 
Legitimacy markers 
Any study of legitimacy has to be clear about how state legitimacy is defined and observed. 
Indeed, how researchers define the state can influence where they look for markers of its 
legitimacy. If the state is defined as a physical, functional set of institutions then its 
legitimacy (or evidence of its right to rule) might be observed merely through its territorial 
presence, or bureaucratic infrastructure (Lake, 2007). As noted in the introduction, however, 
this study views the state as not exclusively a territorial entity but as a set of rules and ideas 
about how power should be exercised. This follows Holsti (1996), who argues that the state 
can be studied not only as a set of institutions in a physical sense, but as an idea. This is what 
Migdal (2001, p. 33) called the state’s ‘symbolic configuration’, meaning the kind of values 
and social order it represents. The key point is that since this study understands the state as 
existing not only in physical form but also in social imagination, it likewise looks to ideas 
about the state and what it represents (beyond its physical presence) as markers of its 
legitimacy.  
More broadly, the problem of measuring (shifting) legitimacy underlies a scholarly 
frustration that has seen it labelled the ‘dark matter’ of political science, or worse, irrelevant 
as a stand-alone analytical tool (Marquez, 2012).
36
 As a result, observing it directly has often 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
about university provision per se, the burning of the Jaffna public library in 1981 was a key event in the war and an act of 
biblioclasm. The dispute over Private Medical Colleges in the contemporary era has been particularly protracted, and could 
have provided the focus for an entire chapter of the thesis in itself. 
36
 Measuring legitimacy is sometimes considered irrelevant because if we can measure compliance – the theorised effect of 
legitimacy – then it becomes unnecessary to also measure legitimacy. 
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been abandoned in lieu of a range of ‘legitimacy-like constructs’ (Weatherford, 1992).
37
 Two 
main sets of constructs have been deployed: individual’s reported beliefs about the state’s 
rightfulness, and (non-)compliant behaviours towards it. In other words, researchers have 
mainly measured legitimacy either by asking people how they perceive the state, by 
observing how people behave towards it, or some combination thereof. Likewise, in this 
study, the citizen evaluation side of processes of legitimation is analysed through public 
deliberations about the state’s rightfulness, as captured in public media, alongside manifest 
dissenting or consenting behaviours towards the state. The latter, behavioural markers of 
legitimacy include political incorporation and mobilisation (juncture 1), insurrection and 
armed separatism (juncture 2) and mass protest (juncture 3). This approach follows recent 
major studies that have combined behaviours with opinions as markers of legitimacy (Gilley, 
2009).  
The rationale for this combined attitudinal and behavioural approach is twofold. First, 
opinions about the state’s legitimacy and behaviours towards it theoretically have a symbiotic 
relationship. This is recognised by Sacks (2009, p. 4) and her colleagues, writing about 
Zambia, who model legitimacy as ‘a sense of obligation or willingness to obey authorities 
(value-based legitimacy) that then translates into actual compliance with governmental 
regulations and laws (behavioural legitimacy)’. Following this model, researchers might 
expect that changes in beliefs about legitimacy may go along with changes in behaviours 
towards the state, and vice versa. Second, examining legitimacy through both opinion and 
behaviours may address some of the limitations of each of these individual markers. 
Specifically, reading legitimacy through behaviours alone - whether acts of compliance, 
consent or dissent - can be misleading. Researchers have to also understand what motivates 
these behaviours, and whether (il)legitimacy is the true motivating factor. The public sphere – 
that is, the space where grievances may be voiced and justifications for actions given and 
evaluated – is a space where the motivations for behaviours can be scrutinised. It is a 
discursive arena through which to observe the legitimacy politics behind behavioural changes 
towards the state. For these reasons, as outlined further below, legitimacy was observed 
through a combination of claims and deliberations in the public sphere alongside behavioural 
acts of dissent and consent. 
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 There are, of course, exceptions to this. Some experimental research claims to measure legitimacy directly, either in a lab 
(Blair, 2013), or lab-in-field experiments (Dickson, 2013), but this approach remains rare. 
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Legitimacy claims and deliberations in the public sphere 
As noted above, researching legitimation as a political process suggests a need to view 
legitimacy claims alongside their deliberation among the intended legitimacy audience. This 
is the essence of legitimacy politics – the process of contestation and deliberation through 
which societies arrive at (or reject) a justifiable set of rules by which to organise and 
distribute resources in society. To this end, a core element of this study’s empirical enquiry is 
to analyse legitimacy claims and deliberations in the public sphere. This approach follows 
Gilley (2009)
38
, who studied legitimation over time by observing political discourse and 
public deliberations around key policies and reforms in Uganda. The present study similarly 
observes the public sphere to understand how changes in higher education have formed part 
of the state’s legitimation discourse, claims and practices, and in turn, how the public has 
evaluated those claims, and indeed, evaluated the state on the basis of them. 
Epistemologically, the use of the public sphere as an arena for observing legitimacy claims 
and deliberations aligns with discourse analysis. In line with other scholars who have applied 
a discourse approach to study legitimacy claims and evaluations, the primary concern is with 
communication, rhetoric and narratives leaders and organisations deploy to frame and 
reinforce the justifiability of their actions and create, as noted above, the moral basis for 
support that is the hallmark of legitimation (Hurrelmann et al., 2009; Hurrelmann, Schneider, 
& Steffek, 2007; Schmidt, 2013; Steffek, 2003). Empirically, these approaches tend to deploy 
both media analysis and historical texts as sources for analysing legitimacy claims and 
rhetoric. The focus is often on the discourse of political elites, and the symbols and messages 
they evoke to persuade key constituencies of the justifiability of their policies and action. 
This is what Steffek (2003, p. 251) terms the act of ‘explaining and defending’. The content 
of public discourse is significant for legitimacy because, as Gupta (1995, p. 376) tells us, it is 
‘a key arena through which the state, citizens, and other organizations and aggregations come 
to be imagined’ and where ‘representations of the state are constituted, contested, and 
transformed in public culture’. Accordingly, a key empirical focus for this study is the 
framing and justification of key policy changes in the sphere of higher education. These are 
observed, as the next section explains more fully, through key political speeches, records of 
key debates in parliament, and archives of leading print media. 
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 To understand the link between how the state performed and how people evaluated the state’s legitimacy, Gilley (2009) 
studied specific policies, the political discourses surrounding them and public opinion surveys that indicated levels of public 
approval of them. 
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Using the public sphere as an arena of analysis also responds to some of the limitations of 
surveys as opinion-based markers of legitimacy. Operationalising the study of legitimacy 
through popular opinion surveys can run into pragmatic difficulties. Particularly but not only 
in fragile and conflict-affected states, there may be a dearth of reliable public opinion data 
and, more fundamentally, even where it exists, people may fear reporting their actual 
perceptions of the state (Call & Cousens, 2008, pp. 15-16). In these situations, some 
researchers have found it difficult to differentiate between people’s support for an incumbent 
government, or individual leaders, and the more fundamental question of whether they accept 
the state’s institutions as justified (Guerrero, 2011). A related, semantic problem is that 
neither the concept of the state, nor the concept of legitimacy is always translatable or 
intelligible at the local level. For example, a cluster of recent case studies of the effects of 
quality of service provision on how people view the state encountered field constraints 
because interviewees were not familiar with the terminology being used (Noor et al., 2010). 
Specifically, they were not familiar with speaking about anything concerning state 
institutions, procedures, or their rights and obligations. In the course of these studies, the 
research questions had to be reconstituted, re-phrased and reformulated.  
A closely related problem is how legitimacy is measured in surveys. A fairly wide range of 
questions have been used in different settings to try to capture the degree to which people 
recognise and justify the state’s right to exercise power. For example, questions have been 
based on whether the state ‘should exist in independent form’, to whether it is it ‘moving in 
the right direction’ (Bakke et al., 2014), or the right of different departments to make 
decisions (Sacks, 2011).
39
 Other quantitative studies construct combined indicators from 
multiple questions to create a marker of legitimacy. Following this strategy, Carter (2011) 
uses questions about the courts’ right to make decisions that people have to abide by, the 
police’s right to make people obey the law, and the tax department’s right to make people pay 
taxes. She takes the answer to these questions as a combined measure of ‘whether state 
institutions have the moral authority to make decisions with which ordinary citizens would 
feel compelled to comply’. Some of these questions require significant judgment on the part 
of the surveyed which may be beyond imagination and possibly dangerous in conflict 
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 Sacks uses Afrobarometer, Latino barometer and Arabbarometer data to measure approval of the incumbent, trust in 
government and willingness to defer to the government. The following question were asked in the Afrobarometer surveys: i) 
For trust – ‘How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say: The President?’ 
Ii) For approval – ‘Do you approve or disapprove of the way that the following people [Your President] have performed 
their jobs over the past twelve months, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say?’ iii) For willingness to defer - 
respondents were asked how far they agree with the statement ‘The tax department always has the right to make people pay 
taxes.’   
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settings. Moreover, if legitimacy is conceived essentially as a belief in the rightfulness of the 
state, and operationalised through surveys, then researchers have to control for the subjective 
origins of beliefs, which may or may not relate to the aspects of performance they are 
concerned with, as well as the heterogeneity of beliefs. Inconsistencies in the interpretation of 
legitimacy used across different survey designs are hardly surprising given legitimacy’s 
contested and difficult nature, but they nevertheless reduce the possibility for comparison 
across studies. 
Perhaps a more serious challenge for opinion-based studies is what significance they assign 
to the opinions they survey. It could be argued that legitimacy beliefs are in any case 
irrelevant for state legitimacy unless citizens act on them; either by complying, or at the other 
end of the spectrum, withdrawing their active cooperation or consent to state rule. In adopting 
this position, Beetham (1991) argued that asking whether people believe a particular 
institution is legitimate is not only riddled with flaws, but can be misleading. This is not only 
because people are unlikely to understand what ‘legitimacy’ means, as discussed above, but 
because the more demonstrable, behavioural markers of legitimacy - consent and compliance 
- are more likely to be witnessed in the public sphere, rather than ‘in the recesses of people’s 
minds’ (ibid, 1991, p. 13). Legitimacy matters, ultimately, because of its consequences for 
behaviour. In other words, legitimacy beliefs only translate into realised legitimacy effects if 
people act on these beliefs. For this reason, the present study is concerned not only with 
expressed opinion and public deliberations about the state, but with behaviours that indicate 
conferral or withdrawal of legitimacy. As the discussion below illustrates, however, 
legitimacy behaviours should, like opinions, be read cautiously and in light of their 
imperfections as a marker of the right to rule. 
Reading legitimacy through behaviour 
At each critical juncture, changes in mass behaviours - whether consenting or dissenting - 
were analysed as signals of shifting legitimacy. Prominent theoretical models of legitimacy 
propose that when a state acts within the boundaries of justifiable power, citizens will reward 
the state with everyday acts of consent (Beetham, 1991; Gilley, 2009). Beetham (1991) goes 
further in suggesting acts of consent actually confer legitimacy on the state, ‘binding in’ 
critical elements of the population. Following Beetham (1991, p. 209), mass political 
mobilisation and participation in elections are indicators of legitimacy, because they express 
consent with a system of rules. On the other hand, de-legitimation may entail people 
behaving in ways that withdraw consent. This may materialise in a range of behaviours, from 
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minor forms of non-compliance (e.g. non-payment of fines), to civil disobedience and mass 
demonstrations and, at the more extreme end of the spectrum, outright violent rejections of 
the state (Beetham, 1991). The latter may include armed conflict, insurrection, or armed 
separatism. Surveys can and have measured behavioural markers of legitimacy – for example, 
people’s reported willingness to comply with laws and taxes (Levi et al., 2009; Murphy, 
2005) or their reported compliance with the police (Hough, Jackson, Bradford, Myhill, & 
Quinton, 2010). However, this study is concerned only with manifest, rather than reported, 
acts of consent and dissent as markers of (de-)legitimation. This is not least because how 
people report they can/would act does not always correspond with how they actually do act. 
A central challenge with using consent or dissent as legitimacy markers is that it is often 
difficult to know whether legitimacy, or indeed illegitimacy, is the true cause of these 
behaviours. On the surface, (non-)compliant behaviour may have greater bearing on the 
degree to which a state can claim to have legitimacy than mere opinions, or privately held 
beliefs. Nevertheless, as Schaar (1984) reminds us, states can achieve compliant behaviour 
through coercion, and people can consent/not consent out of fear, rather than out of a belief in 
the state’s rightfulness. In this sense, the entitlement or right to rule is not equivalent to 
deference to power. From the reverse perspective, the normative justifiability of the state’s 
power – or what Marquez (2012) terms institutionalised persuasion - cannot explain all 
forms of consent or cooperative behaviour on the part of the subordinate. A suite of 
alternative private and public motivations might otherwise explain them, such as self-interest 
or material advancement, individual weakness, or even the absence of an alternative (Weber, 
1922 (1978)). Compliance with laws can result from perceptions of government’s 
enforcement capacity, for example (Ramcilovic-Suominen & Epstein, 2015). In other 
situations, compliance may be motivated by more instrumental calculations of the feasibility 
and costs-benefits of rejecting the state, or seeking alternatives. This leads some scholars to 
conclude that behaviour towards the state can only be taken as a marker of legitimacy where 
these other potential explanations – self-interest, enabling conditions, the absence of 
alternatives - for that behaviour can be ruled out (Blair, 2013). 
This study assumes that dissent can only be read as a sign of illegitimacy when it is motivated 
by rejection of the state’s right to rule on the basis of its moral unacceptability. Episodes of 
insurrection, separatism, mass mobilisation, and strike action, are taken as markers of 
illegitimacy only because the basis of this dissent lies in a rejection of the state’s right to rule. 
This is opposed to more superficial or interest-based motivations for mass action that may 
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entail rejections of particular government policies, or advocacy and agitation on particular 
issues. Insurrection and violent separatism go much deeper that this in that they 
fundamentally reject one set of rules and seek to replace them with another set. Separatists by 
definition reject the state’s basis for exercising power over them, based on discontinuity 
between the operating rules of the state and the preferred rules of the separatists, for example. 
Of course, not all mobilisations are in practice consequential for the state’s legitimacy - that 
is, they may not succeed in overthrowing the state, or in forcing a change of rules. Whether or 
not behaviours challenge the moral authority of the state may depend on either the numbers 
involved, or the significance of the constituency they represent, which inevitably looks 
different across different contexts (Beetham, 1991). Moreover, mass behaviours do not have 
to pose a significant physical threat to the state’s capacity to rule to be taken as a marker of 
declining legitimacy. A more important cue is the degree to which they may be perceived as a 
threat to the state’s moral standing, or labelled as one, by the state.  
It is also important to acknowledge that all behavioural acts towards the state – be they 
broadly supportive or non-supportive - are context specific and depend on the culture of 
political activism. For example, a study of the political attitudes of people in rural China 
found that when people do not comply with laws they are engaging in ‘constructive non-
compliance’, a form of feedback to the state (Tsai, 2015). People held the view that the 
government was rightful, but nevertheless believed that when a policy or decision is wrong it 
is not necessary to comply with it. On the contrary, it was considered a duty to not comply, in 
order to send a feedback message to the state – what Tsai (2015) terms ‘constructive non-
compliance’. This further illustrates that not all acts of dissent can be viewed as a sign of a 
breakdown in legitimacy. Behaviour that confers or withdraws legitimacy may also be 
influenced by citizens’ perceptions of whether protesting is more or less futile. This was 
recently demonstrated in an analysis of the propensity to protest in South Africa about the 
poor state of basic services over time, which conversely concluded that the greater legitimacy 
afforded to the government of Jacob Zuma (as opposed to the previous Mbeki rule) enabled a 
heightened level of protest, because people assumed Zuma would be more likely to address 
their demands (Alexander, 2010, p. 14). So acts of dissent may, ironically, be more possible 
in situations where the state or its leaders are viewed as legitimate. The feasibility of dissent 
may also depend on political opportunity structures (Kitschelt, 1986). These include 
information, resources, access to the public sphere, or perhaps even a demonstration effect in 
the form of other successful social movements (in effect, evidence of the utility of protest) 
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(ibid). Where these enabling conditions are not present, systems of rule may lack any 
normative justification, but nevertheless endure. Behaviours and opinions are therefore best 
understood and analysed in political context. Again, this reinforces the rationale for 
incorporating politics into this study’s analytical framework.  
Operationalising the analytical framework 
The analytical framework was operationalised through a combination of archival research, 
documentary analysis, and key informant interviews. The main sources were news media 
articles and reader opinion pages, records of parliamentary debates, first hand narrative 
accounts of key events, official government reports, and published academic works and 
memoirs documenting and analysing the history and evolution of higher education in Sri 
Lanka. Data was collected in the UK and in Sri Lanka, online and through three field trips. 
The fieldwork involved an initial scoping visit in November 2012, followed by two more in-
depth research trips in October 2014, and April 2016, amounting to 7 weeks in the field in 
total. Given the focus at the national level, the primary field site was the capital and seat of 
government in Colombo. I undertook interviews in government departments, non-
governmental organisations, development agencies, and public and private universities in 
Colombo, its surrounding areas, and Kandy (see Appendix, Table 2, for a full list). 
A key principle underpinning the choice of data sources was that ‘both facts (or experience) 
and the interpretation of those facts (or that experience)’ are entwined and necessary for an 
interpretivist account of the relationship of interest (Lawler, 2002, p. 243). The interpretation 
of facts is particularly important for legitimacy since, as the discussion has hitherto 
illustrated, legitimacy may hinge on subjective evaluation, and certainly involves deliberation 
about the normative justifications for actions. Accordingly, the research involved not only 
studying objective policy changes in education access and the material effects of higher 
education provision, but people’s interpretation of these effects and their justifiability. A 
comparable amount of time, interview focus, and source material was allocated to each 
juncture to achieve parity in depth of analysis and therefore comparability over them.  
The research followed a process of ‘inductive iteration’. This means I began by developing 
broad propositions out of empirical and theoretical literature, then explored the case 
following this loose framework, then continually assessed the fit between the propositions 
and the case to arrive at refined propositions (Yom, 2015). This approach sits between a 
purely deductive approach involving testing pre-determined hypotheses, and a purely 
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inductive approach that begins with empirical observations and from them derives testable 
hypotheses. An inductive iterative approach does not typically follow a neat or linear 
sequence, but rather, researchers move back and forth between the framework and the case 
(Yom, 2015). Following this, the account of each juncture was formed through a process of 
gathering data, analysing it separately, drawing out themes, triangulating between sources, 
particularly between media reports and first-hand accounts, and filling in gaps through 
historical writings. Throughout the process, my understanding of the analytical framework 
also developed, and though the broad categories of analysis remained constant, where to look 
for them and what elements were worthy of particular exploration (e.g. what aspects of the 
political environment seemed important) were refined. 
Like much research, the fieldwork had to adapt to limitations in time, data availability, and 
resources. A significant constraint was that throughout the period of the field research (see 
Appendix, Table 1 for dates and activities), the post-war state was becoming increasingly 
authoritarian and hostile to foreign researchers. To minimise the risk of undue attention to 
myself or to my key informants, and on the advice of local researchers, I did not use the term 
‘state legitimacy’ in correspondence to introduce my research or set up interview meetings. 
During an initial field visit in 2011, and on subsequent visits, key informants cautioned me 
against interviewing people in the war-affected regions in the north and east which were, at 
that time, experiencing militarisation and surveillance. During my second visit, in 2014, the 
Northern Province was closed down fully to foreigners. These political sensitivities and travel 
safety concerns underpinned the decision to not conduct interviews in the north and east of 
the island. The risks to the project and more importantly, to participants, could not be 
justified, ethically. I was still able to collect key informant accounts from Sinhalese, Tamil 
and Muslim groups from the major field sites in and around Colombo and Kandy, as well as 
via skype on some occasions. Though it would have been interesting to visit the north or east 
to see how the conditions and experience of the universities there differed from those visited 
in western and central province, it was felt these potential benefits did not outweigh the risks. 
The significance of these limitations is reflected on in the study’s conclusion. 
The discussion below outlines how each of the three primary modes of enquiry – archival 
research, key informant interviews, and documentary analysis - was operationalised. In 
practice, all three sources informed the entire analysis, but some were more significant for 
certain junctures, and certain aspects of the analytical framework, than others. Key 
informants were particularly useful for developing an understanding of the significance of the 
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historical junctures, and identifying collective understandings about the significance of higher 
education for legitimacy. In the contemporary juncture, they were informative in another 
sense, in that because many of them were working in education, they gave first-hand, lived 
experiences of the ‘live’ field site. Media archives and public opinion pages were the primary 
window to legitimacy claims and deliberations in the public sphere. Documentary analysis 
was helpful in tracing the chronology of events and policies, and for understanding the 
contemporary political environment and history of state transformation in Sri Lanka. 
Archival research 
The archival research involved retrieving and analysing official policy documentation, 
parliamentary records of debates and speeches and news media reports related to the history, 
evolution and political significance of university education in Sri Lanka. The National 
Archives in Colombo are well maintained and open to researchers, subject to a declaration of 
intent of usage. These archives contain full paper records of print media, official government 
enquiries, and full records of Hansards – the Sri Lankan official record of Parliament. 
Hansards are variably recorded in three languages – English, Sinhalese and Tamil.  A 
research assistant conversant in all three of these languages helped me to trawl these records 
to identify relevant material. More than 270 newspaper articles were retrieved and analysed 
covering the three critical junctures of interest (see Appendix, Table 4, for a list of selected 
media archives). New articles regularly reported speeches made by political leaders and 
Members of Parliament (MPs). They also carried readers’ letters in their opinion pages. 
Together, these reports relay dominant political narratives in the sphere of education, the 
rhetorical justifications behind legitimation claims, and public opinion on the moral 
appropriateness and justifiability of the higher education system and reforms to it.  
Although media commentary can be used to study public deliberations around legitimacy, 
there is obvious potential for press bias. In particular, there is scope for over or under-
reporting of alternative viewpoints depending on the political orientation of the news 
producer (Richardson, 2007). Media may also fail to represent a full range of perspectives 
because the types of individuals who air their views in the press are likely to be those who 
have the capacity, resources and connections to do so. In unequal environments, including in 
Sri Lanka, this biases towards the opinion of the politically connected and wealthier middle 
and upper classes. Hence, although news reports may claim to represent mass public opinion, 
there are convincing reasons why they may not. On the other hand, focusing the analysis on 
media reports, opinion columns and (in the latter era) social media that are biased towards 
76 
 
politically-mobilised elite class may be fruitful for examining legitimacy because as argued 
earlier, it may be precisely this layer of society whose views really count for the state’s 
legitimacy. In this study, opinion pages and press articles are taken as illustrations that certain 
views were present, but not as indicative of how prolific those views were, or the balance of 
public opinion overall. In other words, the fact that certain newspapers are willing to print 
certain opinions or reports makes them interesting and politically significant, but not 
necessarily representative. 
Since Sri Lanka has been a divided and war-affected state, press freedom (and bias) had to be 
factored into the analysis. Triangulation of sources is one way to counter the potentially 
distorting effects of media bias on internal validity. Several English-medium newspapers 
were consulted to try to alleviate potential for a skewed perspective, although newspapers 
printing in other languages may have given a different perspective (see Appendix, Table 3 for 
a full list). During the first two junctures, the English-medium newspapers consulted were the 
leading ones in circulation (Daily Mirror, Daily News and The Island). The Ceylon Daily 
News has always been associated with the government of Sri Lanka, and is now part of The 
Lake House, a government-owned corporation. Reports from this newspaper are read and 
interpreted in this light. It is not that its articles and version of events is less revealing, but 
rather, more revealing of how the government would like events to be analysed and read. In 
any newspaper, certain types reports are taken as reasonably reliable. For example, it is 
unlikely that individual speeches in parliament would be deliberately misreported, given that 
the same speeches were simultaneously reported in other newspapers, and also officially 
recorded verbatim in Hansards.  
Whilst most of the archival retrieval of press reports was undertaken during field visits, at the 
national archives in Colombo, some of it was continued in-between field visits by a Sri 
Lankan research assistant. The resources available to continue the archival work remotely 
were limited, so these searches had to be closely guided and narrowed down as far as possible 
to specific times and events. This was sometimes challenging because the dates and temporal 
ordering of certain events was sometimes unclear, or omitted, in narrative accounts and 
memoirs documenting the history of higher education. Lack of clarity about the dates of 
certain key parliamentary commissions, enquiries and debates occasionally necessitated some 
searching around a wider time-range of interest, which inevitably extended the time spent at 
the archives. Overall, the strategy of targeting pre-determined, narrow time periods of interest 
was efficient in that the material identified was focused. However, as will be discussed in the 
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conclusion, one of the limitations of the research is that targeting particular times potentially 
neglects significant events that occurred in-between. Combining the archival research with 
key informant interviews and documentary analysis helped to fill in some but probably not all 
of those gaps.   
Key informant interviews 
Key informant interviews were undertaken during the two field visits in 2014 and 2016. 
Snowball sampling was used to identify 50 key informants from three types of organisation: 
public and private higher education institutions, relevant government agencies, and non-
governmental agencies, including civil society and development agencies (see Appendix, 
Table 3, for a full, anonymised list). At higher education institutions, the sample included 
university lecturers (including sociologists, historians, political scientists and education 
experts), professors, ex- and serving Vice Chancellors, senior university administrators, 
students, leaders of student groups, and leaders and members of the Federation of University 
Teachers Association (FUTA). In the government sphere, it included a former Minister of 
Education and Higher Education, former Chairman of the UGC, a retired Presidential 
advisor, Ministry officials (including past and current secretaries to the Minister of Higher 
Education). In the civil society sphere, it included public intellectuals, journalists, researchers 
at prominent think tanks, and senior staff in donor agencies working on initiatives in the 
higher education sector. In the interest of obtaining a balance of perspectives, the sample 
included individuals of Tamil and Sinhalese ethnicity. This is because an individual’s 
affiliation or identity (ethnic, religious, social) affects how they interpret events (Lawler, 
2002). This is particularly salient in a war-torn country where, although the military conflict 
was essentially between the state and different groups, these groups were also divided along 
ethnic lines.  
The aim of the interviews was to collect first-hand, narrative accounts of the significance of 
higher education for state-society relations and processes of state transformation, (de-
)legitimation and conflict. In the earlier period, when the concern was to identify critical 
junctures, the interviews were fairly open and largely directed by the informants themselves. 
Later, the aim of interviews was to hear different versions of the selected critical junctures, 
and establish common (triangulated) threads between them. These interviews were semi-
structured around guiding empirical questions, but still did not follow any script. To explore 
the significance of higher education for legitimacy, I asked questions about whether it shaped 
people’s perceptions of the state’s right to rule over them, whether and when education had 
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fuelled acts of dissent against the state, and what would happen if the state stopped providing 
it. Whilst prompts were given to informants to discuss critical turning points and events that I 
had already alighted on, conversations were not restricted to them. This was to enable a 
balance between collecting information related to the analytical framework and specific 
periods of interest, while also leaving room to ‘uncover the unexpected’ (Gerson & Horowitz, 
2002, p. 204). It was also important for limiting confirmation bias – in this case, seeking only 
proof that state legitimacy and higher education are related.  
Higher education was typically a lively topic for discussion, not least because all informants 
were personally invested in it in some way, either through their own experience of being 
educated, through concern for their children or grandchildren’s educational and social 
prospects, or because they were working in the sector. Several interviewees gave long, 
sometimes detailed, accounts of why they thought education was significant for Sri Lankans 
and for the state. Many recounted how their experience of working in education, being a 
parent, or a student, had shaped their own perceptions of the state. In a sense, the selected 
sample was by nature the very people most likely to want to discuss education, and its 
significance for state-society relations. On the one hand, the research benefited from this 
because the sample were willing participants; indeed, a significant proportion of them were 
themselves academics who by nature valued research and were therefore keen to assist me. 
On the other hand, asking people so invested in education whether education matters for state 
legitimacy could give an overstated account. If I had interviewed health professionals about 
whether education is important for state-society relations in Sri Lanka, I might not have 
gotten such an enthusiastic response. This is another reason why it was important to 
triangulate between key informant accounts, press reports and historical texts. 
Most of the interviews were conducted in English, though a Tamil and Sinhala-speaking 
research assistant was present to give the option of using another language if preferred. 
Interviews with university students and student group representatives were typically 
conducted in Sinhalese, or Tamil. The first set of interviews, during the first field trip, were 
recorded and transcribed verbatim. The second set of interviews were not recorded, but 
instead relied on note taking and researcher recall. Those interviews were transcribed on the 
day they were undertaken, so that conversations were fresh in memory. This modification in 
technique was made because in an authoritarian environment, the use of recording equipment 
could restrain the openness of key informants who are critical of the government. Moreover, I 
was concerned that if recordings were found by authorities on exit from the country this 
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might potentially put those key informants at risk. All informants were aware that they were 
contributing to research that would help produce a PhD thesis, and could therefore be 
eventually published in parts. Since the vast majority said they would prefer anonymity, all 
names of key informants are kept anonymous in this thesis.  
The selection of key informants evolved as the thesis progressed. For the first two historical 
junctures, given the time frame (some 60 years ago), the most informative accounts came 
from retired academics and retired government officials, who had lived through the junctures 
and could recount them with surprising detail. These interviewees were, however, also the 
most difficult to track down. Reaching them sometimes required approaching institutions 
(e.g. Parliament) to obtain personal contact details. In this respect, the Sri Lankan political 
system is remarkably open, for outsiders at least. It was often possible to interview high-
ranking officials and political elites with little notice, sometimes in their own homes. For the 
contemporary political juncture, the most informative people were the recent and current 
serving members of the Federation of University Teachers Association (FUTA), which is the 
organisation that mobilised the mass protest that is the focus of Chapter VI of this study. 
However, again, these interviewees were sometimes reluctant to speak to me openly, on 
record, given the militarised post-war environment.  
Overall, the interviews were used progressively to develop the thesis. Early interviews were 
open-ended and used primarily for identifying periods of time and events of interest, and for 
mapping the basic terrain. Interviews conducted towards the end of the last field trip were 
used to test and confirm the narratives that arose from and through earlier interviews and 
research. I did not use a coding program for analysing interviews, but preferred to (re-)read 
and absorb them, make annotations, and colour code transcriptions by theme. As the thesis 
progressed, and the core arguments began to solidify, I returned to the interview transcripts 
several times to re-read them. Over time, I was able to extract more from them as my 
understanding developed. In this way, interviews were key not only for guiding the rest of the 
research, but throughout the iterative process of analysis and writing. 
Documentary analysis 
In addition to the archives and key informants, the research is based on official government 
reports, and published academic works and memoirs documenting and analysing the history 
and evolution of higher education in Sri Lanka. Two types of official policy reports were 
consulted: official reports and statistics on higher education performance, including access 
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and quality, and reports of commissions of inquiry into the universities. Obtaining official 
reports at the archives was not always straightforward. The reports of some politically 
sensitive commissions were restricted. Others were missing from the archives. Efforts were 
taken to mitigate these gaps in documentation: repeated visits to the archives were made, key 
informants were asked if they had copies (which some did), and several book shops were 
visited in Colombo. Though efforts were made to retrieve as much primary source material as 
possible, gaps in data are probably inevitable in a war-torn context where there are political 
sensitivities around the past. As a result, some of the citations of reports come from 
secondary materials. Documents are best analysed in the context of the processes of their 
production and consumption – that is, issues that go beyond their content (Prior, 2003). Prior 
(2003, p. 67) argues ‘documents can be recruited into alliances of interests so as to develop 
and underpin particular visions of the world and the things and events within that world’. In 
this sense, narrative text demands to be analysed in action, or at least situated in the context 
of social relations. For this reason, official government reports are read in the context of who 
commissioned them, who was commissioned, and the wider political character of the state. 
They are interpreted as perspectives developed through a political purpose and setting. 
Contemporary writings of Sri Lankan historians
40
 and policymakers were another key source 
of reference for piecing together a chronology of events, obtaining first-hand accounts of 
critical junctures, and filling in the gaps between them. They were particularly helpful for 
understanding the political context at each critical juncture. As is the custom, several Sri 
Lankan political figures have written memoirs chronicling their time serving in office, and 
sometimes setting out their diagnosis and vision for the higher education sector. Among that 
generation, there are several edited volumes of specific interest to this thesis.
41
  In this way, 
the purpose of developing an historical account was not to re-create history, but to build on 
what is already recorded, and interrogate it through a new lens.  
Conclusions 
This study’s approach and methodology responds to the critique raised earlier that the 
operationalisation of research on the services-legitimacy relationship has sometimes been 
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 Most prominent among these is the unrivalled work of Kingsley de Silva, Sri Lanka’s leading authority on political 
history, particularly his book ‘A History of Sri Lanka’ (1981). In the education sphere, the writings of J.E. Jayasuriya, most 
significantly his book ‘Educational Policies and Progress’ (1976), have been seminal. 
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surprisingly apolitical – that is, free from political context or explanation. This study departs 
from the dominant concern with measuring the relationship between service provision and 
state legitimacy through indicators, towards understanding the dynamic relationship between 
service provision and political processes of state (de-)legitimation. It qualitatively analyses 
the significance of higher education for legitimacy claims, deliberations, and legitimacy 
evaluations. This reflects the idea that processes of legitimation involve interaction between 
legitimacy claims and effects, which could be slow-moving processes. It also aligns with 
historical institutionalism, which likewise focuses on the temporal dimensions and historic 
origins of social outcomes. Though it views legitimation as a process, the study still needs 
ways of observing shifts legitimacy over time. It combines behaviour and attitudinal 
legitimacy markers – legitimacy claims and deliberations in the public sphere, and 
consenting/dissenting behaviours – to address their respective limitations.  
Based on this approach, the following three empirical chapters give an historical, narrative 
account of the relationship between higher education and state (de-)legitimation at three 
critical junctures in Sri Lanka’s history. The sequencing of the chapters is chronological, and 
the narrative begins, as historical-institutional accounts tend to, at the formative initial event. 
In this case, that was the period when the right to higher education was first extended to the 
masses, and became significant for making a new social contract between the post-colonial 






Making the social contract: Higher 
education and post-colonial state 
legitimation 
The Introduction to this thesis argued Sri Lanka’s remarkable progress on welfare alongside 
its deep descent into war appears on the surface to challenge the received wisdom that 
effective performance and improved legitimacy run neatly in parallel. To address this 
paradox, this and the proceeding two chapters examine the relationship between higher 
education – a highly coveted, state-provided good - and state (de-)legitimation, at critical 
junctures in Sri Lanka’s history. Each juncture is identified as a time of shifting legitimacy. 
The aim is to understand the significance of higher education in these legitimacy shifts.  
This chapter traces the role of free, university-level education in the making of a new social 
contract during the process of post-colonial state transformation.
42
 It begins by analysing the 
introduction of the landmark free education reforms in 1945, which was a formative event in 
the relationship between state provision of higher education and state legitimation, and one 
that remains imprinted in collective memory to this day. It argues these reforms were a key 
pillar of a new, welfare-based social contract that helped legitimise the state in a newly 
democratic political landscape. They not only embodied new legitimacy values, anchored in 
nationalist and socialist ideologies, but embedded a commitment on the part of the state to 
protect the welfare of the indigenous population, particularly the poor and marginalised. The 
extension of new rights to free education, from kindergarten up to university level, expressed 
a wider state legitimacy claim to address colonial injustices and legacies of inequality. The 
social contract was reciprocal in that competing political elites successfully courted the 
political support – and consent to rule - of the indigenous majority in return for the extension 
of these new rights and entitlements. 
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 This chapter uses the name Sri Lanka, but during this juncture, the country was known as Ceylon. The name was later 
changed to Sri Lanka under the 1972 Constitution.  
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Sri Lanka’s welfare-based social contract was re-energised and revised after the major 
political conjuncture of 1956. This landmark event in Sri Lanka’s political history marked the 
consolidation of a more staunchly Sinhalese-Buddhist nationalist state. The rise of Sinhalese 
nationalism gave a new impetus to deliver on the promises embedded in the social contract, 
and also a new interpretation of it. Three specific legitimation claims and practices dominated 
the sphere of higher education for at least the following decade. First, there was a dramatic 
and sustained effort to ‘democratise’ higher education. In practice, this entailed opening up 
access to the aggrieved masses, and transforming the system from an elite (Western) to a 
mass (Sinhalese) model. Second, this period saw a series of hasty reforms to nationalise, or 
more accurately Sinhalise, the character and purpose of higher education. Finally, partly in 
reaction to the unsatisfactory pace of change from these earlier legitimation practices, the 
nationalist state also sought to assert greater control over universities and reduce their 
autonomy, so as to maximise scope for political intervention to realise the social contract. 
Each of these legitimation practices appealed politically to the majority Sinhalese. Each was 
justified, rhetorically, through recourse to the colonial injustices done to them. The chapter 
argues that, in this way, higher education was a key arena for making a social contract 
between a resurgent, nationalist state and its main legitimacy audience. 
The chapter is structured as follows. It begins by analysing the significance of the extension 
of free education from a legitimation perspective by considering its role in forming new terms 
of the post-colonial state-society relationship. It then traces forward to the major political 
conjuncture of 1956, and shows how nationalism amplified the material and ideational 
impetus to cater to the legitimising ideas and values in the social contract, but also to mould 
them increasingly to serve the interests of Sinhalese-Buddhist majority in particular. From 
this, the chapter identifies and explores three concurrent legitimation practices - nationalising, 
democratising, and controlling higher education - to illustrate that manipulating access to 
higher education had become a significant commodity in post-colonial Sri Lanka. 
Free education in the social contract 
In the period leading up to the end of colonial rule in 1948, Sri Lanka’s education system 
came to symbolise the injustices of foreign domination. Several such ‘defects’ were first 
formally identified by a Special Committee appointed in 1940, headed by Sri Lanka’s first 
Minister of Education, the Hon. Mr Christopher William Wijekoon Kannangara.
43
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43 Known as ‘The Kannangara Commission’. 
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landmark committee highlighted two particularly pernicious effects of colonialism on 
education: linguistic segregation, and group inequality. Colonial rule, it maintained, had 
segregated the education system at all levels along linguistic lines. While the majority was 
learning in poor quality, free schools in the swabasha languages (Tamil and Sinhala), a 
privileged minority was learning in the English medium, in fee paying, higher quality 
schools. Speaking in Sri Lanka’s elected legislature, the State Council, in 1944, Mr 
Kannangara said this division into two mediums of instruction - English and swabasha - had 
conferred the English-educated with a ‘badge of superiority’ and concomitantly resulted in 
the ‘utter neglect of Sinhalese and Tamil’.
44
 Further inequality, he argued, had been created 
by the wide gulf between the two types of schools – fee-levying and ‘free’. This, Kannangara 
concluded, meant ‘the system was unfair and unjust to a larger section of the population’.
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That larger section was the Sinhala Buddhists, the majority of the population of Sri Lanka. In 
speeches to the State Council, Kannangara pointed out that the 1921 census had found 58.1 
per cent of Christians were literate, compared to 38.6 per cent of Buddhists (the majority), 
28.5 per cent of Hindus and 25.5 per cent of Muslims.
46
 These group inequalities, perpetuated 
by linguistic segregation, were considered an unacceptable legacy of colonialism. 
Inequality and injustice were also keenly observed at the higher level of education, at the 
University of Ceylon. While the Kannangara Committee made no direct claim of 
discrimination against the university, it reported that a colonial system of denominational 
(religious) schools had given the Christians and Tamils that attended these schools 
preferential access to higher education.
47
 During colonial rule, an English education was the 
only available pathway to higher education, taught exclusively in English. The majority of 
schools providing English-medium instruction were denominational (religious) schools. Part 
of the problem, the committee observed, was that certain regions and therefore certain groups 
had benefited from a higher concentration of these schools than others. These were the more 
populated areas of Western Province, Colombo and surrounding commuting districts, as well 
as the Jaffna Peninsula, Galle and Kandy (M. Roberts, 1979, p. 189). Outside these regions, 
English-medium education, and therefore access to higher education, was only available to an 
elite class who could afford to send their children to boarding schools (ibid). These regional 
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and group inequalities were reflected in the actual numbers registered at the University of 
Ceylon. In an influential and widely-cited paper, its first Vice Chancellor, Sir Ivor Jennings 
(1944), reported uneven admissions based on race, religion and economic status. Comparing 
the distribution of races in the three-year period 1942-1944 with the island-wide distribution 
of ethnic groups in the 1921 census, Jennings (1944, p. 2) claimed that Tamils and Burghers 
were proportionately over-represented, and the Sinhalese and Muslims proportionately under-
represented, in the university population. In religious terms, this suggested Christians were 
disproportionately over-represented, Hindus represented roughly proportionately, and 
Buddhists and Muslims much under-represented (ibid, p. 3). The problem, Jennings claimed, 
was not university admissions criteria, which were irrespective of race or ethnicity
48
, but 
regional inequalities in access to schooling. Jaffna Tamils, he claimed, were gaining access to 
higher education disproportionate to their numbers due to a combination of the presence of 
good schools within commutable reach in the district, students’ ability to study and live at 
home (unlike Sinhalese students living outside of Colombo, Kandy and Galle, where 
boarding was the only option available to attend good schools), the lower cost of living, 
lower fees, and a close-knit family support system. Through this important paper, Jennings 
publicised the idea that the legacy of the colonial education system was not only one of group 
inequality but of group favouritism towards the Jaffna Tamils in particular. 
To address perceived group-level injustices, the Kannangara Committee put forward radical 
changes to the system of education, not only at the upper level, but at all levels of education. 
Its report, thereafter known as the Kannangara Report, has since been described by J.E. 
Jayasuriya (2013, p. 112) as ‘the single most important social policy document of this 
period’. The committee made two particularly revolutionary recommendations. The first was 
to extend free, universal and compulsory education at all levels.
49
 Education would be free to 
all, and no educational institution could any longer levy fees, including universities. Second, 
the medium of instruction in secondary schools would be changed to the local swabasha 
languages - Sinhala or Tamil. English would be retained as a compulsory second language, 
however, and university instruction could be in Tamil, Sinhalese or English.  
                                                          
48 Students were admitted based on the number of candidates who sat the entrance examination, the overall standard attained 
(which determined the cut-off for entry), and a student’s ability to pass internal exams and provide the necessary funds. 
49 It is important to note that swabasha education had at that time already been free. The significant change brought about by 
the reform was that English medium education, which was until then provided in denominational schools for a fee, would 
also now be free. 
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Through these changes, free education at all levels, which Kannangara termed the ‘pearl of 
great price’
50
, was enshrined as a fundamental right. The normative justification for this right, 
as Kannangara put it, was that ‘every individual must have equal opportunity so that, 
provided he has the necessary innate ability, he can lift himself from the humblest to the 
highest position in the social, economic and political life of the nation’.
51
 The right to 
education was founded on principles of social justice, equity, and universalism. In a 
frequently-cited statement to the State Council encapsulating this ethos, Kannangara urged 
the passing of the Bill so that councillors would be able to tell future generations that ‘we 
found education dear and left it cheap, that we found it a sealed book and left it an open 
letter, that we found it the patrimony of the rich and left it the inheritance of the poor’.
52
 This 
statement, more than any other, captures the essence of the new ideas underpinning a social, 
welfare-based contract. There would be no financial barrier to education. It would belong not 
to the rich, old elite, but to the new nation. It would be available to all, irrespective of social 
class or economic means.  
Rectifying colonial injustices, and extending new rights to the masses, had intrinsic popular 
appeal. A ‘Central Free Education Defence Committee’ had promoted free education for the 
masses in an island-wide campaign. This had put pressure on state councillors to vote for it, 
while at the same time building the necessary popular support (K. M. De Silva, 1981). As 
Jayasuriya later recalled (1969, p. 25), free education ‘had such an emotional appeal to the 
enfranchised masses that it became a slogan with them’. He continued that ‘for any political 
personality to oppose free education was to commit political suicide, and none dared to take 
the risk’ (ibid, p. 25). The idea of free education was popular because inequality in education 
was not only a perception, and an issue of policy concern, but an acutely felt social reality. As 
elsewhere across the British colonies, the colonial education system in Sri Lanka was 
designed first and foremost to produce an English-speaking cadre of local officials with the 
requisite skills to staff the civil service. However, a nation-wide census revealed that only a 
small minority of the country – some six per cent - was literate in English (J. E. Jayasuriya, 
1969, p. 280). Accordingly, a select committee reported in 1946 that six million Tamils and 
Sinhalese were governed by twenty thousand English-speaking government officials (Pieris, 
1964, p. 447). Poor English literacy was, in this way, a formidable obstacle to government 
                                                          
50 Hansard, June 2 1944, Col 938. Kannangara stated, in defence of free education at all levels, that: ‘I have been condemned 
for offering this ‘false pearl’ of the central schools. I say it is a pearl of great price. Sell all that you have and buy it for the 
benefit of the community. ‘Mankind has struck its tends and is on its onward march’. Let us not lag behind.’ 
51 Hansard, June 2 1944, Col 938 
52 Hansard, June 2, 1944. Col 946 
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employment for the swabasha-educated majority. As the language of government 
administration, English was required for entry also to the professions (teaching, journalism, 
engineering, accounting) (M. Roberts, 1979). Educational segregation therefore visibly 
spilled out into the wider labour market, reinforcing inequalities along linguistic lines. 
Contemporaries described the gulf between the English-speaking minority and swabasha 
speaking majority as amounting to the division of the country into ‘two nations’: westernised 
and indigenous (J.E Jayasuriya, 1976, p. 539). While an English-educated middle class of 
civil servants and plantation entrepreneurs were westernised in their appearance and 
language, the swabasha educated remained true to their historical cultures and dependent on 
the village economy (ibid). In this way, the colonial model of linguistic segregation in 
education perpetuated a visibly divided society.  
As colonialism was coming to an end, Sri Lanka’s political system was reformed in such a 
way that it became highly conducive to re-dressing these visible inequalities. More than a 
decade prior to Independence, in 1931, a landmark colonial commission - the Donoughmore 
Commission – had established Ceylon’s first elected State Council.
53
 This commission 
extended semi-autonomous government and universal franchise for the first time to a British 
colony. Under a new constitution, local legislators were elected to the State Council. Control 
over budgets and resources, however, remained firmly in the hands of the non-elected 
colonial administrators (Jayasuriya, 2010, p. 94). This partial democratisation of the state set 
the stage for a new era of politics. It shifted the basis of power from a system of communal 
representation to one of democratic election, and simultaneously in favour of the 
demographically dominant Sinhalese majority, who outnumbered Tamils by six to one. The 
demographic power of the Sinhalese masses became politically decisive. Thereafter, 
appealing to this constituency was instrumentally vital for politicians seeking election (Pieris, 
1964). At the same time, the incentives to court this majority for electoral gain were not 
restrained by any concern for resources, since that responsibility was retained by colonial 
administrators. This separation between power and budgetary responsibility enabled elected 
legislators to pass progressive social welfare reforms ‘without any acknowledgement of how 
this package of social legislation was to be implemented’ (L. Jayasuriya, 2010, p. 94). From 
that time onwards, ‘proposals for social reform poured out of the legislature like lava from an 
erupting volcano’ (F. R. Jayasuriya, 1969, p. 630). The Kannangara reforms were part of a 
                                                          
53 The State Council comprised 61 members, of which 50 were to be elected by local constituencies. The remainder were 
nominated by the Colonial Governor (E. J. De Silva, 2013, p. 144). 
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welfare-oriented social contract that was enabled by this political environment. In turn, they 




The passing of the free education reforms also marked the ascendance of a new, national 
elite, pitted against a more established, westernised elite with vested interests in preserving 
the status quo. The central champions of free education were a coalition of elites with shared 
nationalist and socialist ideologies.
55
 Themselves English-educated, they galvanised support 
for the reform from a second-tier elite, comprising Buddhist monks, swabasha teachers, and 
editors of swabasha print media (J.E Jayasuriya, 1976). The bill was supported by backbench 
pressure groups reflecting these interests, including younger members of the Ceylon National 
Congress (K. M. De Silva, 1981). These groups overcame significant opposition from those 
who benefited from the system of fee-paying English schools and missionary schools: 
including state councillors of both Buddhist and Christian religion with ties to these schools, 
who sought to delay and disrupt its passing. Key figures associated with foreign rule, 
including then leader of the State Council, D.S. Senanayake, and Sir Ivor Jennings, were 
among those reportedly lukewarm about the proposals (J.E Jayasuriya, 1976). Support for 
free education was by no means unanimous, even among the Kannangara Committee itself. 
Indeed, the idea that education should be free at all levels was reportedly a late entry into its 
recommendations (E. J. De Silva, 2013). There were concerns about the high associated costs 
to the state, the magnitude of the task of implementing free education across the island, and, 
from a socialist viewpoint, a fear that children from poorer backgrounds would not be able to 
pay the associated costs of attending anyway (travel, meals, etc) (ibid). As a result, the bill 
was debated for more than a year in the State Council, passing only in 1945, after having 
taken up 15 days of discussion in total (E. J. De Silva, 2013). But delays could not assuage 
pressure for social justice. First-hand accounts suggest that members of the Special 
Committee were of the view that raising living standards, preventing unemployment, and 
promoting social security - relied ‘first and foremost’ on education (E. J. De Silva, 2013, pp. 
172-174). Kannangara himself spoke out against the vested interests that defended the ‘sacred 
                                                          
54 Jayasuriya (2013, p. 112), who has written extensively on Sri Lanka’s welfare state, wrote that free education, along with 
health and social security ‘established firmly the principle of collective provision for common human and social needs 
through state intervention’. 
55 C.W.W.Kannangara and A.Ratnayake were leading nationalists, and N.M Perera a pioneering socialist in support of the 
reform (Jayasuriya, 1976, p. 472). 
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edifice’ of a denominational education system.
56
 While he acknowledged the contribution of 
these schools to social development, he said ‘where the nation calls for justice that kind of 
shibboleth of gratitude shall not stand in the way of our taking proper action’.
57
 The passing 
of free education thereby signified the victory of a new order over an established system of 
elite benefits, and of a new driving socialist ideology over pragmatic concerns.  
In turn, the extension of this fundamental right to education to the masses was a victory for 
them, and the culmination of a process of their political awakening and mobilisation. A local 
political organisation, the Sinhala Mahajana Sabha, had been instrumental in this process by 
developing a network of associations of peasant cultivators that promised rural regeneration 
and self-government for Sri Lanka (K. M. De Silva, 1981). This grass-roots organisation 
stimulated and later harnessed the voting power of a national ‘sub-elite’ of Sinhalese 
Buddhist activists and Bhikkus
58
, including teachers, traders, and cultivators. Significantly for 
the time, the organisation conducted its affairs in Sinhalese, and supported Buddhist political 
candidates in opposition to Christians. It was led by key political figures that later ascended 
to leading roles in the post-colonial political order, including both DC Senanayake, the first 
Prime Minister and so-called ‘father of the nation’, and his successor, SWRD Bandaranaike. 
This movement was countered by more radically leftist political movements
59
, who 
politicised the urban people, including the Marxist Lanka Sama Samaj Party (L.S.S.P). But in 
Sri Lanka, both then and now, the majority rural population are the critical mass of voters, 
and competing political organisations could not match the mass following the Mahajana 
Sabha had mustered by appealing to them (K. M. De Silva, 1981). This process of political 
mobilisation demonstrated that the mid-level Sinhalese elite controlling the rural masses were 
the key audience to whom aspiring political elites needed to win legitimacy among. In effect, 
the rural Sinhalese majority became the state’s main legitimacy audience. Extending new 
rights to this constituency was part of a process of consolidating their relational ties to the 
state. 
Free education became significant for incorporating this legitimacy audience into the state not 
only instrumentally, but ideationally. Colonial injustices had amounted to a denial of national 
identity. To the majority Sinhalese, western education was unpalatable, linguistic segregation 
                                                          
56 One obvious source of vested interest was that those who had been educated within the system naturally defended it. As 
Kannangara said in the State Council ‘Who dare condemn a school in which he was educated’. Hansard, June 2 1944, Col. 
924 
57 Hansard, June 2 1944, Col. 924 
58
 An ordained Buddhist monk 
59 Led by A.E. Goonesinha, under the Young Lanka League 
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unacceptable, and group inequalities unforgivable. Tamil dominance in front-line government 
jobs was considered a visible symbol of minority privilege (Laiq, 1985). Against this 
backdrop, addressing injustice in education was part of the search for national self-respect, 
which has been described as the most ‘powerful motor-force in the development of 
nationalist sentiments as a whole’ (M. Roberts, 1979, p. 65). The new rights and ideas 
enshrined in free education were inseparable from the development of the identity of the 
Sinhalese nation. Indeed, in Kannangara’s own words, the very fate of the nation hinged on 
education reform. In his closing remarks to the State Council, on the second reading of the 
bill, he said: ‘Are we going to have a nation in this country or not? Are we going to be slaves 
forever? Are we not going to have some freedom? If we aim at that, let us start with our 
schools, let us educate our people’.
60
 These provisions, he said, would give education ‘lasting 
value to the nation’. Just as educational injustice had denied national identity, delivering 
educational justice was rhetorically tied to its restoration. Free state education at all levels 
was enshrined in the social contract as a fundamental right. 
The political environment for escalating legitimacy claims 
The passing of free education reforms was a seminal event in the forging of new state-society 
relations in a new post-colonial order and a key pillar of a new, welfare-based social contract. 
In turn, this contract helped embed a new set of legitimising ideas and values based on 
equality, social justice and state intervention. The egalitarian ethos of the free education 
reforms had been universalist in principle. It did not discriminate in principle between Sri 
Lanka’s majority and minority ethnic populations – Sinhalese and Tamil. At the same time, 
the political rewards in the new, post-colonial era of democratic representation lay primarily 
in catering to the majority Sinhalese constituency. In this political environment, competing 
nationalist and populist elites reinterpreted the foundational ideas of equity as primarily 
meaning social justice for the rural Sinhalese.  
The political conjuncture of 1956 was a formative event for ushering a new, Sinhalese-
Buddhist reinterpretation of the education social contract. For the first time since 
independence, the dominant centre-right United National Party (UNP) of the westernised elite 
was defeated by a centre-left coalition of Sinhalese-nationalist elites, led by the Sri Lanka 
Freedom Party (SLFP).
61
 This victory marked the ascendance of a Buddhist revivalist 
                                                          
60 Hansard, June 2, 1944. Col 946 
61 The electoral defeat was significant: The coalition led by the SLFP, under the banner of the Mahajana Eksath Peramuna 
(MEP), won 51.6 per cent of the votes, as compared to the UNP’s 8.4 per cent (Bush, 2013, p. 88). 
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movement in politics. The SLFP championed a populist platform of ethnic chauvinism that 
appealed strongly to the religious, linguistic and material grievances of the Sinhalese masses  
(Kearney, 1975). Together with more leftist political parties (Trotskyites and Communists), it 
campaigned to restore Buddhism and Buddhist language to its rightful place in the state and 
society, and deliver distributional equity for the rural Sinhalese majority (Bush, 2003). Their 
leader, SWRD Bandaranaike, had defected from the established United National Party 
(UNP), and found a new support base among the pivotal Sinhalese mid-level elite – the 
state’s main legitimacy constituency - courted by the Mahajana Sabha. In this way, as 
Kingsley de Silva (1981, p. 517) wrote, ‘the SLFP had accommodated itself – as the UNP 
clearly did not – to an expanding ‘political nation’ in which a Sinhalese-Buddhist 
intermediary elite sought an influence commensurate with its numbers’. The SLFP’s victory 
marked the culmination of the successful mobilisation of the peasant vote in Sri Lanka, a 
breakthrough that was itself aided by early franchise and push to welfarism, including free 
education (Obeyesekere, 1974). Thereafter, the politics of mass welfare took on added 
impetus, and came to dominate the political landscape for at least a decade (L. Jayasuriya, 
2010). The victory of ethno-nationalists gave a new impetus to cater to the promise of social 
justice embedded in the welfare contract.  
It was significant that leading up to this, the newly agitated and politically mobilised 
Sinhalese majority constituency had demonstrated their power as a strategically important 
legitimacy audience. A one-day ‘hartal’, or mass strike, on 12th August 1953 had recently 
and graphically demonstrated the masses would come to the streets to protest against 
measures perceived as unfavourable to them. This, the first mass uprising in Sri Lanka, 
erupted in reaction to Dudley Senanayake’s – then leader of the Westernised UNP - attempt 
to remove the rice subsidy, and in the process, break an election promise to preserve it. 
Leftist movements of Marxists and Trotskyists that went on to join the SLFP’s coalition had 
supported the one-day strike. At the University of Ceylon, situated in the Central Province at 
Peradeniya, police had opened fire against the protesting students and several were killed. 
The ensuing uproar forced the Prime Minister to resign in October 1953 (K. M. De Silva, 
1981). Several scholars have described this as a pivotal moment for the entrenchment of 
welfare politics in Sri Lanka when the masses showed their teeth (Kelegama, 2000, p. 1481). 
In this way, it was a precursor of what was to come, and a wakeup call to the state. It 
demonstrated the repercussions of breaking the commitments to the masses enshrined in the 
welfare contract. Opposition parties, including the SLFP, thereafter united in opposition to 
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the UNP, promoting non-capitalist government that would first and foremost uphold their 
welfare.  
After the victory of the SLFP, populist promises to deliver social justice only escalated. Sri 
Lanka was now a dual party, ethnic majoritarian state. Thereafter, the two competing 
Sinhalese parties sought to correct perceived inequalities, and in particular perceived Tamil 
advantage, in what some scholars have termed a process of politicised ‘ethnic outbidding’ 
(DeVotta, 2004; Sriskandarajah, 2005). Between 1956 and 1977, the ruling party, or some 
coalition including minor parties, changed five times.
62
 These pendulum swings only 
magnified the electoral promises, and pressures, for social justice for the masses that 
characterised the earlier post-colonial era. The search for political legitimacy in this new 
political landscape became dependent on serving the social contract and the commitment to 
social justice (L. Jayasuriya, 2010). The political environment both responded to, and 
generated, greater mass agitation for such justice. Voter turnout increased significantly along 
with the politicisation of the rural villages, from 56 per cent in 1947 to 70 per cent in 1956 
and up to almost 85 per cent in 1970 (Kearney 1975, p. 457).  In turn, this expansion of 
citizenship, and political awakening, increased the pressure on the state to continue to deliver 
the promise of social justice embedded in the social contract. 
The SLFP’s ascent to power in 1956 also brought with it a Buddhist interpretation to social 
justice in university education. A Buddhist revival in politics was aided by the religious 
fervour surrounding the 2500
th
 Anniversary of the parinibbana (death) of the Buddha in that 
same year. The rural vote had simultaneously shifted from the UNP’s brand of non-
communal nationalism to the ethno-centric brand of nationalism proffered by the SLFP. In 
this context, the report of a Committee of Enquiry, entitled ‘The Betrayal of Buddhism’ was 
highly significant for rekindling old grievances (All Ceylon Buddhist Congress, 1956). It 
repeated earlier claims that Buddhists were not duly represented in the population of 
university graduates. It made a particularly striking assertion that ‘a Christian child may be 
computed to have 1 in 200 chances of gaining admission to the University. A Hindu child’s 
chances are 1 in 500. The chances of a Buddhist child are one in one thousand, of a Muslim 
one in two thousand’ (All Ceylon Buddhist Congress, 1956, p. 94). To remedy this perceived 
                                                          
62 Election victories were as follows: 1956, Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) led by SWRD Bandaranaike; 1960 (March) 
United National Party (UNP), led by Dudley Senanayake (could not form a government due to insufficient majority); 1960 
(July) Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), led by Sirimavo Bandaranaike; 1965 United National Party (UNP), led by Dudley 
Senanayake as National Front coalition; 1970 Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), led by Sirimavo Banaranaike as United 
Front coalition; 1977 United National Party (UNP) led by JR Jayewardene. 
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injustice, the report recommended a re-doubling of measures to expand access to higher 
education. Its tone was impatient, to say the least, claiming that ‘almost every page of this 
report bears witness to the extent and duration of Buddhist tolerance’ (All Ceylon Buddhist 
Congress, 1956, p. 124). At the same time, during the 1950s, ‘impressionistic views’ of 
Tamil’s claiming ‘more than their fair share’ in the professions were propagated by 
opportunistic politicians (M. Roberts, 1979, pp. 70-71). Pledging to act on the report, and 
return Buddhists to their rightful place in higher education, had been an electoral promise of 
the now victorious SWRD Bandaranaike. In this way, political legitimacy was stirring and 
then riding on a wave of manufactured nationalism. In the education sphere, this gave new 
impetus to pick up the pace of implementation of a Sinhalese-nationalist version of social 
justice. This found expression in three legitimation practices that dominated the higher 
education arena in the altered political environment after 1956: democratising, nationalising 
and controlling higher education.  
Legitimation practice I: Democratising higher education 
For at least a decade after 1956, Sri Lanka pursued what has been termed a ‘social demand’ 
model of higher education which in practice entailed mass expansion (Jayaweera, 1969). As 
the label implies, its driving principle was that access to university should be designed first 
and foremost to meet demand, and that all who were qualified to enter the universities should 
be given access. In this way, the social demand model took the right to education embedded 
in the social contract to its logical conclusion. It also responded to the social effects of earlier 
post-colonial education reforms. Through the 1950s, the intergenerational benefits of free 
education had begun to bear fruit, as more children were being born to educated parents with 
better economic opportunities than preceding generations. As these intergenerational effects 
were felt, popular demand for education at all levels grew (Aturupane, 2009). School 
enrolment in Sri Lanka had risen from 360,000 in 1920, up to almost 800,000 by the end of 
1945 (Kearney, 1975, p. 370). A significant rise in secondary education enrolment swelled 
the number of candidates taking the advanced level qualifications necessary to enter the 
University of Ceylon. As a former education secretary recalled, ‘with the medium change, 
larger numbers became entitled to university education’.
63
 The number of candidates 
increased from 2,026 in 1956, to 31,199 in 1965 (Jayaweera, 1990, p. 52). By 1959, not long 
after the consolidation of the ethno-nationalist state, the first cohort of children educated in 
                                                          
63 Interview with retired government official, Colombo: October 11, 2014. 
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the swabasha was ready to graduate from secondary school and enter the universities.  In this 
way, the social contract had had a self-reinforcing property. Moreover, it had come of age 
along with the consolidation of an ethno-nationalist state.  
Political pressure to widen access to university simultaneously mounted among all ethnic 
groups. Because of the high levels of social demand, securing entry to Sri Lanka’s only 
university, the University of Ceylon, was a significant source of patronage for political elites. 
The university, however, was not equipped to accommodate rising demand. Press reports 
emerged suggesting students who were rightly entitled to education were not being allowed 
entry due to a lack of accommodation available.
64
 In 1957, for example, only 75 of 337 
applicants to the faculty of engineering were accepted, due to a lack of accommodation. To 
the government, the inability of the university to accommodate all qualified prospective 
entrants – and realise the right to education - presented a political problem in the sense that it 
was easy ammunition for the opposition. In 1957, the leader of the opposition, Dr Perera, 
complained in the House of Representatives that after nearly 20 years it was only in the 
previous year that he succeeded in getting five students from his constituency into the 
university. He bemoaned accordingly that there was ‘an obligation they [the government] 
owed to the rural folk. Even if the students failed when they came out of the university, they 
came out with a broader outlook towards life’.
65
 Expanding access, and thereby dismantling 
the elitist model of education, was nothing less than fulfilling a promise to the people.
66
 
Political pressure reflected the issue-salience of accessing higher education in the wider 
public sphere. The principal of one of Sri Lanka’s largest Buddhist schools called admissions 
to the science faculties a ‘gamble’, on the basis of the very limited spaces.
67
 Organised 
student bodies, including the Ceylon National Union of Students, also began to agitate for an 
increase the number of places. One MP, Dr S.A. Wickremasinghe, claimed in the press that 
‘the thinking public are gravely concerned with the future of higher education’. He called 
small, slow measures, such as the plans afoot to build a new faculty at the university 
‘reminiscent of Nero’s fiddling while Rome was burning’.
68
 In reply, the new SLFP 
government was, according to Mr Bandaranaike, ‘fully alive’ to the increased need for 
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65 ‘University council hid facts from Vice-Chancellor’, Daily News, August 15, 1957. 
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 The political stage was set for the new nationalist government to 
begin, unabated, to ‘open the doors’ to university education.
70
 
The dethronement of English as the medium of instruction and the sole pathway to accessing 
university was a key pillar of the expansion of access. Since independence, successive 
governments had sought to dismantle the colonial legacy of linguistic segregation in 
education. In the 1950s, the language of instruction in schools had been changed from 
English to swabasha in the first year of school entry. The pace of change had been slow, 
however. By 1954, the Sinhalese language of the majority was still not operative as a medium 
of instruction, or even of the conduct of affairs, at the University of Ceylon. This was 
publicly illustrated when Mr Bandaranaike reported in Parliament that the English Vice 
Chancellor of the University of Ceylon, Sir Ivor Jennings, had refused to even hear a motion 
put forward in Sinhalese by a member of the University Court.
71
 Moreover, the switchover to 
swabasha up to secondary level meant school-education was out of synch with university-
level education. School students taught in the swabasha were now seeking entrance to the 
university, where they would study in English, a language they had only learned inadequately 
(as a compulsory second language). Those studying to be teachers were obtaining a degree in 
the English medium, only to return to teach in schools in the swabasha. One MP, speaking in 
the House of Representatives in August 1957, called this ‘midsummer madness, not an 
education policy’.
 72
 In the same year, the government made the formal request to switch the 
language of instruction at the university level to the swabasha.
73
 Full switchover to swabasha, 
including in the sciences, was declared from 1968 onwards.  
The issue of language of instruction at the university became more politically salient under 
the SLFP’s ethno-centric brand of nationalism. A high profile Commission on Higher 
Education in the National Languages (Government of Ceylon, 1956) had reiterated the role 
of English in the reproduction of colonial injustice and called for English to yield pride of 
place to swabasha. It claimed English was not only excluding the majority but hindering the 
development of national identity, since ‘as things stand now, university education is denied to 
94 per cent of the people’. It further called for a ratio of ‘six Sinhalese students to every 
single Tamil student’ and, to this end, recommended the creation of new universities to cater 
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72 ‘The university – urgent tasks ahead’, Dr. S. A. Wickremasinghe, MP, Daily News, September 6, 1957. 
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to the swabasha educated. This, it argued, would allow for the ‘restoration to the people of 
their cherished inheritance, their culture and language and way of life’ (ibid, p. 82). The 
report also challenged the dominant status of English on more pragmatic grounds, noting that 
‘English has been the medium of higher education for the last 150 years. Have we produced a 
single outstanding scientist, research scholar or critic?’  (ibid, p. 41). These findings reflected 
a popular view that switchover to swabasha was essential to ‘bridge the gap existing in 
society between the English-educated and the swabasha-educated’.
74
 Shifting to swabasha 
medium at university level was vital for realising the responsibility of the government to 
fulfil the right to education.  
Expansion of access to university education in the swabasha languages was a consistent 
theme throughout the late 1950s and early 1960s. It peaked with the election of the second 
SLFP government, led by SWRD’s widow, Mrs Sirimavo Bandaranaike, in 1960. The 
number of registered students exploded thereafter. Under the first Sri Lankan Vice 
Chancellor of the University of Ceylon, Sir Nicholas Attygalle, the student population trebled 
between 1960 and 1965/6, from 3,181 to 10,723 (Jayaweera, 2010, p. 49). Sir Attygalle told 
the Ceylon Daily News that all students who passed the entrance exam for university would 
be admitted, and no prospective undergraduates would be shut out, ‘even though they may be 
in excess of the actual vacancies at the university’.
75
 At the same time, expenditure on the 
universities rose steadily, from LKR 7,325 in 1955/56 to LKR 18,466 in 1965/66 {(Kearney, 
1975), 1969 #233@895}. Progressive measures were taken to expand accommodation and 
facilities. Such was the scale of expansion that by 1965 the University of Ceylon had been 
forced to acquire, on an ad hoc basis, the adjacent Colombo Race Course at Reid Avenue, 
where horses used to run, to deliver lectures over the public address system, in the open-air
76
 
(E. J. De Silva, 2013). The local people derisively called it ‘ashva vidyalaya’ (meaning 
equine college, or university for horses). The university simultaneously shifted from a 
residential-only model to conferring a large proportion of external degrees.
77
 Affiliated 
colleges were created and upgraded to university status. New science and medical faculties 
were opened in Peradeniya, an arts faculty in Colombo, and two new halls of residence were 
opened (Wijewardene and Akbar halls). Later, in 1967, the University of Ceylon was divided 
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75 ‘Undergrads will not be shut out’, Daily News, March 3, 1960.  
76 It was reported that lectures were delivered over loudspeaker to up to 2,000 arts graduates seated in the grandstand 
("University Autonomy in Ceylon," 1966). 
77 There were 4,092 new registrations for external degrees between 1965-1966 alone, taking the total registered external 
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into two administrative campuses: the University of Ceylon, Peradeniya and the University of 
Ceylon, Colombo. The right to education was in full swing. In the momentum, university 
faculties had lost control over admissions.
78
 
This rapid and seemingly uninhibited democratisation of higher education was justified, 
rhetorically, through recourse to the earlier legitimising idea that education should be 
available equally to all, regardless of wealth or social status. Dominant political narratives 
conveyed the significance of access to higher education for realising the social contract with 
the rural Sinhalese. The SLFP was driven by the idea that ‘a qualified applicant was deemed 
to have a right to a university education’ (E. J. De Silva, 2013, p. 214). Accordingly, Mr 
Bandaranaike argued ‘the common man deserved his place’ in higher education.
79
 He later 
reflected on the effects of democratisation in the same vein, finding it ‘a matter of great 
satisfaction and encouragement to find that those of them who were successfully going 
through a university education were not limited to a particular type of school or college, and a 
good many of them were rural schools’.
80
 Three separate Commissions of Inquiry in the late 
1950s and early 1960s reiterated the egalitarian ideology underpinning it.
81
 The Commission 
on Higher Education in the National Languages, urged that ‘the availability of employment 
should not be an argument for limiting higher education’ (1956, pp. 82-83). Whilst 
acknowledging the growing popular demand for education, and encouraging the government 
to continue open up access, it also reported a deterioration of standards, and forewarned the 
potential challenges of creating a cohort of unemployed graduates. A later commission stated 
‘nothing should be done to deny university education to any student who has the capacity to 
benefit from it’ (Universities Commission, 1963). Such expansion, at whatever cost, was 
justified because it was a matter of reclaiming self-esteem and realising post-colonial rights 
and freedoms. Specifically, ‘if people are to realise what freedom stands for, and what it 
means, they must be in a position to know what is taking place in their own country’ (ibid, p. 
23). Because the social demand model pursued a principled right, it was uninhibited by 
pragmatic concerns. 
The rhetorical power of the right to education sometimes resulted in reforms that were not 
always fully attuned to the needs of the education system itself. The government faced 
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dissent from the University of Ceylon over the switchover to swabasha, for example. There 
were few textbooks available in the local languages, and limited academic staff able to teach 
in all three languages (Malasekera, 1969). Political leaders claimed to be investing resources 
into the translation of textbooks to address this.
82
 But again, the crux of the problem was not 
viewed as a pragmatic one, but a matter of principle. A former Education Minister surmised 
that ‘the university wanted to remain in the same mould which Jennings created’, referring to 
the Westernised, elite origins of the university, but this was outmoded in face of ‘pressure to 
enthrone the Sinhala language’ (Warnapala, 2011, p. 216). The switchover to swabasha 
before proper provisions were in place was an example of putting the political cart before the 
horse. 
By the early 1960’s, the negative effects of unplanned expansion began to surface. The 
University of Ceylon had originally planned to accommodate up to 3,500 students, but the 
university population was now over 10,000 (E. J. De Silva, 2013). Eric de Silva (2013, p. 
215), a former student and later Minister of Education, recalled that ‘the explosion of 
numbers was virtually making the university system stand on its head’.  Expansion put a 
strain on water supply (Malalgoda, 1997). A later report on the viability of expanding 
university status to the University of Ceylon, Colombo
83
 lamented that ‘it appears to have 
come to be assumed that a qualified student has the right, not only to a university education, 
but also to an education in the subject. No university can function on this basis’ (Cited in 
Malasekera, 1969, p. 885). A University Commission Report of 1962 had warned against 
‘any attempt to stampede the universities into teaching all subjects at all levels in the 
swabasha medium’ (1963, p. 509). In its conclusion, it emphasised the need for a sound and 
long-term educational policy ‘untrammelled by considerations of race, caste or creed, or by 
any false sense of nationalism. For this purpose we strongly recommend that the problems of 
educational policy should be removed from the realm of party politics and treated on a 
national level’ (1963, p. 518). 
These reports are in contrast to the vitriolic political narratives justifying mass expansion. 
These are exemplified by the words of then Minister of Finance Mr U. B. Wanninayake, 
speaking at a prize-giving ceremony at a Buddhist school, Baialla Maha Vidyalaya. He said 
that ‘whatever the difficulties Ceylon had to experience on account of free education, the 
results of the system were marvellous. Higher education was earlier confined to the richer 
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classes generally and to those in the cities. But now children of the villages were reaping the 
benefits of free education as a result 75 per cent of the entrants to the universities were 
children from the rural areas’.
 84
 The rhetorical legitimacy dividend from catering to social 
demand from the Sinhalese had been fully exploited all costs. Delivering on the principle of 
the right to education, and fulfilling the promise to the poor embedded in the social contract, 
had been a driving political legitimation imperative. 
Legitimation practice II: Nationalising higher education 
Another strand of reform that sought to realise the promises in the social contract involved 
nationalising, or more accurately Sinhalising, higher education. After 1956, the elite legacy of 
university education inherited from colonial rulers was increasingly at odds with the values of 
the resurgent Buddhist-nationalist state. Initiating a national system of education was not only 
a matter of national pride, but rightfully the responsibility of the welfare state. This 
responsibility was realised most starkly when the government upgraded two Pirivenas - 
centres of Buddhist learning - to the status of fully fledged universities under the Pirivenas 
Universities Act of 1958. Two new universities were created: Vidyodaya Pirivena, based at 
Maligakanda, and Vidyalankara Pirivena, based at Kelaniya. This upgrading was a major 
symbolic event in a wider process of de-colonising and nationalising higher education.
85
 It 
channelled and realised some of the post-colonial state’s central legitimation claims: to 
dismantle the elitist colonial legacy over education, democratise access, and in the process, 
reclaim national self-esteem. 
The impetus to upgrade the Pirivenas had come partly from the fact that the University of 
Ceylon was perceived as alien to Sri Lanka’s national identity. Perceptions of higher 
education as overtly western in its orientation, and therefore not reflecting the nation-state, 
had bubbled since its establishment in 1921. Indeed, the vision of the first agitators for a local 
university was to create ‘a university adapted to local needs’ that would ensure ‘our youth do 
not grow up strangers to their mother tongue and to their past history and traditions’ (Cited 
in: K. M. De Silva, 1978, p. 252).
86
 In the event, however, the University of Ceylon was 
modelled on Cambridge and Oxford by its British architect, Sir Ivor Jennings. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, it therefore failed to live up to indigenous ideals, demonstrated by the foreign 
content of the curricula and the westernised appearance of the students (Pieris, 1964). Indeed, 
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Jennings’ own vision was for the university to become ‘the site for transmitting Western 
cultural traditions and sustaining the dialogue between the liberal intelligentsia who were 
expected to be the guardians of this rich legacy long after the end of colonial rule’ 
(Jayasuriya, 2010, pp. 96-97). In this way, far from representing a national resurgence, the 
first university had been critical in perpetuating the westernised political elite (L. Jayasuriya, 
2010).
87
 The idea that the university should continue to do so was increasingly unpalatable to 
the resurgent, indigenous-nationalist elite. 
The upgrading of the Pirivenas marked a continuation, but escalation, of the de-colonisation 
of education. The Kannangara report had propagated the idea that education belonged to the 
nation, and should reflect and serve its needs above all. It had found education unsuitable for 
Sri Lanka’s economic and social needs, owing to what it termed ‘excessive uniformity which 
was purely academic in character and bore little relation to the practice aspects of life’. 
88
 The 
type of education, it claimed, imparted was along the lines of the British grammar schools. It 
was academic rather than vocational in nature, with no emphasis on technical, agricultural or 
commercial training (K. M. De Silva, 1981). These ideas were powerful, and carried through 
time. When the House of Representatives discussed education appropriations for the year 
1953-54, MPs evoked the same criticisms of the western model, arguing that higher 
education in particular was not well adapted to local conditions, nor the industrial needs of 
the country. One member went so far as to say that ‘the only connection that [the University] 
had with Ceylon is that it was situated on the soil of Ceylon’. 
89
 In this way, the University of 
Ceylon was not considered to be sufficiently furthering the development of national 
prosperity, nor culture. Ministers emphasised the essential need for a ‘practical bias in the 
system of education, so that children would be equipped for future work’.
90
 These sentiments 
were also captured in an official Commission of Inquiry, the Needham Commission, which 
reported in 1959 (Government of Ceylon, 1959). It criticised the university on the grounds 
that its atmosphere ‘was alien and hostile to the traditions of the country’ (ibid, p. 5). It 
further lambasted the university as persistently promoting ‘an ivory tower attitude, devoid of 
responsibility to the nation’. It claimed these sentiments were widely held, and had stirred 
collective resentment of the universities among the public. 
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If the orientation and purpose of the university was unpalatably Western, then the antidote 
was to dislocate it from it western roots, and re-plant it in the local culture and tradition. In 
this vein, a new ‘national education’ was pursued to redress the alien westernised purpose 
and form of education (M. Roberts, 1979, p. 229). A key aspect of re-nationalisation was 
breaking the Christian monopoly over education in particular. Since Kannangara’s reforms, 
legislators had been placing progressive restrictions on Christian missionary schools in lieu of 
state support for Tamil and Sinhala-medium schools. Between 1930 and 1960, the number of 
Buddhist schools more than quadrupled, from 240, to 1,121. During the same period, the 
number of Christian schools declined from 1,353 to 1,170 (C. R. De Silva, 1979, p. 478). In 
1957, the Prime Minister lamented the development of Christian education during the rule of 
foreigners. He said government had spent ‘an enormous portion of its wealth on education, 
but are we getting enough results?’
91
 In the same vein, reforms at the university level sought 
to displace Christian values and replace them with Buddhist ones. The influential Betrayal of 
Buddhism report had earlier implored the government to elevate the status of training in 
Pirivenas to degree level on the basis that there should be equality in Buddhist and university-
level education. It stated that ‘the standard of the degree should be equal to that of a 
university degree, and the holder of one accorded the same status as the holder of the other’ 
(All Ceylon Buddhist Congress, 1956, p. 122). In the event, the Pirivenas Act specifically 
included ‘the promotion of Sinhala and Buddhist culture’ as part of the responsibility of the 
two new universities (Malasekera, 1969). It also allowed for the appointment of Buddhist 
monks as Vice Chancellors. In this way, growing hostility to the western, and by association 
Christian, character of the university spawned a recoil to a Buddhist-nationalist interpretation. 
Political narratives reinforced the symbolic significance of the Pirivenas to the Sinhalese 
nation. The official justifications for the Bill were that these universities would give the 
Sinhala language its due place in the higher education scheme, that they would help train 
future Sinhala teachers, and that they would provide an option for those students turned away 
from the University of Ceylon because of limited accommodation (E. J. De Silva, 2013, p. 
212). At the same time as lauding the Pirivenas, the Education Minister lambasted the 
Peradeniya University for its continued western association. He reportedly said ‘the 
Peradeniya University its buildings and the panoramic scenery give the impression that it is a 
heaven on earth but it is biased in favour of everything Western’. He went on to say he was 
glad to be able to preside over the revival of the ‘glorious education system of the past in 
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which Buddhist culture was an integral part’. Furthermore, ‘Pirivena education must become 
the heart of the system’.
92
 This illustrates that the Pirivenas were legitimised in the negative, 
prized as much for the nationalist outlook they would embody, as recoil to unpalatable 
western values. 
The so-called renaissance of Pirivena education appealed directly to the main legitimacy 
audience of Sinhalese. The event of the opening of the new universities was front-page news 
and a ‘matter of great joy’.
93
 It was keenly anticipated that, contrary to their Western 
counterpart, these national universities would benefit from first-hand knowledge of the 
problems facing the nation.
94
 They would finally deliver a system of education ‘of which we 
all can rightly be proud’.
 95
  At the inaugural ceremony, the Minister of Education described 
the granting of university status to these institutions ‘one of the most important historical 
events in the last 500 years’. Pirivena Universities represented the restoration of the pre-
colonial order, and a return to the era of the Kings of Ceylon, when they had offered the only 
available education. 
96
 The Education Minister said ‘the object of the government was to 
mould the education system to suit the needs and requirements of the people of the country’.
 
97
 This was a matter of national pride, and a question of ‘giving education back to the 
people’, made possible by the new freedom of the nation. He further said that: ‘national 
education cannot be separated from national culture, because national culture is a part of 
national education’.
98
 These political narratives conveyed the normative appeal of the 
reinstatement of the Pirivenas: they symbolised the return to a national education in a national 
form.
99
  It was morally appropriate to do so, and in turn, doing so presented an opportunity to 
reaffirm the moral authority, and legitimacy claims, of the new political order. 
As with the push to democratisation, the education system was moulded to a principle as 
much as to the pragmatic needs of the nation. Likewise, as with democratisation, cracks 
began to surface in implementation. Legislation to confer university status onto the two 
Pirivenas had been put together hastily. A significant motive had been to satisfy newly 
powerful sectional interests. In particular, it made a concession to the Buddhist Sangha, a 
group of monks who had supported the campaign of the SLFP in the run up to the 1956 
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election, and on whom they continued to rely (Warnapala, 2011). At the time, the SLFP was 
publicly calling on the Bikkus to be loyal to government, telling them it was their duty to 
support a government voted by the masses
100
. For the same reason, an official commission 
appointed in subsequently lambasted the architects of the Pirivenas Act. It lamented the role 
of the ‘political bhikku’ in its architecture, many of whom it alleged were subsequently 
employed as teachers at the Pirivenas. It recommended full repeal of the Act (Universities 
Commission, 1963). Indeed, ironically, the two new Pirivenas Universities were later forced 
to secularise their entrance criteria, and open up to lay students, under the weight of the social 
demand model (Malasekera, 1969).
101
 As the next chapter will also show, there was a 
perception that indiscipline and disobedience grew in the universities precisely because 
appropriate Buddhist values were not being imparted at them. In this, way, the social contract 
was rhetorically served by the nationalisation of higher education, but its contribution to this 
goal was not so straightforward in practice. 
Legitimation practice III: Escalating state control of higher education 
Strategies to assert greater state control over universities and reduce their autonomy also 
escalated after the political conjuncture of 1956. The Kannangara report specifically called on 
the state to reclaim responsibility for education, in order to remedy the injustices done to the 
masses. Indeed, it assigned a degree of blame to the state for neglecting its responsibility, and 
allowing a situation of perceived injustice to develop and persist. It criticised the 
denominational system as akin to the ‘abrogation of state responsibility for education’. 
Speaking in the State Council, Kannagara said ‘the present system is nothing short of a 
system of farming-out education’. 
102
 In the political arena in the decades that followed, 
efforts to exert greater state control over higher education continued to be justified through 
recourse to this idea that education had been an alien imposition, and should be re-claimed, 
territorially and symbolically, by the state and by association the people of Sri Lanka.  
In a context where the state had no formal powers to intervene in the running of university 
affairs, efforts to assert greater authority over them were re-doubled in the new post-colonial 
order. This reached an apex when a newly elected coalition of centre-right political parties 
drafted the Higher Education Act no. 20 of 1966. The aim was to give the government new, 
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far-reaching powers to exercise control and co-ordination over the universities. Among its 
provisions, it would allow the collection of fees for certain courses, and conferred the Hon. 
Minister of Education the power to appoint members of a new National Council of Higher 
Education (NCHE). The NCHE was a central admissions bureau that would administer one 
common entrance exam for the universities, and regulate admissions. It would be able 
recommend the size of the grant to the universities, control the admission of students, decide 
the style, name and site of the university, as well as making regulations regarding the 
recruitment and conditions of university staff. Furthermore, the Minister would be able to 
select university Vice Chancellors from a short-list submitted by the NCHE
103
. This act 
brought to fruition the idea the state should be responsible for education, and marked the apex 
of state intervention and assertion of control as legitimation practice. 
The idea that the university was outside the remit of state control had been simmering since 
the end of colonialism. This critique of the universities surfaced during a debate on the 
varsity in the House of Representatives in August 1957. Mr P. Kandiah (Point Pedro) made a 
series of hostile accusations about the unsatisfactory workings of the university, questioning 
its contribution to the workings of the country, its financial management, and its degree of 
autonomy, concluding ‘there was something rotten in the state of the university’.
104
 He said 
the early protection of the autonomy of the university, in the name of academic freedom, had 
been taken to the extreme, whereby the university was operating completely outside the 
sphere of government control. He accused the University Council of hiding the true cost of 
moving the faculty of engineering from the Vice Chancellor, calling its management of the 
public grant ‘irresponsible to the point of reckless’, and demanded an independent inquiry. 
Criticisms of maladministration and waste at the university surfaced, and gave rise to a long-
standing tradition of frequent commissions of enquiry into their workings. At the same time, 
‘the drift of public opinion in the country was in favour of greater government control’ (K. 
M. De Silva, 1978, p. 261). 
The centralisation and increased control over education was also a response to the 
unsatisfactory pace of change from earlier legitimation practices. In particular, efforts to 
democratise higher education had met resistance from university administrators. The 
switchover from English to Swabasha had been a key area of contestation. The University of 
Ceylon was not subject to the same political pressures for social justice facing politicians, and 
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had resisted on the grounds of feasibility. It had sought to determine the timetable of the 
switchover. Then Vice Chancellor, Sir Nicholas Attygalle, pushed back against the 
government, arguing ‘the most satisfactory way of giving effect to the proposal would be the 
establishment of a second university’ (E. J. De Silva, 2013, p. 212). In the face of this foot-
dragging, the government sought to circumnavigate the university. For one thing, it upgraded 
the Pirivenas to University status and effectively removing the University of Ceylon’s 
monopoly over higher education (Malasekera, 1969). In the process, it created two new 
universities on which it could more directly impose its own vision of reform. In this way, the 
state sought to assert greater control over universities to maximise it capacity to re-claim 
responsibility over education. 
The escalation of control was also a reaction to the negative feedback effects from earlier 
legitimation practices. An official inquiry, the Gunawardene Commission (1963) had raised 
serious concerns about student indiscipline, ragging and a general deterioration of standards 
of education. It lambasted ‘a serious deterioration in the standards of discipline among 
university students in the last few years’ inspired by ‘a small proportion of undesirable 
elements who should never have been admitted’ (Universities Commission, 1963, p. 498). 
Overcrowded halls of residence, large classes, inadequate facilities and the political 
indoctrination of students by political parties were identified as critical problems.
105
 Even the 
Pirivenas had fallen short of upholding the values of the Sinhalese nation, it claimed. The two 
new universities had not performed satisfactorily; in fact, they ‘were becoming prejudicial to 
the Buddhist way of life’ (1963, p. 1). It noted: inadequate accommodation, admitting 
students without proper restrictions resulting in a lowering of standards, irresponsibility and 
utter disregard to rules of behaviour by students, disturbances and lack of discipline both 
among the graduands and teaching staff, immoral behaviour and eventual frustration. At the 
same time, public perceptions that students were being indoctrinated at the universities were 
also surfacing in the press. For example, Mr Wilmot A. Perera at the prize-day at the 
Koholana Dham Sonda Sunday School said that ‘youths from village schools who were 
generally innocent and well-mannered and charming often changed their ways after the evil 
influence crept into their lives at the universities’ and that ‘Buddhists would have to do a 
good deal of thinking to devise ways and means to overcome the malady that had seized 
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 As perceptions of unruliness and resistance at the universities were 
officially recognised, so the idea that universities should be reined in by the state was also 
legitimised.  
Exerting control over the universities was not only a means to an end, but an end in itself. It 
was justified as necessary to correct the ‘defect’ of university autonomy – viewed as a 
persistent legacy of colonialism. The political narratives and justificatory discourse 
surrounding the debate in the House of Representatives revealed this. The Minister of 
Education, Mr Iriyagolle, returned rhetorically to the injustices of colonial rule to justify the 
Bill. He recalled that the Universities Ordinance drafted by Sir Ivor Jennings did not fall in 
line with the aspirations of the Sri Lankan people, but had merely conformed to the British 
colonial pattern. He referred to many unwelcome remnants of colonial rule, conceding that 
even the Pirivenas had been a disappointment: ‘due to the ‘revolution’ of 1956 there had been 
a religious and cultural awakening and in the rush two Buddhist universities also came to be 
created. But unfortunately the fate that overtook the university moulded by Dr Jennings befell 
these two universities also’.
107
 Universities were beset by a catalogue of ills, he claimed. 
This, he said, was why the Needham Commission and later Gunawardene Commission 
became necessary to inquire into the ‘maladies’ at the University. It was not proper, he 
argued, to give funds to the universities and allow the Vice Chancellors to utilise them to help 
their stooges, without proper ministerial control over affairs’.
 108
 In this way, the escalation of 
control over universities was both a continuation of the need to address injustices of the past, 
and a response to the deterioration they had contributed to.  
Increased state control was also justified, rhetorically, through reference to the right of the 
majority to be able to mould the system for which they were paying. Universities in Ceylon 
were financed by the state through a recurrent government grant, voted in the Parliament. 
Minister Iriyagolle himself said ‘he who pays the piper must have the right to call the tune’.
 
109
  If the aim was the proper utilisation of public funds, then a grants commission would be a 
logical option. There was a sense of exasperation with the universities. MP for Akurana, Mr 
A.C.S. Hameed said the ‘universities have rolled on without any plan and have failed to live 
up to the aspirations of the people’.
110
 There was a claim that reducing the authority of the 
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universities would simultaneously augment that of the state. In the House, Mr Jayewardene 
Minister of State analysed the Bill from a ‘purely governmental point of view’ and noted that 
the government’s main aim had been to achieve harmony between the autonomy of the 
universities and the authority of government, so that government ‘would be able to express its 
own desires in respect of higher education’. Parliament had no control over the universities, 
he said. Their affairs had deteriorated to the point here had been ‘public agitation for the 
government to intervene’. Recent events, he claimed, had proven that the universities were 
enjoying the ‘freedom of the wild ass’.
111
 There was a sense the universities had not lived up 
to their promise for the nation. Mr Ponnambalam, in support of the reform, said the university 
was not responsive to the country: ‘Political freedom has seeped down to the masses. 
Government have been impeded by the passivity of administrators due to the rather 
antiquated type of training that has persisted from the Jennings era’. He went on to state ‘you 
cannot have arbitrary restrictions to admit students for convincing and inappropriate 
reasons’.
112
 These statements reveal the idea that universities had inhibited progress towards 
the realisation of the rights and freedoms underpinning the social contract, and political 
intervention was legitimised to realise the social contract. 
The justification for control tactics was not universally accepted as legitimate, however. In 
the event, opposition to the bill was deep and wide. The Higher Education Act was passed by 
a majority of 43 votes in the House of Representatives (86 voting for and 43 against) 
following a debate that lasted four days. Politicians voiced concerns about the motivation to 
open up a more direct pathway for interference in university admissions. MP for 
Divulapittya, Mr Lakshman Jayakoddy warned the Minister ‘do not interfere with admissions 
to universities’.
113
 Many of the central criticisms were levelled by Mr Bernard Soysa, MP for 
Colombo South, who talked at length (for over 3 hours) about how the bill would usher in a 
‘dark era’ in higher education by vesting significant powers in ‘a politician wedded to some 
political credo’. Unfettered autonomy was one thing, he said, but that was no justification for 
completely destroying it, which would prove ‘the remedy was worse than the disease’.
114
 The 
leader of the Tamil Congress pleaded with the Minister not to make the bill a partisan matter, 
or consider it a political weapon.
115
 Leader of the Lanka Sama Samaja Party likewise 
opposed the intrusion, noting that the indiscipline in universities was merely symptomatic of 
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the frustration seen in all developing countries.
116
 Members of the University of Ceylon 
Teachers Association held a meeting at which they resolved to ensure the repeal of the act. It 
took the view that ‘student unrest and the general decline in University standards were 
primarily due to all the powers being entrusted with the Minister and making all other able 
university administrators powerless in discharging their duties’.
117
 It interpreted the proposals 
as ‘calculated to undermine and destroy the independence and freedom’ of the universities. 
As with the three earlier legitimation practices, however, addressing the legacies of 
colonialism had provided sufficient justification for political practices, at whatever the cost to 
the integrity of the education system itself. 
Conclusions 
Extending the right to free education up to university level was significant for forging a new 
social contract as part of a wider process of post-colonial state legitimation. Injustice had a 
particularly emotive resonance in the education sphere, where perceived ethnic inequalities 
and linguistic segregation amounted to no less than the denial of national identity and self-
respect. Against these perceived injustices, the landmark passing of the Free Education Bill 
was instrumentally and symbolically significant for the legitimation of a new political order. 
The extension of the right to education, including at university level, helped consolidate the 
state’s relational ties to the indigenous majority constituency of rural Sinhalese – its primary 
legitimacy audience - both materially and ideationally. In turn, the introduction of the free 
education scheme represented the victory of the Sinhalese majority against foreign rule, and 
signified their political coming of age. 
The social contract was enlivened and re-interpreted through the critical political conjuncture 
of 1956. The pressures to deliver for the Sinhalese majority - the state’s main legitimacy 
audience - escalated along with the consolidation of two-party, majoritarian state. The 
political returns to be won from revisiting the ideas of the past increased. In turn, populist 
legitimation practices escalated, and were operationalised through the overnight upgrading of 
the Pirivenas, the unsustainable expansion of university places, the under-resourced 
switchover to swabasha, and the re-assertion of state control in the sector. These educational 
reforms were a key arena for expressing and realising the state’s rules of the game, 
specifically the nationalist resurgence. Indeed, they gave a new, nationalist interpretation to 
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the social contract. Equity and justice increasingly meant fairness for the Sinhalese in 
particular, and rectifying the perceived dominance of Tamils in education. Returning 
education to the nation meant ‘Sinhalising’ it, including through the revival of Buddhist 
higher education. In this way, what was conceived as a universal social contract was 
politically re-interpreted and realised as a particularistic one. 
Each of these legitimation practices appealed to a moral basis for support, and offered a 
conscience-based, rather than purely interest-based, justification for action. Each came 
wrapped in political narratives that channelled a set of new values and ideas that were the 
antidote to past wrongs, re-affirmed the new rights of the masses, and appealed to moral 
support from the primary Sinhalese legitimacy audience. They were part of a wider process 
of de-legitimising and displacing one set of values – elitism, western culture, group privilege, 
linguistic segregation, university autonomy - and replacing them with a new set in a new 
political order. Legitimacy claims promoted the rights of the common person, equal 
opportunity, majority rule, Buddhist values and state intervention to rectify injustice. 
Surrounding education in these appeals to moral rights, self-esteem and national pride made it 
a significant legitimacy commodity, and gave reforms added momentum. As a result, they 
often proceeded without due concern for their practical implications. They also made new 
commitments and engineered new expectations of the role of the state, and its 
responsibilities. Yet in the process of appealing to the main Sinhalese legitimacy audience 
group, populist political elites over-baked their promises, making the conditions on which 
they hung state legitimacy unrealistic and unattainable. As the next chapter shows, the bar 
was set so high that the state went to new lengths to deliver on promises that ultimately could 
not be fulfilled, creating ripe conditions for the very opposite of what was intended – not state 






Breaking the social contract: higher 
education and state de-legitimation  
The previous chapter examined the role of higher education in the process of post-colonial 
state legitimation. It argued this process was formative for establishing rights and 
entitlements in relation to higher education, and the state’s responsibility to safeguard them, 
as part of a new social contract in a changed political order. This chapter now turns to 
examine a subsequent but distinct critical juncture in the history of state transformation, from 
1970 up to 1973. This period saw the emergence and consolidation of a dual legitimacy 
crisis. The chapter traces the role of the higher education system in helping to motivate and 
create the structural conditions for this legitimacy crisis.  
After 1970, the increasingly Sinhalese-nationalist state faced a challenge to its legitimacy 
from within both the majority Sinhalese and minority Tamil constituencies. The first act of 
dissent took the form of an armed insurrection orchestrated by the Janatha Vikmuthi 
Permamuna (JVP, or People’s Liberation Front). It was carried out by educated young 
Sinhalese who had stockpiled weapons on university campuses, from where they launched 
co-ordinated attacks on the state apparatus. This youth revolt unexpectedly gripped the island 
in crisis and, though ultimately unsuccessful and short-lived, represented a rejection of the 
state’s legitimacy from within its core legitimacy audience. The second, concurrent, 
challenge to the state’s legitimacy came from the Tamil minority. It took the form of 
militarisation of Tamil youth, alongside a simultaneous shift in political demands for a fully 
separate, Tamil state in the north of the island. Tamil militarisation and resort to separatism 
were precursors to the devastating civil war between the Sinhalese state and Tamil armed 
groups that lasted almost 30 years.
118
  
These two rejections of the state’s legitimacy – insurrection and separatism - are typically 
analysed in isolation from one another, and sometimes bifurcated at a general level into 
‘class’ and ‘ethnic’ conflicts, respectively (Bastian, 2013). They were different in scale, 
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ideological impetus, and political organisation. The multiple grievances that fuelled the JVP’s 
attempt to overthrow the state are well documented elsewhere.
119
 They included 
disillusionment with an exclusionary political system, widespread unemployment and 
restricted social mobility (Moore, 1993). Similarly, several areas of public policy came to 
symbolise the increasing exclusion of the Tamil minority from access to state power that had 
rallied militant Tamil separatism. Critical among them were divisive language policies, 
failure to devolve constitutional power, and land settlement disputes.
120
 
This chapter argues that, notwithstanding their complex and multiple origins, both of these 
legitimacy crises were exacerbated by earlier legitimation practices in the sphere of higher 
education. Significantly, both mobilisations were enabled by the radicalisation and 
militarisation of Sri Lanka’s large population of disaffected young people.
121
 The legitimation 
practices of democratisation, nationalisation and control analysed in the previous chapter 
helped create the structural conditions and motivational impetus behind this radicalisation. 
The insurrection demonstrated impatience for social justice among Sinhalese youth. In 
reaction to it, the state increased its legitimacy claims and practices by adopting drastic 
measures to engineer university entrance criteria in their favour. In turn, these reforms were 
perceived as discriminatory, unjustifiable and ultimately unfair by the Tamil minority. 
Indeed, they came to be highly symbolic of their wider political and social exclusion. As 
such, they significantly aggravated the militarisation of Tamil youth and helped provide a 
recruitment base for armed separatism in the north. In this way, the manipulation of the 
higher education system for the purpose of legitimation exacerbated the emergence of a dual 
legitimacy crisis. 
The chapter examines each of these legitimacy crises in turn. It begins with a brief synopsis 
of their significance for state legitimacy, including the political environment in which they 
occurred, and the state’s reaction to these open and violent acts of dissent. For each crisis, the 
chapter then traces some of the key connections to earlier reforms of the system of higher 
education, with the aim of showing how they helped create enabling structural conditions and 
grievances that were conducive to this dual rejection of the state’s right to rule. 
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Legitimacy Crisis I: Higher education and Sinhalese insurrection  
On the night of 5th April 1971, gangs of armed assailants attacked police stations in an 
orchestrated effort to ignite a popular uprising. Over the course of the next 24 hours, 
insurgents attacked a further 25 police stations, prompting an island-wide curfew.
122
 Sporadic 
attacks on the state apparatus continued through April, when a further 90 police stations were 
reportedly targeted  (Arasaratnam, 1972). Fighting between police, security forces and 
insurgents continued as the state sought to regain control of ‘pockets of resistance’ dispersed 
across the Island.
123
 Suspicions of dangerous developments had been brewing and a state of 
emergency declared earlier, in March 1971. At that time, a police raid had discovered a 
‘veritable arsenal’ following an explosion at a hall of residence at the University of Sri 
Lanka, Peradeniya
124
. A government communique released in early April characterised the 
insurrection as ‘a culmination of insurgent preparations in various parts of the Island 
calculated to create disorder and to disrupt the machinery of the government’.
125
 Only with 
foreign assistance was the government, some weeks later, able to flush the insurgents out of 
urban areas into retreat to the jungle. Though the figures are disputed, the government 
reported that by the time the insurrection was fully quashed, some 1,200 ‘terrorists’ had been 
killed and 14,000 taken into custody.
126
  
This was the first of two insurrections orchestrated by the Marxist Janantha Vimukthi 
Peramuna (JVP), both of which were ultimately unsuccessful in overthrowing the state. 
While they failed to gain widespread popular support, they nevertheless represented a 
significant challenge to its legitimacy. This scale of organised violence was unprecedented in 
Sri Lanka
127
. Albeit part of a global revolutionary impulse, the insurrection had its origins 
firmly in local conditions. Sri Lanka’s educated but disaffected youth had mobilised to 
attempt to overthrow the state. The social base of the JVP was the non-elite, swabasha-
speaking rural class (Moore, 1993). The vast majority of the suspected insurgents arrested by 
the government were aged between 17 and 26 (77 per cent), most were Sinhala-Buddhists (94 
per cent) and only a small portion (6.3 per cent) had secure employment with reasonable 
financial rewards (Obeyesekere, 1974, p. 368). Another distinguishing feature of those who 
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participated in the insurrection was that they were educated up to or above GCE level 
(Kearney, 1975). Indeed, many were educated in the Maha Vidyalayas (government high 
schools) established through the free education scheme (Obeyesekere, 1974). The 
insurrection’s leadership were connected through networks of university alumni (Moore, 
1993). In this way, the insurrection came from within the state’s core legitimacy audience, 
and from the beneficiaries of free education in the Sinhalese language.  
It is notable that the insurrection occurred in a political environment that was ideologically 
attuned to delivering social justice to the same support base, of rural Sinhalese. By 1970, the 
resurgent nationalist state had reached an apex with the landslide victory
128
 of Mrs Sirimavo 
Bandaranaike, who was - in keeping with the SLFP’s ethnic brand of nationalism - elected on 
a platform of social justice for the masses. She had assembled a United Front (UF) coalition, 
along with the more radical leftist parties, the Trotskyist Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP) 
and the Marxist Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (People’s Liberation Front) to defeat the 
unpopular, right-wing capitalist United National Party (UNP). The insurrection was in this 
sense surprising – it had occurred in a political environment that was, on the surface, 
amenable to the leftist insurrectionaries. Indeed, the UF coalition had made concessions to 
the JVP, only to find that it would later rebel against the state. This indicates the leftist 
ascendance had raised rather than dampened expectations, and heightened impatience for 
social justice. Less than a year after the election, the JVP had made this impatience clear 
when its leader, Mr Rohana Wijeweera, said at a meeting of the People’s Liberation Front 
(PLF) in Colombo that: ‘the masses of this country expected the United Front government to 
solve these burned problems without delay. If they failed, the PLF would solve all these 
problems according to the true Marxist-Leninist concepts’.
129
 In its event, the violent 
insurrection proved this was not an empty threat: patience for social justice had expired. 
The significance of the challenge the insurrection presented to the authority and legitimacy of 
the state was revealed in its response. In Parliament, Mrs Bandaranaike declared ‘the 
insurgency uprising has dealt a severe blow to this country, at a time when we need to strain 
every nerve and sinew to ensure rapid economic growth.’
130
 Evidence began to emerge that 
the insurrection had come from ‘within’, that is, from the state’s core constituency. The 
revelation that government had ‘encountered a revolt from its most ardent and enthusiastic 
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supporters’ was publicly humiliating, and clearly of grave concern.
131
 Speaking at a mass 
political rally on Saturday 3
rd
 April 1971, Mrs Bandaranaike was at pains to distinguish 
between the proper insurgents and the population of rural undergraduates who had merely 
fallen prey to them. She implicated foreign involvement, referring to ‘several hundred rupee 
notes’ found in the dorms of Peradeniya campus ‘along with explosives’ and ‘queried who 
were financing such a movement’.
 132
 The rhetorical impetus was to downplay the revolution 
from within. She further reminded the undergraduates that it was due to the policies of her 
late husband, SWRD Bandaranaike – a key figure in the political awakening of the Sinhalese 
masses - that village students had been afforded the opportunity of university education.
133
 
Through this simultaneous blame shifting and recall of loyalty, the Prime Minister conveyed 
both the absolute jolt that the Sinhalese insurrection represented to the state, and the 
desperate need to rekindle the social bonds to this, its core constituency. There was a degree 
of public sympathy for the student insurrectionaries, who were cast as easily led, misguided, 
some went so far as to say ‘indoctrinated’
134
, into these ideologies. Indeed, government soon 
after deployed the higher education infrastructure – the very infrastructure of insurrection - to 
appease, perhaps coerce, them back into compliance. The Vidyalankara University at 
Kelaniya was set up as a ‘receiving centre’ during a four day concession period. Suspected 
insurgents were provided with books and games and ‘interviewed’ to ascertain their 
‘problems and the reasons for joining the terrorist movement’.
135
 In this way, universities 
became simultaneously sites of revolt and, at least ostensibly, spaces of reconciliation. 
The destabilising effects of state control 
Earlier legitimation practices in the sphere of higher education helped to create the structural 
conditions conducive to armed insurrection. Highly politicised education reforms spurred by 
rising Sinhalese nationalism after 1956 over time produced a series of unintended 
consequences. One such set of reforms involved the assertion of state control over 
universities which, as the previous chapter showed, included centralising power in a National 
Council of Higher Education (NCHE). However, the escalation of state control generated 
hostility and resentment on university campuses with the effect of reducing rather than 
enhancing the state’s territorial control over them. The relationship between the state and 
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university students drifted away from the earlier post-colonial paternalism, and became 
increasingly oppositional. This was an important enabling condition and precursor to 
universities becoming physical spaces of armed dissent. 
In the years leading up to the insurrection, a number of high profile strikes and protests were 
witnessed on campuses. Protests frequently turned into violent clashes between the students 
and the police. A particularly acrimonious relationship had developed between the students of 
the University of Sri Lanka, and its Vice Chancellor, Sir Nicholas Attygalle, who was 
perceived as a political appointee and representative of the government.  There was a 
particularly bloody clash in 1965 when six medical students, led by the daughter of a 
professor, attempted to cross a blockade of protesting students to reach a lecture room. In the 
pandemonium that followed, police fired tear gas and baton-charged the protestors. Students 
and police alike were hospitalised, and some students set fire to Sir Attygalle’s private 
lodge.
136
 Students later called the violent armed response to the non-violent protest a ‘gross 
insult to the entire student population’.
137
 In this case, as others, expressions of grievance, 
however peaceful, were more often greeted with stonewalling, or campus closures, than 
attempts at dialogue. This was exemplified when in December 1967 undergraduates stormed 
the House of Representatives and demanded to meet the Minister to discuss their grievances 
concerning accommodation and student representation and present a petition, claimed to have 
been signed in blood by over 2000 students. The Minister refused to see them, however, 
reportedly asking ‘how can I meet these fellows who burned my effigy and rubbed the ashes 
on their foreheads?’ This event was symbolic of the growing acrimony between students and 
the state, borne on an expectation that their legitimate grievances should be heard, but were 
not being addressed. The Vice Chancellor subsequently declared the campuses at Thurston 
Road, Reid Avenue and Peradeniya closed to students.
138
 In this way, students were 
radicalised through the heavy-handed response of the state authorities to their expressions of 
grievance. 
Territorially, the universities were increasingly marginalised from state control, paving the 
way for them to become a physical and discursive space of dissent where insurrection could 
germinate. As resistance on university campuses grew, the state authorities increasingly lost 
jurisdiction over them. For example, when a first year allegedly stabbed two final year 
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students in 1967, the police merely ‘contemplated’ taking action against the student.
139
 It was 
reported that, for their part, ‘a section of the students are of the opinion that the police have 
no powers or jurisdiction over any matter within a hall of residence or the campus’.
140
 As 
early as 1967, four years prior to the insurrection, police claimed they had found ammunition 
and weapons that were intended to be ‘put to use to wage war’. When police had entered the 
campus, students had fled in a stampede in which several were injured.
141
 In a territorial 
sense, universities had become physical spaces of weak state control. 
What had been a paternalistic relationship between the state and students – the people to 
whom new rights had been conferred – increasingly turned acrimonious. This was reflected in 
public narratives by the state that sought to discredit students and label them volatile. After 
the strike of 1967, the Minister declared he had no grievance against the student strikers, but 
against the ‘undesirable elements’ that had misled them.
142
 Another government minister 
called them ‘ungrateful’ of the educational opportunities afforded them.
143
 Clashes between 
students and the army on the eve of Independence Day in 1969, known as the ‘rumpus on the 
campus’, met particularly ferocious disdain. A high-level decision had been taken to billet the 
soldiers on university campuses whilst students were expected to be on vacation. However, 
when students inevitably clashed with the 100-strong army contingent, the campus was 
closed and police guarded the entrance. The army commander declared the campus out of 
bounds for army personnel. 
144 The Criminal Investigation Department (CID) reported to the 
press that these clashes were ‘politically motivated with a view to embarrassing the 
government and disrupting the Independence Day celebrations’
145
. Students met to discuss 
how to respond to the allegations of blame for the unrest and altercation with the army, 
claiming the government’s version of events had no basis in fact.
146
 Their plight found some 
sympathy among more left-wing opposition parties. When the rumpus on the campus came 
up for debate in the House of Parliament in 1969, some MPs expressed concern about the 
scapegoating and neglect of students.
147
 The Education Minister Iriyagolle, in reply, said ‘the 
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people of this country who cherished our national culture and aspirations would endorse the 
steps taken by the national government in the sphere of education’. He added that ‘a properly 
educated student would never be a menace to society’.
148
 In this way, students were cast as 
disruptive, oppositional, and politically indoctrinated. This signified a rhetorical shift in the 
paternalistic stance towards the students - the children of the rural poor - that had 
characterised political narratives after independence.  
In the wider public sphere, there was growing concern with campus unrest, for which blame 
was variably assigned by the press to the state, the education system, and the students 
themselves. Some considered student indiscipline and frustration a product of their 
‘clamouring consciously or unconsciously for a reorganisation, a resettling of values.’
149
 
Others lamented the ‘educationally half-baked’ students who had degenerated from ‘the pride 
of a nation to a menace to society’ due to ‘a spirit of braggadocio and cockiness’.
 150
 While 
there was some sympathy for the students, there was nevertheless alarm that ‘what started as 
a revolt against autocracy flared up into undue proportions goaded by police indiscretions’.
151
 
One opinion page claimed ‘the man on the street is as amazed as the man in cushioned 
comfort as to how a batch of teenage students, mainly from rural areas, could have been 
reduced to the base category of street-thugs or dead-end kids or even hostile harbour workers 
and bashed accordingly’.
152
 These sentiments convey public surprise, and concern, about the 
radicalisation of the student population. They also reflect a degree of demise of the public 
image of them, from the deserving generation, to a generation that were squandering their 
newly won rights and privileges. 
By the time a new socialist government came to power in 1970, the crisis of campus 
instability was pressing. When police and students clashed in November 1970, after a girl 
was allegedly ragged, police claimed they were compelled to use tear gas to break up the 
dispute.
153
 This ‘national episode’ prompted concern in the press about the readiness of the 
students to take the law into their own hands. The Daily Mirror published a front-page 
opinion piece which stated ‘education is fast losing its place as a passport to better living. 
Instead it is becoming a licence for lawlessness’.
154
 The Sri Lanka Teachers Association 
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publicly claimed that heightened student unrest corresponded with the NCHEs increasing 
intrusion into university life, and called for repeal of the act.
155
 There was a feeling that the 
new government of the United Front couldn’t afford to let this situation continue.
156
 The risk 
of unmet grievances was acute. Aware that the JVP - a radical left-wing political organisation 
- had gained a stronghold in the Pirivenas and Universities, the new education minister 
directed the university to probe their grievances, give them a patient hearing and their 
problems viewed sympathetically. The intention was to solve the problems of, and the 
potential threat to the authority of the state that emanated from unmet student grievances.
157
 
By then, however, violent dissent had already found a space on campuses, and deep mistrust 
was already a fixture of student-state relations. Campus conditions were conducive to the 
insurrectionary challenge that was to come. 
The economic limits to democratisation  
In the same way that the control legitimation practice carried forward negative legacy effects, 
so too did the democratisation practice. In the two decades preceding the insurrection, it had 
underscored a so-called ‘social demand’ model of education that had led to rapid, 
unsustainable expansions in the university student population. The scale of the expansion had 
been remarkable. The number of students seeking admission to university rose from 1,612 in 
1948 to 14,000 in 1970 (Samaranayake, 1999, p. 101). As the previous chapter showed, the 
social demand model was catalysed by a political environment of ethnic majoritarianism, and 
justified through populist appeals to pursue of social justice for the Sinhalese. However, 
sluggish economic growth eventually restrained this political legitimation practice. By the 
mid-1960s, universities could not keep pace with social demand, and the economy could not 
absorb the sheer number of graduates being produced either. The democratisation of higher 
education had reached its economic limits. This was a key factor in helping to create a cohort 
of disaffected young people that could be recruited for the purpose of insurrection.  
The democratisation of access to higher education had initially proceeded unimpeded by 
resource and capacity constraints. As one contemporary observed, populist politicians had 
sought to ‘woo their electorates with promises of indefinite extension of educational 
opportunities, without any reference to the employment prospects of educated youths’ (Pieris, 
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1964, p. 466). Perhaps inevitably, however, over the next decade or so, this political impetus 
proved economically unsustainable. This was not least because Sri Lanka’s colonial export 
economy, dependent originally on coffee, tea, rubber and coconut, was increasingly 
vulnerable to global market fluctuations, and suffered badly when both raw commodity prices 
and levels of global demand dropped off during the 1960s and 1970s. Many factories were 
closed, and some food items became increasingly scarce (Arasaratnam, 1972). Reduced state 
revenue and with it, greater reliance on foreign loans, precipitated a retraction of the 
welfarism that underpinned the social contract. Sri Lanka began the transition to a market 
economy, and in the process also to dismantle its welfare state, beginning with the abolition 
of the politically salient rice subsidy in 1968. The welfare state proved unsustainable not only 
because of economic decline, but because of huge population growth. Aided by the 
eradication of malaria, the population had risen by an average 2.7 per cent per year since 
independence. The absolute size had nearly doubled, from 6.6 million in 1948, to almost 12.6 
million in 1971.
158
 It proved impossible to keep extending the rights and entitlements 
embedded in the social contract to a population growing at this remarkable rate in declining 
economic conditions.  
A shortfall in resources coupled with high population growth created a widening gap between 
demand for and supply of university education. By the mid-1960s, the higher education 
system was bottlenecked, and could not accommodate additional intake. The NCHE reported 
that ‘annually thousands of students having qualified to enter the universities were deprived 
of admission due to the lack of accommodation’.
159
 Studies would later show that many of 
the youth insurrectionaries came from this group of young people who were qualified but 
unable to progress their education up to university level because of this restricted access 
(Obeyesekere, 1974). Indeed, by the late 1960s, the social demand model appeared to be in 
reverse. Under the pressure of limited resources, the NCHE began drastically trying to curb 
admissions. It announced that it was ‘essential that suitable steps be taken to restrict the 
numbers entering the universities’.
160
 To this end, standards for university entrance would 
have to be raised, it said. It considered reducing the time frame of degrees, and opening 
‘Junior University Colleges’ under the Ministry of Education.
161
 These measures signalled a 
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revision of the social demand model, and new restraint on the previously unencumbered 
principle of the right to education. 
The social mobility of the youth insurrectionaries was also blocked by limited employment 
opportunities. Many of them were graduates who could not find employment in Sri Lanka’s 
contracting economy. A period of educational expansion followed by economic decline had, 
over time, created a structural problem of educated unemployment. An imbalance between 
the total supply and demand for labour saw a steady increase in unemployment rates from 
10.5 per cent in 1959, to 19.9 per cent in 1975 (Jayaweera, 1990, p. 64). Again, this problem 
was exacerbated by population growth. At the same time that economic growth was 
stagnating, so too the educated labour force was increasing. The full force of population 
growth hit the labour market in the 1960s, when the population aged between 15-65 increased 
from 5.25 million to over 7.5 million (K. M. De Silva, 1981, p. 537). Sri Lanka was later 
labelled ‘an outstanding example of the growing global phenomenon of educated 
unemployment’ (K. M. De Silva, 1981, p. 538). By the late 1960s, nearly half a million 
young men and women were educated but unemployed. Indeed, the level of education was 
inversely related to the likelihood of employment
162
. The economy could not absorb the sheer 
number of graduates produced through the earlier democratisation of higher education. This 
was illustrated when in 1969 the government was unable to recruit medical graduates into 
government hospitals: some 400 doctors competed for 140 vacancies.
163
 Efforts were taken to 
appease unemployed graduates by offering a small allowance to work in government 
hospitals for four hours a day.
164
 But small compensatory gestures were insufficient. Rapid 
and unplanned expansions of access to higher education had, by then, produced a ready 
cohort of disaffected youth, imbued with fresh expectations of social mobility promised after 
independence, but now facing a harsh reality of (under)employment in a failing economy 
(Government of Sri Lanka, 1990). The insurrectionaries were, in this way, both the 
beneficiaries and subsequent casualties of the democratisation of higher education. 
Rapid, unplanned expansions without the attendant resourcing had also led to a decline in the 
quality of higher education, which proved to be another source of grievance among Sinhalese 
youth. The political legitimation practice of democratisation was never adequately resourced. 
                                                          
162 A survey carried out by the Ministry of Education in 1971, found that there was higher unemployment among arts 
graduates that at any other level of employment: No education (18 per cent) Grades 1-5 (28 per cent); Grades 6-8 (47 per 
cent) Grades 9-10 GCE OL 72 per cent; Grades 11-12 GCE (AL) 84 per cent; University Science 2 per cent and University 
Arts 50 per cent: Reported in Hansard, August 11, 1971, column 515.   
163 ‘Meagre deal for new docs’, Daily Mirror, December 19, 1969. 
164 ‘Meagre deal for new docs’, Daily Mirror, December 19, 1969. 
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In fact, the size of the university grant reduced with the expansion of the university 
population. While in 1960, a student population of 3,181 was given LKR 3000 per student, in 
1966, a population of 10,725 were given LKR 1396 per student (J. E. Jayasuriya, 1969, p. 
162). Contemporaries bemoaned how far standards slipped under the weight of this 
politically driven but under-resourced expansion (K. De Silva, 1978). Indeed, among the 
insurrectionaries themselves, a government inquiry later found ‘a general belief that the 
universities have so evolved that they are imparting an education of lesser quality to an 
increasing number of students’ (Government of Sri Lanka, 1990, p. 33). A Universities 
Commission of 1962 more directly argued that ‘the deterioration of standards went hand in 
hand with politicisation of the student population’ (Universities Commission, 1963). 
Overcrowding and poor facilities were identified as grievances that had fuelled the spike in 
student strikes. In 1965, for example, an inquiry reported that expansion had reached 
‘dangerous’ proportions. Furthermore, the report concluded the universities had neglected 
their duty in allowing this situation to prevail. In a particularly damning statement, it claimed: 
‘I find it difficult to believe how such an eminent body of men could shamelessly have 
betrayed the confidence the country has placed in them’ ("University Autonomy in Ceylon," 
1966, p. 1). Whether intended or not, deteriorating quality was a consequence of the pursuit 
of social demand that, over time, exposed the wide gap between the rewards the state had 
promised, and what it actually had the capacity to deliver. 
The unmet promise of nationalism 
Along with the push to democratise higher education, reforms after 1956 had, as the previous 
chapter showed, increasingly sought to realise a Sinhalese-Buddhist version of social justice. 
In practice, this had entailed changing the language of instruction to Sinhalese, and seeking to 
re-plant the education system more firmly in Sri Lanka’s cultural and economic roots. Over 
the course of the 1960s however, these legitimation practices failed to deliver on their 
promise of lifting the social mobility of the majority and re-dressing the colonial legacy of 
social inequalities. The elite system of education was not dismantled, nor was it tethered to 
Sri Lanka’s economic needs. The switchover to swabasha reproduced, rather than 
ameliorated, segregation – both within university education and the wider employment 
market. Together with other grievances, these broken promises were significant in motivating 
and mobilising the Sinhalese youth uprising.   
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The legitimising idea that national education should be more suited to the needs of the nation 
had failed to materialise in practice. Indeed, one of the underlying reasons why the education 
system had produced a structural problem of educated unemployment was that graduates’ 
skills were mismatched with the stage of development and primarily agrarian nature of the 
economy (Jayaweera, 1969). This problem was acknowledged by the Education Minister in 
1969, who claimed ‘degrees held by the majority of the unemployed graduates were not in 
keeping with the needs of the country and only personnel with practical knowledge could find 
suitable employment in the Government and the private sectors’.
165
 A Presidential 
Commission also later concluded that part of the problem had been not only the expansion 
but the orientation of the education system. Specifically, it had inappropriately ‘burdened 
young people with attitudes such as preference for white collar jobs and absence of dignity of 
labour which fore-closed many avenues of gainful employment’ (Government of Sri Lanka, 
1990, p. 21). Contemporaries shared this sentiment. Indeed, the old, post-colonial idea that 
education was a foreign imposition unsuitable for Sri Lanka’s needs persisted. Members of 
Parliament spoke out in the press against the ‘faulty’ education system that was to blame for 
the present food crisis, arguing that ‘the country needed to teach trades, and agriculture, not 
train for white collar jobs’. One recalled that ‘foreign rules shaped the educational set-up to 
suit their purpose and not for the purpose of developing the country.
166
  
There was new recognition that Sri Lanka needed to balance student intake with the needs of 
the economy. In making this case, the chairman of the NCHE, Dr G.P Malalasekera, claimed 
that ‘unemployment among professional men and graduates arose because no such planning 
was done previously and as a result universities produced degree holders without any 
consideration for the requirements of the country’.
167
 A retired judge and principal of the 
Buddhist Ladies College observed in 1971 that ‘those young men who pass out of the 
universities are not willing to go into the rural villages and engage themselves in farming. If 
they do engage themselves in farming, the country’s economy could be developed’.
168
 
Schemes to resettle unemployed young people on rural land and train them to cultivate 
paddy, rural livestock and food crops proved unpopular, as were efforts to extend vocational 
training centre for graduates, to train them in teaching, agriculture and commerce.
169
 This, 
again, was indicative of a shortfall between students’ elevated expectations and economic 
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 Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike herself reportedly regretted ‘the present 
tendency among those who graduated or passed the S.S.C to adopt a negative attitude towards 
labour’.
171
 High profile figures agreed that the education system had grown lop-sided, and the 
nation needed more training in the spheres of agriculture and industry.
172
 In this way, the 
foundational idea in the social contract that the state would create a national system of 
education adapted to local needs had remained elusive, and further exposed the gulf between 
student expectations and state capacity.  
The promise to nationalise education also fell short of ideals in another sense. That is, the 
switchover of the language of instruction to the local swabasha languages was not addressing 
linguistic or wider social segregation. Though the social composition of universities had 
changed – from elite, English speaking to a mass, swabasha demographic - social segregation 
on campuses persisted through language streaming. The requirement for universities to teach 
in all three languages – English, Tamil and Sinhalese – meant that in practice, students were 
taught by different teachers with different levels of competency in their field. Moreover, 
when the first students educated in swabasha entered the universities in 1963, there were no 
science textbooks in Tamil or Sinhalese (only English). The uneven availability of textbooks 
in different languages created inconsistencies in the quality of education delivered to different 
linguistic groups. It meant swabasha students were not able to read outside of lectures, and 
were often dependent on copying lecture notes.
173
 Educational segregation continued, in fact 
escalated, in another sense: the conferring of degrees on ‘external students’ who were 
registered but did not attend lectures from 1965 onwards had created a disgruntled group of 
second-class citizens who deeply resented their status (Malasekera, 1969). In these ways, the 
dynamics of expansion had failed to dismantle linguistic inequalities in learning. 
Furthermore, it had perpetuated new inequalities. 
Changing the language of instruction had not addressed a major driver of group inequalities 
in educational opportunities. The ethnic composition of university entrants had altered 
significantly in a short period, with a greater portion of the Sinhalese recorded as attending in 
1967 (84.1 per cent) as compared with 1950 (66.6 per cent) (Arachchi, 1973, p. 77). This was 
a closer reflection of their proportion of the population. However, the distribution of 
linguistic, and therefore ethnic groups, remained uneven across subjects. Admission to the 
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science-based courses – the most coveted – was still largely dominated by Tamils from 
Colombo and Jaffna (C. R. De Silva, 1974). In 1966/67, 40 per cent of science students and 
almost 50 per cent of Engineering and Medical students were Tamil (C. R. De Silva, 1974, 
pp. 154-155). Meanwhile, the majority of Sinhalese students were studying in the arts 
faculties, where limited competence in English was not an entry barrier. By 1967, 68.9 per 
cent of the 10, 280 students enrolled at the University of Sri Lanka were studying for general 
degrees in the arts and oriental studies (J. E. Jayasuriya, 1969, p. 162). In this way, the 
Sinhalese constituted high proportions of the ‘under-privileged’ faculties. In part, this was 
because the regional inequalities in schooling that Kannangara and his contemporaries had 
criticised also persisted. In 1969, some 47 per cent of schools with science facilities up to 
university entrance level were concentrated in the provinces where English-speaking schools 
had clustered during the colonial era – Northern and Western provinces (C.R. De Silva, 1979, 
p. 484). The continued denial of science education in most parts of the country meant that 
social justice was ‘more a mirage than a reality in so far as the masses were concerned’ (J. E.  
Jayasuriya, 1981, p. 87).
174
 Moreover, over time, the ‘overproduction’ of arts graduates had a 
self-reinforcing effect: arts graduates educated in the swabasha would go on to take up roles 
as school teachers in the local languages, and in turn educate the next generation of 
candidates for arts degrees in the swabasha (Pieris, 1964). In turn, this perpetuated a shortage 
of teachers who could teach the more socially advantageous science subjects in the swabasha. 
Segregation in the universities spilled over into segregation in the employment market. The 
number of unemployed arts graduates was accumulating each year, such that a Member of 
Parliament had calculated in 1969 that ‘it takes five years for one year’s output of arts 
graduates to be employed’.
175
 He further identified a ‘wide gulf between the education 
imparted to the school and what society seeks, unless this is bridged the unemployment 
problem will never be solved’.
176
 In this sense, the colonial legacy of English as the language 
of access to power appeared intact, and a swabasha-educated youth remained shut out of 
access to the highest paid work opportunities. As Obeysekere wrote in 1974 (p. 383): ‘rarely 
could a village lad, even with a B.A., get an administrative job in a firm or large business 
because of his poor knowledge of English’. The extension of the right to free education in the 
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local language, so fundamental to the social contract, had not delivered the expected returns 
on equality.  
Restricted social mobility and continued inequalities represented a breach of rights and 
entitlements promised by the paternalistic state to the rural Sinhalese. The political process of 
making the social contract, and mobilising the masses, had set up expectations that the state 
would deliver for them. The historian and then Deputy Chairman of the University Grants 
Commission later recalled that the expectation of new graduates was that the government that 
had provided free education to them should also be responsible for finding employment for 
them (Pathmanathan, 2000).
177
 In this context, the staggering levels of educated 
unemployment represented ‘an abrupt shattering of new expectations’ (Kearney, 1975). The 
state had broken its promise to the Sinhalese youth. A former MP in the late 1970s recalled 
that: ‘every graduate who passed out of the University of Sri Lanka got employment in the 
1950s. But then with population growth, the government couldn’t keep delivering on these 
promises. They had promised so much.’
178
 Patronage intensified in the context of job 
scarcity, when open employment was restricted in lieu of favours to the wealthy, elite 
kinsmen of local MPs. At the same time, Sinhalese youth perceived that jobs were being 
unfairly allocated by the state: in effect, the avenues for social mobility through patronage 
were closed to them (Obeyesekere, 1974). Contemporaries blamed the corrupt practices of 
government and its failure to live up to the promises made to youth for the insurgency. 
Blocked mobility was more acutely felt in the context of overblown promises of social 
justice. Students’ own representations to a Presidential Commission on Youth (Government 
of Sri Lanka, 1990), which investigated the causes of the insurrection, demonstrated this 
frustration over continued restricted opportunities for self-advancement. The commission 
concluded that in retrospect and as a warning for the future, in the context of unmet 
expectations, ‘the scope for youth unrest cannot be underestimated’ (Government of Sri 
Lanka, 1990, p. 30). The words of one retired government official captured the essence of 
this broken promise: ‘if I can summarise what I am trying to say, or what I’ve tried to say, 
our problem has been a failure to meet the increasing demand which we have created’.
179
  
The insurrection was a critical juncture for the escalation of legitimation practices in the 
education arena. Significantly, a key line of the state’s response was to absorb unemployed 
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graduates into public sector employment. On the night of April 15, the Education Minister 
made this rhetorical commitment in a national broadcast to the nation which called on the 
insurgent youth to ‘come back to their parents and fellow citizens’.
 180
 He reminded the 
people that within months of the government assuming office appointments had been granted 
to 2,500 graduates as teachers. He further recalled that another 5,000 graduates had been 
employed by the ministry of planning and under the graduate training programme. 
Furthermore, he promised to make arrangements to recruit another 2,500 GCE qualified 
youth as teachers and launch a crash programme to fill all vacancies in government 
departments.
181
 In this way, the solution to broken promises - the underlying cause of de-
legitimation - was to make more promises, in compensatory fashion. Legitimacy crisis 
spawned increasing legitimation claims and practices. 
Legitimacy Crisis II: Higher education and Tamil militancy 
During the same period as the Sinhalese youth insurrection had taken place across the island, 
Tamil youth were increasingly agitated and militarised in the north. Militant Tamil youth 
groups were forming largely from within the student population, including the Tamil 
Students’ Federation (TSF) (Wilson, 2011).
182
 Simultaneously, Tamil political 
representatives, particularly under the Tamil United Front (TUF), began to shift their 
demands from federalism towards calls for a separate Tamil state. Youth militarisation and 
the crystallisation of separatist demands were important markers in an ongoing process of 
state de-legitimation among the minority Tamil community. Tamil youth groups would be 
later described as ‘the most militant agitators for separatism’ and ‘a substantial and very 
volatile element in Tamil society’ (K. M. De Silva, 1981, p. 551). The TUF is considered a 
precursor organisation to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) – an armed guerrilla 
group that went on to launch a violent struggle against what was perceived as an oppressive 
state administration.  
Changes to the rules governing access to higher education contributed to perceptions of state 
discrimination and exacerbated this process of state de-legitimation among Tamil student 
groups.
183
 Most significant among these changes was the incendiary policy of so-called 
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‘media-wise standardisation’. This policy applied a new formula for university entrance, 
based on language (‘media’).  Until then, university admissions criteria had been based on 
pure merit, or raw marks, in secondary school examinations. This new formula introduced 
varying qualifying marks according to the language in which entrance examinations were 
taken. A type of quota system was introduced, whereby the number of students admitted to 
the universities was thereafter proportional to the number of students sitting examinations in 
different languages – whether English, or one of the two local swabasha languages of Tamil 
and Sinhalese. At that time, as discussed earlier in this chapter, Tamils represented the larger 
group of applicants sitting university entrance exams in English and Tamil and were 
overrepresented in the coveted science and engineering faculties proportionate to their 
population size. Under the new rules, they would now be required to score higher raw marks 
than those sitting the exam in Sinhalese to gain access to the state universities (C. R. De 
Silva, 1974). In this way, standardisation shifted the principle governing entry to universities 
from one of universal merit, to one of discrimination on the basis of language and, by 
association, ethnicity. 
This highly contentious policy, and the wider concern it raised about fairness in university 
admissions, became a key issue of contention between the minority Tamil and the nationalist 
state (C. R. De Silva, 1974). It provoked a particularly hostile reaction among Tamil youth 
whose rights to education and social mobility were potentially threatened, and further 
agitated already militant youth groups. Though the government subsequently retracted 
language-based criteria for university entrance
184
, the damage to the state’s legitimacy was 
irreversible. Standardisation added to the grievances of Tamil youth and their political 
representatives, and exacerbated the process of state (de-)legitimation. It created perceptions 
of distributive injustice in access to this highly desired social good. Moreover, it 
demonstrated to Tamils that the state was no longer operating on the basis of fair, transparent 
procedures and signified that the right to education embedded in Sri Lanka’s post-colonial 
social contract would be applied selectively, rather than universally. Finally, it became a 
symbol of their increasing exclusion from access to state power and resources. In the process, 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the 1972 Constitution, which gave Buddhism a special state protection. These issues are addressed in depth by Kearney 
(2011). 
184 Language-based standardisation was later replaced by a number of different formulas based on the birthplace of the 
candidate, or the place where they sat the entrance exam, rather than the language in which they had sat the entrance 
examination. These schemes were: 1973 standardisation according to district; 1974 Standardisation with district quotas; 
1975 standardisation with 100 per cent district quotas.  
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standardisation helped to break the social contract between the Sinhalese state and Tamil 
minority.  
Pursuing a Sinhalese interpretation of fairness 
Standardisation was an escalation of the post-colonial political legitimation practice of 
delivering social justice for the Sinhalese. It was significant that perceptions of distributive 
injustice in access to university education – and Tamil favouritism - had been remarkably 
durable over time and provided at least some of the motivational impetus behind new 
measures to engineer access to university. The following anecdote by the historian M. 
Roberts in 1979 is illustrative of the social environment at the time. He wrote: ‘a couple of 
years ago, I had occasion to hear a bitter denunciation of Tamil nepotism and references to 
their disproportionate share of places in certain departments from an articulate, English-
educated Sinhalese nationalist. That these departments were tiny segments of the sprawling, 
new governmental empire was conveniently forgotten. In such a fashion Sinhalese 
nationalists gird their loins for battle in the 1970s with grievances of the 1940s; with veritable 
fictions’ (Roberts, 1979, pp. 77-78). Perceptions of the continued advantage of Tamils, and 
disadvantage of the majority Sinhalese in the education sphere, also had new evidentiary 
support. As noted earlier, a government survey carried out in 1971 found widespread 
imbalances in educational facilities (buildings, laboratories, qualified teachers) between 
urban and rural areas, and between developed and less developed parts of the country.
185
 At 
the same time, the majority of students in the coveted science faculties came from urban areas 
(Colombo South) and Tamil areas (Jaffna), while several rural districts – the state’s core 
legitimacy audience - were still not represented at all in these faculties (Jayaweera, 1969). 
Moreover, the limited prospects for arts graduates – revealed by the high rates of youth 
unemployment – seemed to confirm that the education system was still not adequately 
serving the majority.  
The need to rectify these perceived injustices took on added impetus after the legitimacy 
crisis in the south. The new SLFP government had already committed to delivering a level 
playing field for the rural Sinhalese masses in the opening speech of a new Parliament in 
1970. Crucially, this had also been the first election in which a lowering of the voting age to 
18 had come into effect - meaning that the key constituency of young, educated people had a 
new stake in the political system. The insurrection gave a sense of urgency to address 
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inequalities and deliver social justice for them. As the leading historian K.M. de Silva (1981, 
p. 541) later recalled, the insurrection had demonstrated that the pace of change towards the 
vision of social justice – and fairness for the Sinhalese - had been too slow, especially given 
that their ‘political appetites had been whetted by their zeal in working to bring the 
government into power’. Indeed, soon after the election, MPs began to complain that their 
constituents were already pestering them for jobs and demanding an immediate reduction in 
the cost of living.
186
 Mrs Bandaranaike quickly gathered MPs to the official Presidential 
residence, Temple Trees, and advised them to tell their constituents to be more patient.  
In this context of impatience for social justice, reported inequalities in access to the science-
based faculties were politically problematic. Reforms in higher education subsequently took 
on a new urgency. This was signalled in strong statements made by Dr Baduidain Mahmud, 
then Education Minister, in the days and months after the insurrection, in which he called for 
a complete overhaul of the education system. He particularly stressed the need for quick 
reforms, stating ‘we cannot afford to dilly-dally any longer, so we must take the shortest cut 
possible’.
187
 Meanwhile, the earlier legitimation practice of escalating state control, 
particularly the powers vested in the NCHE, had paved the way for political interference in 
admissions, and exactly that kind of political shortcut. Early in his term of office, the 
education minister made clear his intention to take full advantage of this, and remove all 
remaining hindrances to the rural child, when he introduced a new ‘area rule’ giving students 
residing within a twenty mile radius of a university special access to it.
188
 This move 
exemplified that important political developments had provided the impetus, urgency and 
opportunity for radical new measures to engineer access to university education. 
Political elites revived perceptions of colonial injustice, and Tamils’ educational advantage, 
to rhetorically justify the engineering of university spaces. Political narratives channelled 
widely-held views about the need to re-establish fairness in the education system.
189
 A key 
idea was that if the social justice ideology of the post-colonial welfare state was to be fully 
realised, then maximum educational opportunities had to be extended to the rural majority 
Sinhalese. Standardisation of marks would counteract the regional imbalance in science 
teaching regions that was disadvantaging Sinhalese students in particular (C.R. De Silva, 
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1979). It was perceived by some as morally justifiable if it could overcome ‘the systemic 
legacy of division between the elites and the proletariat’, that was a lingering and resented 
legacy of colonial injustice.
190
 Affording less advantaged students equal educational 
opportunities would, according to some, ‘prevent the emergence of a so-called intellectual 
elite, with its attendant evil of intellectual robbery’.
191
  
The official government narrative struck a similar justificatory tone. A government press 
statement released to the House of Representatives in 1971 referred to ‘a vicious circle that 
operates against the rural child, particularly in the field of science and technical education. He 
has neither the facilities nor competent teachers that would enable him to compete on an 
equal footing with his more fortunate counterparts from the urban areas’
192
. It continued: 
‘however brilliant the rural child may be, he is denied a place in the sun’. This captures the 
central normative justification for standardisation: its normative appeal was in levelling the 
playing field for the majority Sinhalese - the state’s main legitimacy audience. In this way, 
the engineering of university entrance criteria was a short-cut mechanism to ‘appease the 




This pursuit of ostensible fairness and equity for the majority Sinhalese collided with, and 
contradicted, perceptions of fairness among the Tamil minority. Tamil political 
representatives, students and civil society organisations reacted with immediate hostility and 
dissent to the attempt to engineer university spaces. In November 1970, 10,000 students from 
Jaffna staged a protest at which they burned an effigy of the education minister, and then 
cremated it on the Jaffna esplanade.
 194
 The students subsequently delivered an ultimatum to 
the minister: he should reverse the injustices done to Tamils under the new entrance scheme 
before 10th December, or they would take ‘further action’. When asked what that ‘further 
action’ could mean, a student leader replied ‘it can mean anything. We shall show the 
government what we are capable of doing’.
195
 While the objective effects of standardisation 
on university enrolment are disputed, available data indicates that over time, Tamils’ share of 
admissions declined while that of rural Sinhalese increased. More significantly, in the most 
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coveted science and engineering faculties the portion of Sinhalese students increased from 
55.9 per cent in 1970, to 62.4 per cent in 1971. Alongside these Sinhalese gains, Tamil’s 
share of engineering spaces also fell, from 24.4 per cent in 1973 to 16.3 per cent in 1974 (De 
Silva, 1974).
196
 However, the immediate hostility to standardisation emerged before these 
objective, material effects could have been felt. This indicates it was not so much lived 
experience but the very principle of unfair treatment that rallied the militant Tamil youth.  
In the same way that a Sinhalese version of fairness had provided justification for 
standardisation, perceptions of unfairness were at the heart of its rejection, by both Tamils 
and even some Sinhalese. Even if language-based standardisation was conceived by some 
Sinhalese as positive discrimination, there was no doubt it was received by many Tamils as 
blatant racism.
197
 Opinion pages condemned it as ‘discriminating against a particular 
community and bestowing undue advantages on others’
198
. The President of the Parents 
Association of Jaffna similarly complained that ‘if ‘standardisation’ is a euphemism for 
discriminating against a particular community and bestowing undue advantages on others, it 
stands condemned as violating a fundamental human right’. He went on ‘from its inception 
our own university prohibited distinctions of race, creed or class. Is not what are seeking to 
do with your communal quotas a return to the medieval system of privileges based on 
birth?’
199
 The apparent subversion of the principle of merit in lieu of special rights was 
widely considered unjustifiable. As one former university student recalled, ‘there was a clash 
between the normative goal of social justice on the one hand, and then distributive justice. At 
one level, you have democratisation of higher education. At the same time, you have these 
contradictions’.
200
 The rejection of merit was also intolerable among Sinhalese. A prominent 
Sinhalese Senator staged a walk out over the confusion and chaos over admissions, claiming 
that ‘selection on merit had been ignored in admitting students’. He said ‘the government 
only pretended that it was following a socialist policy and equality for all, so in the ostensible 
pursuit of this, they undermined the very principles they seemed to espouse’
201
.  
The given justifications for standardisation were perceived as not only morally unacceptable 
– illegitimate - but illogical, among sections of both Tamil and Sinhalese society. Even those 
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with sympathy for the government’s social justice orientation viewed the engineering of 
admissions criteria as unjustifiable.  A front-page opinion piece is particularly illustrative. In 
it, a Professor Emeritus of the university
202
 objected to standardisation on the basis that it was 
‘the wrong solution to the right problem’.
203
 Whilst he acknowledged that justice for the 
children receiving education in sub-standard schools ‘will be appreciated by all who have the 
larger interests of the country at heart’, he feared standardisation was going about this in the 
wrong way. Weightage based on school facilities would be fairer than weightage based on 
language, he argued. An obvious solution would be to ensure that at least one school in every 
disadvantaged rural district was staffed and equipped properly up to advanced level standard. 
If the aim was to level the playing field, standardisation did not appear to be the most 
effective way of going about achieving it. Rather, the solution to remedying the imbalance 
between the educational facilities in urban and rural areas surely lay in correcting those 
imbalances in facilities, rather than in adjusting criteria for entry. In November 1971, the 
principal of Jaffna Hindu College publicly criticised the proposed system to this effect. He 
wrote: ‘If certain areas lacked facilities for higher education, it must be remedied forthwith 
and those children provided with all amenities for better education rather than denial of 
admission to children who deserved a place in the university’.
 204
 This questioning of the 
logic further undermined the state’s justificatory rhetoric, and bred perceptions of 
discrimination. 
Standardisation also suffered a justificatory deficit because it had no apparent evidentiary 
basis. After the introduction of the policy, a government committee on social overheads 
encouraged memoranda to be submitted for deliberation. One such memo, submitted by the 
National Science Council of Sri Lanka, found no evidence to support the given justifications 
for language-based standardisation and, as such, concluded that it was ‘indefensible without 
proof’. It further stated that pertinent data on examinations and admissions it had requested 
from the Examinations Department had not been made available to it (National Science 
Council of Sri Lanka, 1975). It therefore rejected claims that were being made that there were 
differences in marking standards between different examiners of different languages, 
particularly in the science-based multiple choice questions, ‘where there can be no subjective 
bias in the marking’ (ibid, p.8). It called instead for a district quota system to remedy 
imbalances in facilities between districts, which, it argued, would also encourage students to 
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study in their own districts. Nevertheless, it noted a lack of transparency around the cut-off 
point for students from underperforming districts, and the continued need for university to be 
oriented towards ‘educating the best talent’ (ibid, p. 14). Overall, this report illustrated that 
the trading of merit for positive discrimination was not justifiable: students from the worst 
performing areas should be helped, but not at the cost of the best students being shut out.  
Even among those communities that stood to benefit materially from positive discrimination, 
the political subversion of merit could not be justified. The very principle of political 
interference in university admissions was rejected by some on moral grounds.
205 The 
principal of the Buddhist Ladies College remarked that although the policy of standardisation 
was justified in its pursuit of socialist education, ‘the standardisation should not be in the 
hands of politicians and partisan bureaucrats. The standardising process should more properly 
be in the hands of the university authorities’.
206
 Others argued students’ lives ‘must not be 
kicked around at the whims and caprices of politicians. Otherwise far from blossoming into 
the wealth and riches of a future age, they may well become the instruments of eventual 
ruin’.
207
 These public deliberations illustrate concerns about fairness not only among Tamils, 
but also some Sinhalese. 
Perceptions of procedural unfairness 
Standardisation was also significant to the ongoing process of state (de-)legitimation among 
Tamil minority groups and their political representatives because it signalled to Tamils that 
the state was no longer operating on the basis of fair, transparent procedures. This was a 
significant impediment to its justifiability, and a key recurring theme in public objection to it 
among both Tamils and Sinhalese. The attempt to manipulate entrance criteria was later 
condemned by a cabinet committee on precisely this basis. It noted ‘its contribution both to 
deepening and indeed institutionalising suspicions between communities and promoting 
distrust in the fairness or impartiality of public examinations was considerable’ (1974, p. 4).  
It was significant that standardisation was introduced in an environment where controversies 
over university admissions were already testing ethnic relations. After the language of 
instruction was changed to three mediums – English, Tamil and Sinhalese – examinations 
scripts were marked by examiners of these respective ethnic groups. This led to rumours of 
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cheating. In 1970, allegations of bias in the marking of examination scripts began to surface 
in the press.
208
 There was public scandal when rumours surfaced that 100 of 162 new 
engineering students were Tamil (C.R. De Silva, 1979, p. 487). When the cabinet authorised 
the National Council of Higher Education to re-scrutinise marks, there were counter-
allegations of undue political interference.
209
 A resolution was subsequently adopted at a 
public meeting at the Dharmaraja College Hall, calling for all university admissions to be 
suspended until an official inquiry into alleged allegations of discrimination could be 
undertaken. Speakers at the meeting claimed that the Sinhalese majority had been reduced to 
a minority in certain spheres, including in trade and commerce, where they had been 
systematically ousted. Tamils publicly objected to allegations that their representation in 
coveted faculties was due to corruption and cheating. One opinion piece questioned ‘is it just 
that most of the admissions were to Tamils?’ It went on to state ‘we hope that whoever 
enquires into these allegations does not define corruption as being Tamil!’
210
 After results 
were re-scrutinised, it was found that a number of students - across all groups - who had 
qualified for admission had been refused entry, but could not now be admitted because the 
universities were already full to capacity.
211
 Although a later commission found no evidence 
of marking irregularity or bias, claims of unfairness created an environment of mistrust over 
university admissions.  
Language-based standardisation of marks added to this climate of secrecy and procedural 
unpredictability around university admissions. Admissions for the academic year 1970 had 
been particularly fraught, beset by delays and allegations of favouritism. Criteria for entry 
were not released until October 1970 – almost 10 months after examinations had been sat in 
December the previous year. All of this contributed to a feeling of mistrust and suspicion of 
the rules governing entry. At the same time, lingering grievances concerning university 
admissions were perceived as not being properly addressed. The Sinhala Theruma 
Sanvidhaanaya (a pro-government youth organisation) alleged that a committee of inquiry 
appointed by the government to review the marking of engineering scripts had failed to 
conduct a proper enquiry. As early as 1970, Tamils were complaining they were being 
admitted to the universities through Tamil rather than English language streams.
212
 In 
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November 1970, the turbulent year of admissions, a peaceful demonstration over allegations 
that 23 Muslims had been improperly admitted to the University of Technology, Moratuwa 
was put down with tear gas.
213214
 The strikers alleged that the Muslim entrants didn’t have the 
proper qualifications, and distributed pamphlets around campus to this effect. The minister 
said if the students would meet with them then he could explain. He later publicly revealed 
that ‘a certain standardisation was made in the selection, and nearly 50 per cent of the 
students admitted were from rural areas’. He claimed this was beneficial to all students.
215
 
The opaque and seemingly unfair process through which standardisation was introduced 
further exacerbated perceptions of procedural irregularity in university admissions. The 
introduction of language-based criteria of entry was not publicly debated in advance. Since 
there was no advance notification of any adjustment, MPs later scrambled to clarify the 
criteria after adjustments had already been made. In 1971, Mr K. P. Ratnam, the 
representative of the Tamil district of Kayts, asked the Minister of Education whether he was 
aware that ‘candidates who sat in the Sinhala medium and obtained 212 marks and above, 
and Tamil medium candidates who obtained 232 marks and above’ had been selected for 
admission to the Engineering Faculty of the Katubedde Technical College.
216
 He asked the 
Minister of Education to ‘state the basis on which the standardisation was done’. A 
subsequent government press release presented to the Parliament dismissed a ‘wrong 
impression that the marks have been tampered with’, and called allegations that entry rules 
had been introduced to benefit students of particular identity or religious identity ‘a 
canard’.
217
 Nevertheless, at the same time, it publicly acknowledged that pass marks had been 
adjusted for different languages. In 1970, for example, students who scored a total of 227 and 
above in the Sinhala medium and all students who scored a total of 250 and above in the 
Tamil medium were admitted to the Peradeniya Engineering degree
218
. Overall, the ad-hoc 
politicisation of policymaking eroded trust in the system of admissions. 
Lack of clarity and transparency over the precise meaning and application of the new 
entrance criteria was another source of contention. The President of the Parents Association 
of Jaffna implored the Minister to address the confusion behind how standardisation of marks 
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was actually carried out. He wrote ‘you freely use the word standardisation and say that it 
obtains in most advanced countries. Will you take us into your confidence and tell us what 
standardisation means?’ Opinion pages were replete with similar scorn over the government’s 
vacillation. As one observer wrote, ‘the authorities can claim no consistency of standards nor 
point to any stable principle on which the admissions were granted’.
219
 Senators requested 
that ‘the minister and the government should place before the country on what basis this 
standardisation was enforced’.
220
 The lack of clarity about standardisation underscored 
doubts about the state’s true motives. As a Tamil academic later recalled, ‘what was more 
alienating and hurtful to the Tamils was the manner in which the admissions issue was 
handled’.
221
 The apparent ‘casual arrogance’ of discriminatory decision-making, absent of 




A symbol of wider exclusion 
Standardisation also added to the grievances and Tamil youth and their political 
representatives, and exacerbated the process of state de-legitimation, because it signified the 
removal of long-held rights and entitlements that were no longer safeguarded under any 
social contract. The university entry system had veered away from a fundamental principle 
laid down through the landmark free education reforms of the Kannangara Committee in 
1943 – namely, the right to education. For Tamils, standardisation was not merely a denial of 
rights, but a removal of them. As one interviewee summarised: ‘Tamils felt they were not 
getting what they had. It’s a question of what had, you know? Privileges were taken away’.
223
 
The denial of the right to education was more acutely felt in a context where educational 
achievement, including access to university, had been a long-term symbol of social status 
among the Tamil community. In this context, the removal of rights was also seen as an 
assault on Tamil identity and social status. This is signified starkly in the Tamil United 
Liberation Front’s manifesto in 1978, which likens the removal of the right to education to 
the removal of the very ‘attributes of nationhood of the Tamil people’ (Kearney, 2011, p. 
500). Declining access for Tamil students had ‘driven them to the brink of frustration and 
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gulfed with anxiety about their future’, it claimed. It said there was no alternative left but to 
end the Sinhalese reign if equality of opportunity was to be restored, and crucially, ‘if this 
generation of youth is to live as human beings brimming with self-confidence’. The denial of 
rights had acute symbolic significance. To many Tamils, ‘university was a symbol of social 
prestige and upwards social mobility’.
224
 The blow to self-esteem was acutely felt. Several 
new entrants under the first standardisation batch were given entry to colleges in lieu of state 
universities. One such candidate, a former Vice Chancellor of the University of Jaffna who 
was moved to Moratuwa (at that time a College with no degree program), recalled that ‘some 
of us had nervous breakdowns. A few who could afford it, went abroad. The vast majority 
who stayed for lack of any other choice, were radicalised and moulded into communalists’.
225
 
In the same way that Sinhalese nationalism fuelled the ostensible pursuit of social justice, 
standardisation provoked strong recoil to protect Tamil national identity.  
In a wider political context in which the nationalist state was increasingly discriminating 
against Tamil minority groups, standardisation magnified their perceptions of exclusion. 
Though standardisation reflected these wider processes of perceived state discrimination, the 
removal of the right to education had a special resonance. It was a tangible and therefore 
acutely felt blow to the Tamil youth. As one former Tamil student recalled, ‘the riots and 
even the Citizenship Act were distant to Tamils in the North East. But standardisation was 
seen even by those who would never entered university as blocking them out.’
226
 The 
prospect of being shut out of the universities was more acutely felt in a context of scarcity. 
The economic downturn of the 1970s had exacerbated a long-term mismatch between 
demand for, and supply of, higher education (Little & Hettige, 2013). Accessing state 
universities was even more crucial because there was high competition for few spaces. 
University education also represented an avenue to public sector employment at a time when 
there were very few private sector job opportunities.  
The removal of previously held rights to education was also highly symbolic of a wider 
process of state discrimination and as such, became an emblem of state illegitimacy. One elite 
Tamil businessman from a family closely connected to the government of the time described 
how it was ‘the prime minister’s betrayal of her closest advisors and friends that really 
undermined our status. I mean, Tamils owned a lot of businesses, and the state needed them. 
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We were running the state, basically’.
227
 In this way, standardisation signalled not only 
blocked social mobility, but blocked access to power. For these reasons, it significantly 
aggravated the ongoing process of state de-legitimation among Tamil groups. 
Conclusions 
Two separate legitimacy crises consolidated in Sri Lanka during the early 1970s: insurrection 
in the south of the country, and armed separatism in the north. These distinct crises had multi-
dimensional causes and effects, but both were exacerbated by politicised reforms to the 
system of education that had escalated after 1956. Both crises were partly the unintended 
feedback effects of legitimation practices in the sphere of higher education. Reforms intended 
to legitimise the state with its core constituency - the rural Sinhalese - had the reverse effect 
of helping to de-legitimise it among elements both within that constituency, as well as among 
the Tamil minority.  
The control legitimation practice generated hostility and resentment on university campuses, 
and helped turn them into a physical space for dissent. The democratisation of higher 
education produced a structural problem of educated unemployment, and a cohort of youth 
shut out of the promise of social mobility. At the same time, the nationalisation legitimation 
practice failed to address persistent linguistic and structural inequalities and, in the process, 
perpetuated new perceptions of inequality and injustice. Together, these legitimation 
practices not only patently failed to deliver on the promise of greater social mobility for the 
Sinhalese embedded in the social contract: they violated it. They helped create an 
environment of unrest at the universities, a structural problem of educated unemployment, 
and a cohort of frustrated young people with both old and new grievances against the state. 
The conjuncture of the apex of a nationalist state and the legitimacy crisis in the south gave 
rise to new measures to deliver social justice in higher education in order to further legitimise 
the state with its core constituency. Standardisation was introduced in response to impatience 
for social justice among the majority rural Sinhalese. It was widely perceived as unjustifiable 
and unfair, both in a distributive and procedural sense, among both Tamils and Sinhalese. It 
sent a strong signal to the Tamil minority that the state was not operating on the basis of fair 
procedures nor committed to upholding the long-held right to education and the principle of 
meritocracy embedded in the social contract. Its significance was magnified in the context of 
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wider discrimination against the Tamil minority and as such it became an emblem of the 
illegitimacy of the state. 
Both de-legitimations resulted, at a basic level, from breaches in the social contract. The state 
had violated the legitimacy ideas and values encapsulated in the social contract, on two 
fronts. On the one hand, it had not gone far enough to satisfy the new expectations of rights 
and entitlements promised to the ‘common man’ Sinhalese. On the other hand, it went so far 
in trying to realise these rights that it violated the rights and expectations of Tamils, and 
helped to irreversibly alienate them from the state.  
These de-legitimations can only be understood in the context of expectations of rights and 
entitlements implicit in Sri Lanka’s welfare-based social contract discussed in the previous 
chapter. In boomerang fashion, the solutions had become the problems: legitimation practices 
had helped de-legitimise the state. As the next chapter shows, the legacy of both the 
legitimising ideas and values, and the consequences for breaking them, would be long-lived. 
Both of these events have left a lasting impression on the state, not least in the higher 
education sphere. Both the ideas underpinning the social contract, and the consequences for 
violating them, would continue to mould and shape the higher education arena well into the 
post-war period. Any challenge to the rights and entitlements embodied in the social contract 







Defending the social contract: Higher 
education and contested post-war 
legitimacy 
The two previous chapters examined the role of higher education in the making and 
subsequent breaking of the social contract between the state and its core Sinhalese and Tamil 
minority constituencies. This chapter now examines the significance of higher education for 
state legitimacy in the contemporary, post-war era.
228
 During the critical juncture between 
2009 and 2015, the education social contract was again challenged and re-contested in a new 
political order. Against a backdrop of education crisis, the state’s core constituency mobilised 
to defend the rights and entitlements embedded in the social contract and reassert the state’s 
commitment to safeguarding it. Defending the right to education became significant to a 
wider process of contesting the legitimacy of the post-war state. It illustrated both the 
continuing importance of the right to free education for the state’s legitimacy, and the 
enduring legacy effects of the post-colonial social contract. 
The war between the Sinhalese state and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) had 
widespread, devastating effects on both state and society. Like many areas of public life, 
state-funded universities suffered from long-term underinvestment, deteriorating 
infrastructure, and skills drain. After the defeat of the LTTE in 2009, addressing the 
education crisis by reviving and reinvigorating the universities was an issue of widespread 
concern. At the same time, the prevailing political climate was not obviously conducive to it: 
a triumphalist regime, with a market-oriented outlook, and an increasingly authoritarian state 
apparatus, appeared to be veering increasingly away from the protectionism and rights 
enshrined in the education social contract. In this context of education crisis and political 
change, the Federation of University Teachers Association (FUTA) mobilised an extended 
and high profile campaign to ‘save state education’. On the surface, FUTA’s demands were 
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typically trade unionist. The union was calling for an increase in educational expenditure up 
to 6% of GDP, an end to politicised control over the universities and enhancements in 
academic pay and conditions.
229
 Yet, through an island-wide campaign of mass rallies, 
conventions, print and social media
230
 and a ‘million signature’ petition, FUTA was able to 
galvanise a cross-section of public and civil society support for their cause. This popular 
mobilisation culminated in the so-called ‘long march’ - a 130-kilometre, 5-day, symbolic 
procession from the south of the country to the capital, Colombo.
231
 What had begun as 
narrow trade union action had developed into no less than a social movement, with the 
unified goal of defending the right to free education embedded in Sri Lanka’s welfare 
contract. 
This chapter explores the popular movement to save state education as a window to the 
significance of higher education for state legitimacy in post-war Sri Lanka. It argues that the 
FUTA dissent was galvanised in response to cracks in the social contract in the form of 
restricted access, declining investment and quality, and a splintering of the higher education 
system along class lines. These changes challenged foundational ideas about the right to 
education for all and the role of the state as patron and protector of the poor that had been the 
fundamental basis of the post-colonial social contract. FUTAs campaign gained momentum 
because it revived and rejuvenated the intrinsic mass appeal of these ideas. This mobilisation 
was significant not because of its size or scale, but because of the constituency it represented 
– that is, the majority of rural poor that have been the core bloc of power since independence. 
In turn, the state’s response to the challenge to its legitimacy was conditioned by the past. 
While the state’s response was hard-line, and rhetorically sought to discredit FUTA, it was 
also forced to make reluctant concessions to them. This illustrates that the obligations 
embedded in the social contract act as a line in the sand that continues to straightjacket the Sri 
Lankan state, even as an authoritarian regime. It argues that while servicing the social 
contract is important from a political legitimation perspective, and is reinforced through 
continuous negotiation, this political logic does not guarantee that the social contract is 
optimal from an education perspective. Indeed, over time it has arguably re-produced post-
colonial social injustices, making it sub-optimal, dysfunctional even, from an education 
perspective. 
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The chapter begins by outlining the post-war cracks in the social contract in higher education. 
It then examines how FUTA’s campaign narratives revived appeals to the original rights and 
entitlements embedded in the social contract, and explores why these ideas had intrinsic 
popular appeal. The chapter then analyses the state’s response to the FUTA challenge, which 
indicated both the significance of the challenge to its legitimacy, and the continued need to 
navigate the line in the sand laid down by the social contract. Finally, the chapter contrasts 
the legitimising function of protecting the social contract with its dysfunctions from an 
education perspective. 
Cracks in the post-war social contract 
The near 30-year war between the Sinhalese state and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE) took its toll on the system of higher education. Cracks in the education social 
contract surfaced in the post-war economic climate. Academic salaries had declined, 
infrastructure had been poorly maintained, unions were inactive, and many academics had 
migrated abroad along with the broader flight of human capital.
232
 It was not that Sri Lanka’s 
economy had bottomed. On the contrary, between 1978 and 1989 it had grown at an average 
of 5.1 per cent (Bastian, 2013, p. 22). Nevertheless, growth had been lopsided, and had 
stagnated after the financial crisis of 2001. More significantly, educational expenditure had 
declined during the final stages of the conflict, from 2005 onwards, when funds were 
increasingly diverted into the government’s final military campaign to defeat the LTTE 
separatism in the north. As defence expenditure increased, educational expenditure declined. 
Some 3 per cent of GDP, and 20 per cent of public expenditure, was absorbed by the state 
military apparatus (Bastian, 2013, p. 1).  In contrast, the portion of GDP spent on education 
had been hovering between 1.4 and 1.7 per cent. In 2009, Sri Lanka was spending a 
substantially smaller portion of its national wealth on education South Asian countries with 
comparable economic fortunes (World Bank, 2009).
233
 An escalating military budget 
accompanied a contraction of the state, and increasing market liberalisation (Venugopal, 
2011). At the official cessation of military conflict, government funds had been diverted to 
massive infrastructure investments (ports, highways, airports, railroads, power and energy 
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 This reflected a populist, state-led approach that was presented as a route to 
economic progress (Walton, 2015). Even in education, the portion of budget allocated to 
recurrent costs (salaries) reduced in comparison to physical infrastructure.
235
 In this way, war 
undercut and diverted the fiscal capacity of the state to continue to fulfil its legitimising, 
paternalistic welfare role. 
Reductions in the (perceived) quality of state higher education signalled the general decline 
of the state sector. Years of declining investment damaged the infrastructure and 
administration of the state universities. Delays and allegations of corruption in the 
distribution of examination results were rife, as were strikes, boycotts and campus closures 
that were interfering with the completion of state degrees (Warnapala, 2011). A particularly 
high-profile fiasco occurred over the miscalculation of the intake for the entrance exams sat 
in August 2011. The Department of Examinations subsequently received 147,000 appeals to 
review their marks, and more than 500 students filed petitions to the Supreme Court to cancel 
the results entirely.
236
 As a result, waiting times for public universities were as long as 18 
months.
237
 Overcrowding in halls of residence - partly a legacy of the under resourced 
democratisation of access - continued to be a persistent problem.
238
 At the same time as huge 
infrastructure projects were being developed on a national scale, buildings and roads on state 
university campuses were in a situation of disrepair and decay. One academic bemoaned it 
had taken ten years for sufficient funds to be granted to build a road (in place of a dirt track) 
to their faculty building at Colombo University.
239
 University classrooms offered limited 
basic facilities, buildings lacked any air conditioning and in some cases, student’s living 
conditions are unsafe. Electricity sockets were overloaded, and conventional ovens were used 
to make rotis.
240
 The visible decline of facilities was viewed as a symbol of state neglect of 
education, and of student welfare.
241
 FUTA itself described the state of education, including 
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The long-term problem of mismatch between the supply and demand of state higher 
education was further exacerbated through war. The number of students qualified to enter 
universities had increased, while the number of students admitted had not (Sandarasegaram & 
Karunanithy, 2009). At the end of the war, as had been a continuing theme since 
independence, access was highly restricted. The government reported in 2010 that only 17.2 
per cent of students eligible to enter state universities - that is, students who had obtained the 
minimum requirements in the GCE/AL examination - were granted entry.
243
 The remaining 
82.8 per cent of qualified students would have to seek higher education elsewhere. The Gross 
Enrolment Rate (GER) was around 16 per cent.
244
 These figures illustrate that higher 
education provision had not kept pace with the post-independence social demand model. The 
continuing void between supply and demand was not only limiting the prospects for the rural 
lower and middle classes to enter the universities, but also the prospects of realising the equal 
right to free university education as a key term of the social contract. 
Along with declining quality and restricted access, the state lost its monopoly on higher 
education provision. The higher education system had segregated along three lines: public 
(state-funded), private (market-driven) and transnational (overseas study). This segregation 
also followed class lines. While the rural middle classes and workers/peasants have remained 
largely educated in the state sector, a new urban middle class could now afford to educate 
their children in private schools and universities. The capitalist classes were largely educating 
their children overseas (Hettige, 2000). The figures are illustrative. Between 2005 and 2010, 
the number of students studying in foreign universities almost doubled, from 5,000 to up to 
10,000 (Warnapala, 2011, p. 328).
245
 By 2013, more than 60 transnational higher education 
institutes were operating, offering foreign, fee-paying degrees.
246
 Perceptions of deteriorating 
standards in state education, including admissions delays, campus disruptions, and poor 
employability prospects, are at least partly to blame for sections of the middle classes having 
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The post-war political conjuncture of heightened regime legitimacy, neoliberal ideology, and 
creeping authoritarianism appeared unconducive to addressing these pressing issues of 
access, equity and quality in state education. The incumbent regime accumulated a 
groundswell of legitimacy among the Sinhalese majority from its final military defeat of the 
LTTE in 2009. A ‘sigh of relief’, in the south of the Island at least, had accompanied the end 
of violence (Keerawella, 2013, p. 5). At the same time, the apparent defeat of the LTTE 
carried significant political capital, and ushered in a period of post-war triumphalism 
(Keerawella, 2013). Electoral victory followed in 2011 when  the SLFP made gains alongside 
the weakening of the UNP opposition. At the same time, President Mahinda Rajapaksa 
gained a fresh political mandate. This regime tapped into fear and paranoia about a return to 
violence to justify a centralisation of power. This was signified in the passing of the 18th 
Amendment soon after the Presidential victory in 2010, aided by a two-thirds majority in 
Parliament, which removed constitutional constraints on presidential powers, particularly the 
two-term limit, and brought the public service, police and judiciary directly under the control 
of the executive. The post-war state was subsequently characterised by the increasing 
personalisation of power in the Executive President, who strategically appointed family 
members into key ministries (see Wijewardene, 2013).  
The new regime’s support for privatisation of universities signified a drift away from 
welfarism, and posed a more acute threat to the social contract. Market forces had operated 
more freely in education since economic liberalisation took off after 1977, echoing a wider 
transition from welfarism (Hettige, 2000). However, Rajapakse’s post-war regime openly 
supported the marketization of education. Accordingly, the Mahinda Chintana (the 2010 
election manifesto and subsequent national plan) had reaffirmed the right to pursue higher 
studies by all students who pass the advanced level (Government of Sri Lanka, 2010). 
Crucially, however, the interpretation of the route to realising the right to education had 
fundamentally shifted - from the foundational idea that delivering the right to education was 
the state’s responsibility, to the idea that the same right to education should be realised 
through market expansion. Significantly, the government’s strategic plans prioritised greater 
choice in education, and a diversification of ‘modes of learning and alternate institutions 
within a regulatory framework’ (2012b, p. 2). Privatisation would, the government argued, 
attract overseas students, and help Sri Lanka retain revenue lost to students studying 
overseas. In a context where the public universities increasingly could not absorb the sheer 
number of graduates qualified to enter the universities, privatisation was presented as a means 
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of plugging the gap between supply and demand. For their part, private higher education 
institutions claimed to provide courses that were more tailored to the needs of the local jobs 
market, for example in commerce, business and finance, than those of the state sector.
249
  
Defending the social contract: FUTA’s campaign to ‘save state 
education’ 
This crisis of state education, combined with an apparently unconducive political 
environment for addressing it, provided a catalytic impetus behind FUTA’s mobilisation to 
‘save state education’, and an enabling environment for its accumulation of widespread 
popular support. Significantly, the FUTA mobilisation represented one of the first post-war 
social movements to transcend ethnic divisions. During the war, relations between 
universities in the Tamil north and Sinhalese south had entirely severed, and the union had 
disintegrated in all but name.
250
 At the end of the war, Jaffna University had disaffiliated 
from FUTA. In 2009, a small cohort of individuals began an island-wide tour to re-activate 
the union, visiting all 17 state universities in a bid to regroup and garner support for the 
movement. Their success in doing so was significant in that it represented an important post-
war mechanism of reconciliation. One of the union activists recalled the following: ‘I mean, 
when I visited Jaffna they asked me “for the last 30 years, where were you? And I told them, 
I know, you’re right, but now we must work together for our own rights”’.
251
 The post-war 
re-convening of FUTA suggests the education crisis transcended the ethnic divide. Unlike at 
previous junctures, when ethnic interests were broadly divided around arbitrary quota 
systems, ethnic interests now re-converged around a common claim on the state: to fulfil its 
obligation to invest in free education. Over time, FUTA itself became a bastion of ethnic 
unity in the face of continued state paranoia and repression. They frequently mounted a 
collective front against the suppression of Tamil freedom. In 2013, for example, they publicly 
condemned the Rajapaksa regime after a group of Tamil lecturers were accused of attending a 
conference organised by the Elam ‘government in exile’ and were subsequently questioned 
by the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) on arrival at Bandaranaike airport
252
. In this 
way, FUTA actively cultivated an identity as an inter-ethnic alliance. FUTA’s role in 
catalysing a wider process of social mobilisation that eventually culminated in regime change 
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in 2015 is at least partly attributable to its ability to successfully mount a sustained and inter-
ethnic front against an increasingly repressive regime.  
The foundational idea about the right to education for all Sri Lankans formed the rhetorical 
heart of FUTA’s campaign materials and narratives.
253
 The mismatch between supply and 
demand was portrayed as a threat to the foundational principle that education should be 
available to all. Declining educational expenditure was presented as a signal of the state’s 
neglect of its responsibility to uphold the welfare of its citizens.
254
 Through its popular 
slogans and material, FUTA elevated the crisis in education to an abrogation of state 
responsibility to fulfil its legitimate role as patron of the poor.
255
 The fundamental basis of its 
demands, it claimed, was ‘the principle of protecting and uplifting state education’.
256
 Indeed, 
protecting state education was presented as nothing less than a matter of safeguarding 
national heritage. FUTA’s campaign materials pointed out that early progress on welfarism, 
of which free education had been a core pillar, had elevated Sri Lanka beyond the status of 
many other developing countries, and should rightly be considered a source of national pride. 
By this measure, Sri Lanka’s welfare state was ‘of great distinction and therefore needs to be 
protected at all cost’.
257
 Moreover, if the rights and ideals laid down in the post-colonial 
period of welfarism were left by the wayside, the injustices of the past would, FUTA claimed, 
resurface. In a pamphlet entitled ‘Education Under Attack!’, the question was posed directly: 
‘do we want to go back to the time of colonialism, when only a few were educated?’.
258
 
These narratives revived both old injustices and the former glory of welfarism. Through 
them, FUTA appealed to the original legitimating ideas underpinning the making of the social 
contract in the post-colonial era. This was, in effect, a re-deployment of the legitimising 
power of those ideas for the purpose of mobilising popular dissent. 
Another key line of contestation put forward by FUTA was that declining investment 
signified that the state was de-prioritising state higher education. Indeed, declining state 
investment in education was presented not only an issue of neglect, but a direct threat to the 
future of universities.
259
 FUTA argued this decline was less a product of limited resources 
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and capacity than a reflection of government policy. Its main campaign slogan – ‘6% for 
education’ - reflected its central goal of not only increasing resources, but fundamentally 
reviving commitment to state education. This, in turn, elevated FUTA’s demands beyond a 
narrow concern with wages, and gave it a basis for popular appeal. It was hard to argue 
increased spending on education was not in the interests of all. The details of how the 6% 
investment might be spent were left fairly open to interpretation. In its campaign material, 
FUTA suggested the additional investment could improve the quality of education and 
increase the number of students who could be admitted to the universities.
260
 This spoke to 
the acute supply-demand gap, and promised to expand access. It also addressed the perceived 
unfairness of the high proportion of students being shut out of the university system.
261
 
Nevertheless, the President of FUTA later termed the slogan as ‘mainly symbolic’. At the 
time, some close supporters found this non-specific, non-committal response somewhat 
disconcerting.
262
 To others, the very same vagueness held the key to enabling its popular 
resonance and, in particular, its cross-class appeal. FUTA’s campaign narratives strategically 
traversed and bridged the divide. There were even reports that some of the people who came 
to rallies were calling for 6 per cent investment in private education. In effect, the details of 
FUTA’s demands were less significant than their symbolic weight: FUTA stood for more 
investment in education, because this was the obligation of the state.  
Protecting the hard-won heritage of state education from interference by an authoritarian 
regime was another key line of FUTA’s campaign. In practice, this meant defending the right 
to education from political interference, in two senses: First, by safeguarding the proper and 
appropriate process through which decisions about education were taken; Second, by 
buffering the education system against politicisation. Incursions into the autonomy and 
independence of the universities were symbolic of the curtailment of freedom in other areas 
of civic life. FUTA campaign materials revived Kannangara’s own words to defend the 
education system against such undue political interference, reminding the public that 
‘Kannangara would surely administer a stern rebuke to those who destroy teachers’ 
freedom’.
263
 Political interference was not only seen as destroying the principle of intellectual 
freedom, and having pernicious effects on learning, but a challenge to the very meaning and 
status of the universities.
264
 Specifically, FUTA claimed the government was ‘compelling the 
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university community to follow a path that is quickly leading us to impart an education that is 
transient, empty of content and ultimately worthless’.
265
 
FUTA’s stance on privatisation similarly strategically maximised its potential broad-based 
appeal. Whilst some members viewed privatisation as a direct ‘assault on free education’, by 
no means all academics were ideologically opposed to it.
266
 Rather than adopting a principled 
stance against privatisation, the campaign appealed to common ground to address this 
potential fissure. That common ground was that all academics, regardless of their position 
regarding private education, were in favour of protecting state education. The campaign also 
played to a shared concern that private institutions were being supported at the expense of 
state universities.
267
 In other words, investments in private education were presented as a 
trade-off against investments in state education. Moreover, FUTA claimed the decrease in 
government spending, combined with support for the private sector, was ‘a ploy by 
government to hand over the responsibility of providing education, particularly higher 
education, to the private sector’ that would eventually destroy the state system.
268
 It claimed 
the comparably poor salaries in the state sector threatened to lobotomise it, sucking staff into 
the better paid, private sector. In this way, FUTA found common rallying ground that cut 
across class and political affiliations.  
Rhetorically, FUTA’s movement to save state education appealed to the same constituency 
with whom the education contract was made. FUTA’s mobilisation was primarily led and 
orchestrated by the generation that had benefited from free education, and had vested interest 
in protecting it. The majority of the 4,000 FUTA members were Sinhalese, of middle-class 
background, educated through the free education system (Witharana, 2015)
269
. They 
represented what Bastian (2013) has termed an ‘intermediate class’ of state employees. In 
turn, FUTA was also able to boost its island-wide campaign partly by drawing on a network 
of alumni from state universities – again, the children of free education – who were 
strategically positioned across the island in business and government. The campaign also 
accumulated cross-party backing from the mid-level elite of religious leaders, trade unionists 
and artists. This was not least because, as one academic put it, ‘in the end, we are all children 
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. In this way, the call to defend state education was boosted by the 
structural effects of decades of free education.
271
  Part of its success lay in its ability to attract 
support both from those still invested in state education (whether as students, parents or 
lecturers), and those whose social mobility had been aided by it (graduates). 
The popular appeal of saving state education 
Much like the extension of free education in the 1940s, FUTA’s campaign to save state 
education had intrinsic popular appeal. Its message that the government had neglected the 
education system resonated at least partly because parents were absorbing the costs of that 
neglect. In the context of high competition for limited places, parents who were already 
supplementing free education - including informal fees
272
 and school transport – were now 
increasingly burdened with the extra cost of private tuition (Witharana, 2015). The portion of 
households with school-aged children spending on tuition fees increased significantly during 
the last decade of the war
273
, from 25 per cent to 55 per cent between 1996 and 2010.
274
 
Household spending on substitutes for state education simultaneously tripled during the same 
period.
275
 This situation represented a significant entry barrier for the rural poor who could 
not afford to pay the rising supplementary costs of securing a good education (Little, Upul 
Indika, & Rolleston, 2011). Likewise, middle class families were also stretched by the high 
cost of private degree programmes.
276
 For these reasons, by the end of the war, free education 
was popularly derided as a misnomer.
277
 In practice, the costs of state underinvestment were 
being privately absorbed. FUTA itself presented the increase in household expenditure on 
education alongside the reduction of government expenditure as trade-offs. In the words of a 
former FUTA leader, ‘there is no need for government to invest in education…it’s on 
parents’ shoulders now’.
278
 The grade five scholarship exam – a route to accessing better 
schools through merit – was popularly referred to as the ‘mothers’ examination’, reflecting 
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the familial investment in tutoring for the test. Indeed, the heavy toll on parental time of the 
added social investment in education was, and remains, an issue that inspires lively debate in 
Sri Lanka.
279
 To FUTA, the widespread phenomenon of private tuition was undermining the 
idea that education in Sri Lanka was (if it had ever been) ‘free’. In turn, popular support for 
FUTA reflected the social realties and pressures of education rivalry.   
The apparent decline of free state education was highly symbolic of a retreat from welfarism 
and its legitimate, interventionist role as protector of the poor. FUTA’s campaign sought to 
remind the state of its responsibilities to its core, majority constituency. These ideas 
resonated with that section of public opinion in particular. One observer commented: ‘in a 
militarized society where war heroes have been celebrated, the contribution of the working 
people towards this country’s progress had not been duly recognized or remembered by the 
State’.
280
 FUTA supporters reiterated and promoted the potentially de-stabilising 
consequences of such a retreat. One commentator, for example, wrote: ‘unfortunately, the 
war ravaged Sri Lanka is mistakenly taking that path with a strong determination of ending 
the welfare state. This path would only lead to a tragedy of social unrest and authoritarianism, 
once again making the ordinary citizens bear the brunt of waging rebellions in the name of 
eliminating social inequality with class hatred’.
281
 The apparent marketization of higher 
education also raised fundamental questions about whether education was still intended to be, 
in the words of Kannangara, ‘the inheritance of the poor’.
282
 The regime’s justification, to 
make Sri Lanka’s education system the ‘Wonder of Asia’ by increasing educational choice, 
could not be tolerated at the expense of inequality. As one commentator wrote, ‘this could be 
a noble dream of visionary thinking, but if it is to be realised while the social identity that Sri 
Lanka inherited from free education of welfare state is left for destruction, the future that this 
regime is making will not belong to the ordinary citizen of Sri Lanka’.
283
 These views 
expressed in public opinion echoed FUTA’s own narrative campaign to cling on to the 
welfare contract. 
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Another reason for FUTA’s popular appeal was that social demand for free higher education 
among the majority constituency had not abated through the course of the war. Parental 
expectations for university education remained high among rural Sinhalese from lower socio-
economic groups. A survey of rural schools in three districts in 2011 is illustrative. It found 
the vast majority of parents expected their child to attain a university education (Little et al, 
2011)
284
. Furthermore, around two thirds also expected their child would later take up 
government employment – whether in the security forces, as teachers, or doctors.
285
 The 
reasons why education remains at the forefront of social aspiration in post-war Sri Lanka are 
largely unchanged since the colonial period. Obtaining a degree remains an important 
indicator of social prestige.
286
 Over time, intensified competition over university spaces has 
only heightened this social prestige. At the end of the war, students making it into a state 
university could claim to be in the top 20 per cent of students in their batch (or year). 
Education has added significance as a route to social mobility because it is seen as a way to 
escape the limited prospects offered by rural village life. Stories of underprivileged children 
making it to the coveted prize of university exemplify the continued social prestige of 
educational achievement.
287
 As one interviewee captured it: ‘there are a number of examples 
of people from very ordinary, low socio-economic backgrounds making it to university and 
then getting to the top. That is very much part of the ‘national imagination’.
288
 Moreover, in 
Sri Lanka’s hierarchical and patronage-based society, higher education remains a primary 
route to advance your position regardless of political or social connections. For these reasons, 
the working class ‘cling on’ to the public system, investing resources into maximising the 
chances of their children getting into school as ‘their only hope’.
289
 In this context, FUTA’s 
campaign to defend the system of state education was meaningful because it spoke directly to 
the idealised notion of education as hope.  
Perceptions of procedural injustice in the handling of higher education were also a source of 
popular concern. Indeed, arbitrary changes in the higher education sector symbolised the 
increasingly unfettered and irregular exercise of power by the state without regard to due 
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process. The opaque process through which non-state universities were seemingly 
proliferating was a particularly politically salient issue. It was rumoured that the authority to 
grant university status to private institutes was placed in the hands of the Minister of Higher 
Education by gazette notification.
290
 FUTA accused the government of facilitating the 
establishment of private universities ‘in utter and inexplicable secrecy’ through the so-called 
non-state universities act.
291
 FUTA had rejected the establishment of a new private 
universities act that was prepared behind closed doors in 2011, and to the use of government 
gazette notifications to seek to accommodate private institutions.
292
 It called on the 
government to declare its policy on education, and to make transparent its plans for investing 
in both state and private sectors. The politicisation of universities and infringement of 
academic autonomy represented the wider curtailment of basic freedoms in an increasingly 
authoritarian, post-war environment.   
In turn, FUTA’s moral authority was heightened because its grievances with the education 
system echoed wider concern about the increasingly arbitrary abuse of state power. FUTA 
stood for democracy in a context of oligarchy, viewing oligarchy as the enemy of welfarism. 
As one commentator wrote, ‘the FUTA strike is no longer about FUTA, it’s about you and I 
and what we do to bring a halt to the caravan of state as it rumbles on to total control of 
public life’.
293
 An academic member of FUTA described how ‘the orange and black t-shirts 
with ‘Save Education’ and ‘6%’ printed on its back in black or orange became a sign of pride 
in Sri Lanka in the year 2012’ (Witharana, 2015, p. 3). As one former FUTA leader described 
it, ‘the government was seen as invincible. No one disagreed with anything they did. No one 
critiqued anything. This kind of opened up the space to say there is space for dissent, and you 
can’.
294
 Appealing to these wider injustices helped FUTA to achieve legitimacy among the 
people.
295
 In its stand against perceived unfairness in the education system, FUTA came to 
represent a wider struggle against social injustice and state repression. By 2014, academics 
were openly calling for regime change. Though education was the main concern and 
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mobilising force, FUTA by then also embodied a call to re–establish democracy, rule of law 
and good governance as a way to address social justice.
296  
Concern that supporting private education was damaging the state sector tapped into a history 
of popular opposition to privatisation. This was most graphically illustrated in the public 
outcry over the Private Medical Colleges in the 1980s, when the government allowed private 
universities to use state hospitals to train private medical students. In that instance, a central 
point of contention had been that the state was ‘taking resources from the state to build up the 
private sector’.
297
 In other respects, privatisation is considered detrimental to the principle of 
rights and inclusion in the social contract, and bestowing unfair advantage on those who 
could pay for a degree. As one arts student commented, ‘those with minimal qualifications 
but with money attend these private tertiary institutions and graduate’.
298
 The strategic 
positioning of FUTA’s message – not against privatisation in principle – did not align with 
the more radical stance of the student movement which represented the constituency of the 
rural, lower socio-economic groups. The student group, the Inter University Student’s 
Federation (IUSF), took a stronger position against privatisation, campaigning instead to save 
‘free’ education. They argued the marketisation of education would ‘ultimately deprive this 
country poor people the opportunity to climb the ladder of social status through justifiable 
means’.
299
  When it came to the so-called long march, the students literally took their own 
path, marching from Kandy to Colombo but nevertheless still connecting with the FUTA 
rally in Hyde Park. Once again, common ground was found. In part, this was because to both 
constituencies, privatisation symbolised state withdrawal from the commitment to social 
justice embedded in the social contract. 
Navigating a line in the sand: the state’s response to FUTA 
The authoritarian state’s response to the campaign to save state education offers insights into 
the continued significance of state education for state legitimacy. As with the insurrection, 
the magnitude of the threat presented by the FUTA mobilisation was evident in the state’s 
response. Its posturing demonstrated that even an authoritarian state has to navigate the 
historical line in the sand laid down in the social contract. It was not that FUTA presented 
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any physical challenge, but this pocket of resistance represented a nuisance to an otherwise 
dominant state. FUTA’s narratives had raised a question mark over whether the state was 
acting appropriately, and legitimately, in the interests of its patrons by reference to a founding 
value. In reply, state-supported media challenged the legitimacy of FUTA. It rhetorically 
labelled the strikes and marches as ‘unpatriotic’.
300
 The regime argued that the call for hikes 
in salaries was unethical and unjustified at a time when the country was still reeling from 
war. It sought to dismiss the action as politically motivated, and further argued it was not the 
legitimate role of a trade union to demand increased state investment in education.
301
 
Another, much less subtle strategy to neutralise the legitimacy-deficit was to openly discredit 
FUTA leaders, who were increasingly becoming public figures and accumulating moral 
authority of their own. The Education Minister, S. B. Dissanayake, was openly dismissive 
and hostile to FUTA, calling its demands laughable.
302
 This rhetorical response sought to 
downplay the threat to the state’s normative basis for rule, and publicly disassociate FUTA 
radicals from the key legitimacy audience they claimed to represent. 
Another theme in the state’s rhetorical response involved exaggerating the potential threat 
FUTA posed to post-war security. The Minister of Higher Education accused university 
teachers of seeking ‘regime change’
303
, and implied they were part of an anti-government, 
international conspiracy.
304
 State media even went so far as to claim that the Tamil diaspora 
had funded FUTA in order to ‘destabilise the country, which had been saved from these 
forced by the ruling regime’ (Witharana, 2015).
305
 The history of students violently attacking 
the state - particularly the insurrections - was recalled. As was the case at the time of the 
insurrections, government implied universities were being mobilised for political purposes. In 
a press statement released on 21
st
 August 2012, it wrote ‘when we analyse the prevailing 
situation in the academic crisis it is very clear to all that there are some invisible parties who 
want to use this crisis to achieve their petty political motives whilst they do not seek any 
positive alternatives to resolve the matter amicably’.
306307
 In this way, narratives of 
insecurity, hidden political forces, and memories of past disruptions, were conjured to 
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legitimise the regime’s response. For their part, FUTA members viewed the propagation of 
the idea that universities were ‘in a constant state of crisis and tension and conflict’ as a way 
to undercut and de-legitimise FUTA, and simultaneously ‘reduce public confidence in 
them’.
308
  In this way, legitimacy contestation played out as a battle for the moral high ground 
between the state and FUTA. 
Alongside these rhetorical responses, the state also sought to re-assert its authority over 
university administration. One aspect of this involved stepping up efforts to strategically 
position supporters of the regime in key leadership positions. This was not a new tactic, but 
an escalation of previous practices of exerting state control over universities. Politicised 
appointments had grown along with creeping post-war authoritarianism. Long-standing 
conventions for the appointment of the university vice chancellors were no longer adhered to. 
Historically, it had always been the practice that the University Council would nominate three 
names for the position, and academics would subsequently vote, then present to the 
University Grants Commission (UGC) a list of candidates in ranked order. The UGC would, 
as a mere formality, proceed to accept the candidate with the highest votes from his/her 
academic peers. This balance of power was shifted under the new regime. Under new rules, 
the UGC would nominate three names and proceed to select the candidate itself. A high 
profile debacle around the appointment of the Vice Chancellor of the University of Colombo 
was particularly illustrative of the fallout. When the husband of the UGC’s own chairperson 
was appointed as VC of Colombo University in May 2013, there was an outcry within the 
academic community and in the media.
309
 In the context of heightened contestation between 
FUTA, students and the state, this new level of political interference was perceived as more 
hostile and arrogant than before. One academic reflected: ‘I don’t know, because I can’t read 
their minds, but my assumption is that the main motivation is to have someone who is very 
loyal, who is very much committed to their ideas, that will defend the university against these 
forces’.
310
 Those ‘forces’ were FUTA. In turn, these incursions into university bureaucracy 
bred an impression among some academics that the university system was being increasingly 
infiltrated by the state.
311
 Thereafter, some academics began to suspect military surveillance 
on campuses  (Perera, 2015). 
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The post-war state also sought to re-assert its physical presence on university campuses. 
Indeed, the history of violent activism on campuses, including the JVP insurrection, was used 
to justify an escalation of control.
312
 With the FUTA strikes, the state appeared to be once 
again losing territorial control over universities. In September 2011, the Ministry of Higher 
Education subsequently ordered all universities to hire Rakna Lanka Ltd - a government-
owned, commercial security company – to provide all security on campuses. This militarised 
response also reflected the nature of the post-war political regime. Particularly towards the 
end of the military conflict, Sri Lanka’s defence establishment had been fortified in numbers, 
resources and political stature. A large number of military service jobs had been created 
through war, leaving a hangover of surplus military personnel after it ended (Jayasuriya, 
2010). Many under-utilised military personnel had already been re-deployed into other areas 
of public service, including street cleaning for example, giving the appearance of a visible 
militarisation of society (Venugopal, 2011). Universities were legitimate spaces for military 
redeployment because they had been declared ‘un-cleared territory’ – a military synonym for 
high threat – at the end of the war.
313
 However, the state was forced to later rescind the 
ordering of state security personnel onto campuses following the publication in the press of 
an open letter objecting to it, which gathered more than a hundred signatures from 
academics.
314
 The academics objected on the grounds that the forced recruitment of state 
security constituted an infringement of the autonomy of universities to hire and fire at their 
own discretion. Protests against campus militarisation grew.
315
 In this way, the response of 
militarisation only provoked further resistance and galvanised FUTA’s following.  
The introduction of compulsory, military-style ‘leadership’ training for all undergraduates 
was another tactic of response to the legitimacy challenge that sought to instil loyalty on 
university campuses. Accordingly, at significant cost to the state
316
, a Training Programme 
on the Development of Leadership Qualities and Positive Thinking was provided at 28 
military installations around the island. It was officially justified as a mechanism to instil 
greater discipline and improve the soft skills and employability of graduates. It would also, 
the official narrative claimed, counter the destructive practice of ragging – that is, the practice 
of harassment and violence perpetrated between students. The accompanying handbook 
opened with a quote from the Minister of Higher Education, stating ‘we commence this 
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theoretical and practical training course to develop leadership ability and positive attitudes, 
with the objective of creating the ‘universal child’’.
317
 In this way, the appeal to justification 
lay within the problematic behaviours of unruly students and their unsuitability for the 
employment market. To a degree, these justifications were accepted by the students 
themselves.
318
 Some of them appreciated the practical orientation of the training.
319320
 
Government officials themselves considered the training to be popular among the vast 
majority of students.
321 Others objected on purely pragmatic grounds, arguing it ‘didn’t 
develop the right skills’, and furthermore, ‘you can’t make a leader in two weeks’
322
. Soft 
skills could be better developed at universities, they argued, rather than army training 
camps.
323
 Concerns were also raised about the manner in which the programme had been 
developed: that is, without consultation with students’ unions, university teachers, parents or 
potential students. Others viewed the given justifications for leadership training as not only 
illogical but somewhat ironic. One commentator wrote ‘it is sufficiently amusing – in 
consideration of the egalitarian pretence of boot camp society – that the instruction of an 
alternative hierarchical system with a similar call for subordination is the solution to 
ragging’.
324
 This amounted to an abrogation of academic values. As one commentator wrote, 
‘encouraging military style leadership skills, regimentation and behaviour patterns is contrary 
to core values of freedom of thought, opinion and expression, and the value of dissent which 
all universities should strive to inculcate in their students’.
325
 This indicates that at least some 
academics and students had more political interpretations of the motive behind, and 
justifiability of, leadership training. 
There was also perception that leadership training was an attempt to neutralise the potential 
challenge to the state posed by university students. Civil society groups raised concerns about 
the ‘insensitive’ choice of venue, the mandatory nature of the training, and the content of the 
curriculum. In a post-war context, Tamil students had reason to be fearful of spending time at 
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 Civil society groups raised concerns about whether this was 
genuinely a leadership training program, or in fact a military training program. Many viewed 
the imposition of military-style teaching as political indoctrination - a practice fundamentally 
inimical to the principle of academic free-thinking considered central to higher education.
327
 
The ethno-centric nature of course content caused alarm.
328
 The Young Researchers’ 
Collective particularly objected to the module on history and national heritage, which 
appeared to be exclusively concerned with Sinhalese cultural buildings and symbols, with no 
mention of the cultural heritage of minority communities. This, it warned, did not bode well 
for the prospects of inclusive peacebuilding.
329
 In an open statement, it wrote ‘subjecting new 
university entrants who may well become future leaders of this country to a course which 
focuses exclusively on the majority community was seen to undermine all the official 
statements on national reconciliation after three decades of civil strife’.
330
 Leadership training 
was also seen as a way to counter the influence of leftist political parties, including the JVP, 
on campuses. It was ‘a way to inculcate students who can’t be controlled’.
331
 Some observers 
surmised the training amounted to nothing more than a show of force.
332
 The Supreme Court 
subsequently dismissed a petition from a collective of students’ unions against infringement 
of rights against the leadership course in June 2011, without stating any reason. In the 
absence of any procedural redress, and given the training was made a compulsory condition 
for acceptance into university, students’ response was circumscribed. Ultimately, they were 
left with no choice but to ‘put up with these things’, as one informant put it.
333
 Nevertheless, 
through the leadership training, the state had found a mechanism for disciplining and 
demanding the loyalty of students, who represented the core constituency of the state, while 
simultaneously re-asserting its rules of the game, ideas and political orientation as having 
primacy over competing sources of authority operating on campuses.  
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This posturing suggests that the authoritarian state felt the symbolic challenge to its 
legitimacy posed by FUTA. FUTA’s mobilisation to reverse the decline in state education 
was particularly remarkable because it took place in this oppressive, authoritarian 
environment where any form of dissent against the regime carried significant risk of 
imprisonment or personal harm.
334
 Even in this context, however, FUTA won significant 
concessions on academic salaries, and successfully buffered some of the political interference 
into university administration. These victories surprised even some of its own members.
335
 
FUTA’s wider effects, beyond the education sphere, were equally remarkable. By galvanising 
cross-sections of society and bringing the people to the streets, it demonstrated the possibility 
of popular mobilisation in opposition to the state. In so doing, it not only established itself as 
an emblem of anti-state protest, but fortified other pockets of resistance that later went on to 
contest the hegemonic regime.
336
 The campaign to save state education was a significant 
catalysing event in an ongoing process of regime change that culminated in the surprising 
victory of a new coalition in 2015. Notably, this coalition publicly promised to address 
FUTA’s demands in full.  
The significance of FUTA’s challenge to the state’s legitimacy did not lie in the number of 
people who came to the streets, but in the core constituency of Sinhalese it represented. That 
constituency remains the core voting bloc in Sri Lanka. FUTA academics had initially 
supported the candidacy of President Rajapaksaa and, as part of a massive groundswell of 
political support, helped usher him to power in 2003.
337
 Up until 2010, they had worked 
closely with the regime, and been in dialogue with it.
338
 It was widely reported that the 
academics had been called to the official presidential residence, Temple Trees, en masse in 
2009, when the President himself had personally promised to address their salary issues
339
. 
Indeed, FUTA had suspended an earlier trade union action in March 2011 on the basis of the 
government’s commitment to meeting its demands. Nevertheless, it subsequently re-activated 
trade union action in 2012, claiming government had not been sincere and had failed to 
honour its earlier agreements. Thereafter, FUTA’s tactics became more radical, as it began to 
make a broader appeal for popular support. Simultaneously, it escalated its demands from a 
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narrow, interest-based concern with salary increases, to calls for increased state investment in 
education, protection of university autonomy, and the restoration of collective as opposed to 
arbitrary decision-making. In this way, motivated by a growing context of broken promises 
and increased mistrust, FUTA transitioned from core supporters to challengers of the state.  
The state’s concessions to FUTA serve to illustrate the strategic importance of the 
constituency they represented. Nevertheless, in the education arena at least, the state’s 
legitimacy audience had splintered along class lines. As noted earlier, while the rural class 
were still dependent on the state university system, the middle classes had graduated on to the 
private sector. The regime’s narrative justification for privatisation suggested an awareness of 
the need to navigate carefully between these audiences - that is, between openly supporting 
private investment while also making concessions, at least rhetorically, to the legitimate role 
of the state as protector of the state sector and defender of social justice. Furthermore, it 
illustrated that any departure from this latter role may have to be strategically framed within 
the terms of the social contract. As discussed above, investments in private education were 
rhetorically justified to the public primarily as an expansion of access and presented as a way 
of continuing to address injustice and inequity in the education system. Indeed, privatisation 
was seen by some within government as a way of tackling unfairness in the system, whereby 
‘rich people can send their children to a foreign country and get a degree’, while ‘less than 
three per cent of qualified students can enter university in Sri Lanka’.
340
 Nevertheless, openly 
supporting privatisation remains a major political risk for any government in Sri Lanka - even 
a highly centralised, authoritarian regime. The Higher Education Minister’s preamble to the 
government’s strategic plan appeared to acknowledge this. In it, he wrote: ‘there have been 
many instances in history and not only in education when groups have sought to create fear in 
the minds of the public, perhaps for narrow political advantage, when transformative changes 
are proposed. We recall as if it were today the opposition to the free education policy in this 
country’ (Goverment of Sri Lanka, 2011, p. 3). This statement reflects a popularly held 
belief, as one former Minister put it, that ‘no government could tackle free education’.
341
 For 
its part, the post-war regimes rhetorical balancing act on privatisation seemed to acknowledge 
that legitimate policies may need to channel and re-cycle the primary obligations of the state 
and the rights of the people embedded in the social contract.  
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Functions and dysfunctions of the social contract 
The FUTA mobilisation, and the state’s response to it, suggests state patronage of free higher 
education remains significant not only for legitimacy, but also for maintaining stability. It is 
widely held, both within government and outside it, that openly challenging free education 
will always provoke popular mobilisation.
342
 Any action perceived to damage the right to free 
higher education prompts vocal opposition from those with vested interests in defending it.
343
 
There is, as one informant put it, ‘no going back, because people would be on the streets’.
344
 
In this way, servicing the social contract remains an important anchor for political legitimacy. 
However, this political legitimacy logic does not guarantee the social contract is optimal from 
an education perspective. Indeed, over time the social contract has arguably re-produced post-
colonial social injustices, making it dysfunctional from an education perspective. 
Free higher education functions for political legitimacy because state universities serve the 
state’s obligations to its core legitimacy audience. A government employability study 
conducted in 2012 recorded that the majority of state university graduates are now Sinhalese, 
and a significant portion of them are studying at the arts faculties.
345
 The majority of arts 
graduates (51 per cent) have lived in rural areas for most of their lives (ibid, p. 58).  In this 
way, universities continue to serve the constituency that the ‘democratisation’ legitimation 
practice initially targeted. At the same time, high expectations for government to supply 
graduates with government jobs also persist across of the country.
346
 A majority of state 
university graduates (61 per cent) seek employment in the public sector (GoSL, 2012, p. 12). 
Graduates state they prefer government jobs because they want to give back to the country, 
may not feel university adequately prepared them for working in the private sector, or 
because and they value ‘the free time available in public sector’ (GoSL, 2012a, pp. 55-57). 
Although less well paid, government jobs are widely considered to offer greater security.
347
 
In turn, political elites act as the gatekeepers of employment, distributing public sector jobs 
among their own party followers and favoured constituencies of support.
348
 In this way, free 
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education acts as a form of welfare-based patronage that continues to tie the state, relationally 
and symbolically, to its core constituency. Moreover, it reproduces the mutual dependency of 
this relationship. 
Servicing the social contract entails the absorption of unemployed state university graduates 
into public sector employment. A pattern of accumulation-absorption of graduates appears to 
follow the political cycle. Governments in power will typically allow a backlog of 
unemployed graduates to accumulate. With rising unemployment, so graduates increasingly 
politically organise and agitate to make appeals to opposition parties to successfully secure a 
promise of future employment. With every election, new governments will absorb tens of 
thousands of graduates into the public sector to make good on those promises.
349350
 As one 
former Ministry official described it, ‘there are lots of jobs right after elections, so they all 
know that when there’s a general election, Presidential or Parliamentary, they know there will 
be jobs. So they wait for that’.
351
 The purpose of the absorption of graduates is, as another 
academic put it, ‘to keep stability…because otherwise there would be a lot of protests, 
demonstrations, they distract the university’.
352
 This further suggests that state higher 
education functions from a legitimacy perspective so long as the expectation that state 
universities provide a route to public sector employment is fulfilled. 
The social contract is catered to at high cost to the state, however. This is not least because 
public sector employment is permanent until retirement, therefore typically for up to 40 or 50 
years, and the public sector makes up around 15 per cent of Sri Lanka’s economy. Moreover, 
there is anecdotal evidence that pressure to provide public sector jobs for state university 
graduates exceeds absorptive capacity. This is illustrated through accounts of graduates being 
recruited into fictitious roles that merely exist on paper.
353
 The following account, given by a 
former government official, is illustrative. He told the story of a government official who 
went to visit 12 female graduates recently posted to a police station, but found them absent. 
When the official asked where the graduates were, the police told him ‘we asked them to 
come once a month, sign the register, take the salary, and leave’. When the official asked 
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why, the police told him ‘they [the graduates] had no place to sit and a police station is not a 
suitable place for a young girl to come and work anyway’.
354
 Though this is just one account, 
it indicates the possibility that the under-employment of graduates into menial or ghost roles 
is hardly maximising the return on state investment in higher education.
355
 On the contrary, 
the public sector is absorbing the costs of the patronage politics entailed in servicing the 
social contract.  
While state universities and the route they provide to state employment serve an important 
legitimising function, it also means that the education system operates as a minimalist form 
of welfare. Partly a continuation of the post-colonial social demand model, the political focus 
remains on expanding access to education, rather than improving the quality of education 
imparted. It is instructive that in contemporary Sri Lanka, almost 60 per cent of university 
students are enrolled on external degree programs (World Bank, 2000). These students are 
registered, but do not attend lectures or receive any academic tuition. The World Bank (2000, 
p. 18) described this as ‘a low-cost option for the government to expand higher education 
access and coverage’, that comes ‘at the expense of quality’. This expansion is a legacy that 
dates back to 1965, when external degrees were first hastily introduced to keep pace with 
social demand. To an extent, the political focus on access rather than quality also reflects the 
nature of contemporary social demand. Though the public system of higher education 
remains core to the paternalistic relationship between rural citizens and the state, expectations 
have been largely limited to access. The majority of graduates surveyed in 2012 reported they 
were ‘somewhat satisfied’ (54 per cent) or ‘very satisfied’ with their education (31 per cent) 
(GoSL, 2012, p. 28). The following view expressed by one academic was widely held: ‘there 
is no demand at all from students for better education. All they want is the degree. They are 
trained to pass the exams. If I give my students a reading list, probably not even 1 per cent 
will read any books on it. They just expect the qualification at the end’.
356
 This suggests it is 
the obtainment of a degree in and of itself, rather than its quality, that serves the function of 
the social contract.  
The social contract also continues to operate on the basis that equality of opportunity can be 
achieved by engineering access at the point of entry to universities, rather than addressing 
structural inequalities in school facilities. Urban-rural disparities in access to the science and 
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medical faculties have persisted since the end of colonialism. In 2012, most medical faculty 
graduates came from urban (47 per cent) or semi-urban (41 per cent) areas. Only 11 per cent 
of them came from rural areas (GoSL, 2012, p. 28). These structural inequalities are not 
addressed through a contemporary system of quotas which reserves a portion of spaces for 
the coveted science and engineering faculties from districts that are considered ‘educationally 
disadvantaged’.
357
 In part, this is because people seeking to improve the chances of their 
children entering the universities game the system by moving into these so-called 
‘disadvantaged’ districts while continuing to send children to school in districts with better-
performing schools.
358
 The legitimating appeal of the quota system, however, like the 
mediation of government employment prospects, it is a useful tool for servicing patronage 
relationships. When an independent think tank questioned the formula for assigning districts 
with ‘disadvantaged’ status in 2014, officials within the education department could provide 
no rationale for it.
359
 Indeed, the study found that two of the 16 districts that had been 
allocated disadvantaged status - both in the south of the island, in the President’s own 
constituency - were actually doing well, educationally. Another reason for the continuation of 
geographic inequalities is that facilities for science education in rural areas are, as they have 
been since the end of colonialism, inadequate. Moreover, as it was then, it still remains a 
challenge to recruit swabasha science teachers to rural areas.
360
 These dynamics illustrate that 
the manipulation of educational access remains acutely politically salient. At the same time, 
the short-term political returns from engineering access continue to come at the expense of 
long-term investments in equality. 
Segregation along the lines of language and course of study also persists. Whilst bilingual 
education has filtered through to most faculties, arts students remain largely dependent on 
teaching in swabasha.
361
 A retired Sinhalese Professor further argued that ‘when it comes to 
writing a literature survey, they’re helpless’.
362
 Some districts with low cut offs for entry 
‘means very poor performing students from some districts get into university and they are 
                                                          
357
 Contemporary admissions operate partly on the basis of part merit (Z-scores), and partly on the basis of district where the 
entrance examination is taken. For example, in 2012,  40 per cent of spaces were allocated on island-wide merit, 55 per cent 
on the basis of a district population ratio, and 5 per cent are allocated to ‘backward’, educationally disadvantaged districts. 
Entry criteria from University Grants Commission (UGC): http://www.ugc.ac.lk/   
358 For example, on the West Coast of Sri Lanka, parents living in Puttalam, which has a low Z-score send their children to 
travel to Colombo or Gampaha to study at schools there, thereby benefitting from a combination of education in a well-
resourced school in an affluent area along with lower qualifying marks in their examination district. 
359 Interview with researcher from think tank, Colombo, October 6, 2014. 
360 Interview with former education Minister, Colombo, April 20, 2016. 
361 Interviews with academics across the universities visited confirmed this. 
362 Interview with retired govt. official, Colombo, October 4, 2014. 
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very below other students’
363
. The earlier observation made by Kingsley de Silva (1978, p. 
257) that ‘most students in the arts and social sciences are pathetically and totally dependent 
on notes taken down at lectures’ still rings true in today’s universities. Swabasha education is 
perceived as limiting because there remains a paucity of literature available in these local 
languages, particularly in the sciences. In some cases, students are reportedly confined to 
memorising lecture notes.
364
 In this way, the quality of education for swabasha-educated 
university students is not equal, or optimal. Some academics argued the behaviour of 
university students has declined along with special entry quotas.
365
 This indicates that, as was 
the case in the 1970s, a lowering of standards has been considered a de-stabilising factor at 
the universities (Warnapala, 2011).  
Educational inequalities reproduce structural inequalities in the wider employment market. 
English language proficiency remains a significant indicator of class and social status in 
contemporary Sri Lanka: it is sometimes referred to as a ‘sword’ in popular discourse. 
Reflecting this, employment prospects for graduates remain closely tied to English language 
proficiency. Limited English limits the opportunities for students studying in swabasha to 
enter the private sector labour market in particular, and reinforces the general trend of 
dependency on state sector employment noted above.
366
 As one academic described it, 
students with limited English proficiency are likely to ‘get ridiculed at [private sector] 
interviews because they’ll be interviewed in English and they’ll start muttering and then these 
guys would laugh’.
367
 This is reflected in data that suggests the larger portion of unemployed 
graduates is from the arts faculties, who studied in swabasha. In 2012, for example, more 
than half of unemployed graduates (2,373 of 4,170) had studied in the arts faculties (GoSL, 
2012, p. 51). In interviews, these graduates stated several obstacles to obtaining employment 
including ‘industry is requiring skills not learnt for the degree’, a ‘lack of practical 
knowledge’ and ‘completing the degree in Sinhala medium’ (ibid, p. 53-54).
 368
 In this sense, 
                                                          
363 Interview with researcher from think tank, Colombo, October  6, 2014; this view was echoed in interviews with public 
and private university academics. 
364 ‘If you learn in English, you have access to certain books, you can self-study, and it brings a kind of independent 
approach to learning. Whereas if you lean in Sinhala or Tamil, you will most likely be given one information sheet about the 
topic you will have to learn, probably by heart’; Interview Senior Academic, Education, University of Colombo, April 18, 
2016. 
365 Interview with Professor, University of Colombo, October 7, 2014. 
366 In the survey cited above, graduates who self-reported as having ‘very good’ English proficiency were less likely to be 
unemployed (19 per cent) than their peers who self-reported as having ‘good’ (27 per cent), ‘average’ (32 per cent) or ‘poor 
proficiency’ (38 per cent). On the other hand, those who self-reported their English proficiency as ‘very poor’ were the least 
likely to be unemployed (7 per cent) (GoSL, 2012, p. 30). 
367 Interview with Professor, University of Colombo, 7th October 2014 
368 ‘needing political connections to get jobs in public sector’, ‘no personal contacts’ and ‘most of the jobs are offered 
through personal contacts’. Others centred on matters of reputation, including ‘no recognition of the Arts degree’ and 
‘misconception in the society about university graduates’ and ‘reputation of the university’. 
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linguistic segregation in education has failed to address the perceived injustices of the past – 
specifically, colonial legacies of employment market segregation. 
Conclusions 
FUTA’s campaign to save state education emerged in response to cracks in the social contract 
in the form of restricted access, declining investment and quality, and a splintering of the 
higher education system along class lines. The state was veering too far from both the 
foundational ideas of equity embedded in the social contract, and its paternalistic role in 
safeguarding these ideals. FUTA’s campaign narratives appealed to the rights and 
entitlements laid out in the social contract and gained cross-class, popular support because of 
the continued resonance of these ideas in collective memory and national imagination. The 
movement to save state education was able to win concessions and agitate for regime change 
by contesting a central pillar of state legitimacy – the right to free education for all. 
In turn, the state’s response also recalled the past to justify action in the present. Its hard-line 
tactics – of heightened politicisation and militarisation - revealed both the significance of 
FUTA’s challenge to its moral authority, and the significance of the challenge from within its 
main legitimacy audience. This response continued and dramatically escalated a long history 
of reclaiming control over universities whenever they presented a potential alternative 
authority structure, or alternative source of legitimacy. The rhetorical attack on FUTA – 
labelling it a threat to national security – went hand in hand with hard-line actions that dealt 
with them as exactly that. Leadership training was a further attempt to re-impose, in coercive 
military-style, the state’s moral legitimacy and assert the primacy of its rules of the game.  
FUTA’s mobilisation, and the state’s response to it, illustrates that the social contract remains 
operative and functional from the perspective of political legitimacy. The state’s 
responsibility to fulfil the contract is kept alive, and reproduced, through the continued threat 
of mass mobilisation in the event of any perceived wavering or state retreat from it. However, 
though the social contract functions politically as a call to and a restraint on state action, it is 
not optimal from an educational perspective.  Specifically, it has not achieved enhancements 
in quality, equality of opportunity, or equity in job prospects. The state compensates for these 
deficiencies in state education by supplying government employment to graduates. In this 
way, the social contract is more minimal than progressive, and compensatory rather than 
redistributive. While minimum state investment to service the social contract is politically 
vital, it is insufficient to realise the social justice motivation behind free education. These 
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functions and dysfunctions are a product of historical legacies which, as the next chapter will 
discuss, are central to understanding the continued significance of higher education for the 







Service provision in processes of state 
(de-)legitimation: An historical 
institutional perspective  
The three preceding chapters develop historical narratives of the role of state-provided higher 
education in processes of state (de-)legitimation in Sri Lanka. Each of the chapters identifies 
a period of contested or shifting legitimacy: the transformation of the post-colonial state and 
its embedding within the Sinhalese majority, the emergence of challenges to legitimacy in the 
form of insurrection and Tamil militarisation, and anti-regime mobilisation in the post-war 
period. Each chapter analysed the role of higher education in shaping these legitimacy shifts. 
During the first juncture, free education was tied to a process of post-colonial state 
transformation. It became significant for this process because it had intrinsic mass appeal, 
and was therefore instrumental to elites vying to consolidate power with the majority 
Sinhalese constituency of rural poor. This process of embedding a state-society contract, to 
which education was materially and ideationally important, established some basic ideas 
about what the state stood for, and what people were entitled to expect from it. In the 
education arena, both the right to education and the state’s responsibility to safeguard it 
became central legitimising ideas. Later, frequent political contestation in a nationalist 
political arena magnified the electoral pressures to cater to the majority Sinhalese 
constituency, and capitalise on the intrinsic appeal of these legitimising ideas for political 
gain. During the second juncture, the earlier political manipulation of higher education began 
to generate negative feedback in the form of resistance to the state. Two separate legitimacy 
crises emerged - Sinhalese insurrection in the south of the country, and armed separatism in 
the Tamil north. These rejections of the state’s right to rule undoubtedly had 
multidimensional causes and effects, but both were exacerbated by earlier legitimation 
practices in the system of education. During the third juncture, characterised by post-war 
education crisis and creeping authoritarianism, the student body, academic unions, and a 
cross-class support base mobilised to defend a social contract that appeared under threat. The 
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Federation of University Teachers Association’s island-wide campaign appealed directly to 
protecting the early ideas underpinning the education welfare contract to remind the state of 
its obligations to it. Looking across these junctures provides a consistent, albeit punctuated, 
picture of how higher education has been and remains important for the legitimacy of the Sri 
Lankan state. 
This chapter critically evaluates how the core elements of the analytical framework – the 
social contract, political conditions, and justifiability of service provision – help to develop 
an understanding of the services-legitimacy relationship within and across the critical 
junctures. It argues that the social contract was important for establishing expectations of 
rights and entitlements. In this way, it laid a foundation of legitimising ideas and values. Over 
time, political conditions created persistent albeit fluctuating impetus to cater to these highly 
salient legitimising ideas through legitimacy claims and practices. The normative 
justifiability, or more specifically fairness, of higher education has subsequently been 
evaluated against these legitimising ideas and political promises. In this way, the elements of 
the analytical framework are inextricably linked. The justifiability, or not, of service 
provision cannot be divorced from historical processes of state formation that embed certain 
legitimacy ideas, or from the competitive political process through which those ideas are  put 
to use and re-cycled in the pursuit of power.  
The relationship between higher education and state legitimation was also cumulative, in that 
each juncture was formative to the next. Legitimising ideas, inherited from the first juncture, 
appear remarkably resilient over time. Also striking is the circularity of the relationship 
between legitimation claims and their (un)intended consequences for legitimacy, and the 
enduring legacy effects of earlier critical events on the political legitimacy functions and 
dysfunctions of the higher education sector in the present. In this way, history has left a 
lasting impression on why higher education matters for the state’s legitimacy. In turn, why 
higher education matters for its legitimacy in the present can only be understood in historical 
context. The chapter develops these temporal findings within an historical institutional 
framework. It argues, in line with historical institutionalism, that the relationship between 
higher education and state legitimacy has been historically self-reinforcing. The early critical 
juncture was formative in establishing incontrovertible legitimising ideas which over time 
have set steering limits on political action, and institutionalised a degree of path dependency 
in the system of higher education.  
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Social contracts as the origin of legitimising ideas 
The case study began by examining higher education at its formative juncture: that is, when 
the right to higher education was extended to the masses and the state committed to providing 
it. It did so to locate the relationship between higher education and state legitimacy in the 
social contract, a central yet underdeveloped concept in state-building models. The social 
contract’s significance in the Sri Lankan case was that it set a baseline of rights and 
entitlements – what might be termed new legitimising ideas – that would hold constant over 
time.  
The opportunity and impetus to legitimise a new political order came from the vacuum of 
power left in the wake of colonial rule. Leveraging the political weight of the masses was 
essential in the contestation between westernised and national elites vying to consolidate a 
new power base in this new post-colonial order. It required the state to reach out to society in 
what Gilley (2009, p. 137) has termed a process of ‘incorporation’. In this way, much as Tilly 
(1984) argued in reference to state-building in Europe, the impulse to develop a state-society 
contract came less from altruism than power politics. The basis of the state’s appeal to the 
masses – in effect, its main legitimation claim - was extending new rights and protections to 
them. Here as elsewhere, the extension of new rights was the ‘essence’ of legitimation 
(Kelman, 2001, p. 58). Crucially, the extension of new rights to the majority was also part of 
their political mobilisation. The social contract established a mutual dependency between the 
state and its majority Sinhalese legitimacy audience: new rights, rewards and protections 
were provided in exchange for political loyalty. In this way, the social contract was, as de 
Waal (de Waal, 1996) has argued in reference to post-colonial India, made through a political 
process intended to entrench social control. He termed the right to freedom from famine ‘the 
conceptual sibling of the notion of political rights’ (ibid, p. 197). In a similar vein, the right to 
education became inseparable from the political rights of the Sri Lankan rural masses. It not 
only symbolised their empowerment but was a key condition of their political engagement.  
The introduction of free education as part of a social contract also reinforced the ideational 
ties between state and society by reaffirming a set of shared values and beliefs about what 
was right for society. Shared beliefs about the common good have, as chapter II argued, been 
theorised as a key condition for establishing state legitimacy. The extension of the right to 
free state education not only morally elevated the rights and entitlements of the Sinhalese, as 
noted above, but also embodied new social values: education belonged to the nation, the 
common person deserved his place, and all people were equally entitled to it. These 
172 
 
legitimising ideas helped make the state ‘legible’ to the Sinhalese (Chau, 2005).
369
 They were 
framed in response to the perceived values and norms of the rural peasantry, and drew on and 
developed shared understandings of their rights (Goddard, 2010). Alex de Waal (1996) has 
argued that because the post-colonial Indian nationalist movement used famine to discredit 
the colonial government, famine prevention thereafter became a key pillar of the legitimacy 
of the new, national state. As a result, he suggests, ‘famine prevention is intimately bound up 
with the entire ideology of Indian nationalism’ (ibid, p. 197)
370
. In a similar way, in Sri 
Lanka, just as educational injustice had been a key area of resentment against the colonial 
state, educational justice in turn became a key legitimising idea and a pillar of nationalism. 
Moreover, since this legitimising idea appealed to a moral basis for support, it also embodied 
a moral commitment on the part of the state to uphold it. In other words, it embedded a 
specific deal about the legitimate role of the state: if injustices were to be remedied, the state 
would have to play an interventionist role. As the chapter will later show, over time these 
legitimising ideas institutionalised new legitimacy norms that were path dependent.  
The making of the social contract entailed a parallel process of de-legitimising an old order 
and legitimising a new one. The ideational springboard for the post-colonial state’s claims to 
legitimacy was the promise of rectifying injustices of the past. Educational injustice was 
particularly salient because it visibly reproduced inequalities, and therefore represented a 
denial of national identity and group self-respect. In this sense, as has been observed 
elsewhere, legitimation involved challenging illegitimate values and replacing them with 
counter-norms and beliefs (Walton, 2012).
371
 The moral justification for extending the right 
to free education derived from the moral abhorrence of colonial injustices. In the sphere of 
higher education, this meant de-legitimising an elite, westernised model of education, and 
legitimising a new form of mass, popular education for the nation. Sri Lanka’s experience 
further suggests, in line with Kelman (2001), that processes of legitimation and de-
legitimation tend to happen in tandem. Establishing a social contract involved the ‘de-
legitimisation of oppressive practices and legitimisation of oppressed populations’ (Kelman, 
2001 p. 70-71). In this way, as elsewhere, the social contract was not built on a blank canvas. 
In other cases, for example, the promise of restoring order has had special legitimising power 
                                                          
369 In China, Temple bosses legitimised popular religion in the eyes of an otherwise oppositional state by evoking ritual 
ceremonies that draw on common claims (e.g. meritocracy) that make them ‘legible’ to the state (Chau, 2005) 
370 He continues: ‘It is not that freedom from famine is articulated as a right as such, but that it is part of the same discourse 
as national independence and establishing political legitimacy. In short, it is a conceptual sibling of the notion of political 
rights’ (de Waal, 1996, p. 197). 
371 In contrast, NGOs operating in unsupportive environments may seek legitimacy by challenging the norms of the actors 
they seek to de-legitimise, replacing them with counter-norms and beliefs (Walton, 2012). 
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in a highly violent and unstable context (Phillips, 2013). In Sri Lanka, foundational ideas 
about the right to education were all the more powerful because they embodied a promise to 
rectify past wrongs. In this way, the social contract was, as elsewhere, politically and 
historically contingent. It was shaped by a particular set of social conditions and point in 
time. 
Over time, the social contract has arguably not been optimal for the state’s main legitimacy 
audience. Rather than being a maximalist contract that forged real structural change, it was a 
‘minimalist’ or negative contract that protected and reinforced the status quo. Hickey (2011) 
makes this finding in reference to the development of state pensions in post-Apartheid South 
Africa, which he argued reflected a minimalist social contract that was palliative but 
neglected to address land exclusion as the cause of deeper structural inequalities (Hickey, 
2011). Likewise, it could be argued in reference to Sri Lanka that the extension of free 
education in the swabasha for the Sinhalese has failed to address structural inequality. This is 
both because it failed to stimulate investment in upgrading quality or investing in science 
facilities and because social demand has, over time, been mainly limited to access rather than 
quality. Quality assurance mechanisms have been slow to develop partly as a result of 
minimal political commitment (World Bank, 2009). As chapter VII showed, this type of 
investment in free state universities, effectively treating them as a welfare handout for the 
poor, may be sufficient from a political legitimacy perspective, but the lower quality of 
education it affords does not address the social mobility of the rural Sinhalese. Moreover, it 
has reproduced and embedded new structural inequalities both in the education system and 
the wider employment market, where segregation along the lines of language and course of 
study persist. These weaknesses are to some extent compensated for through the absorption 
of graduates into the public sector. However, in the long term, this absorption is 
unsustainable. In this way, the social contract is functional from a political legitimacy 
perspective, but at the same time perpetuates dysfunction from an educational equity or 
quality perspective. The core of the social contract is politically protected, but in many ways 
its narrow conception inhibits the original intended ethos of social justice. The significance of 
this finding is that social contracts may not be the panacea depicted in state-building models. 
Indeed, Sri Lanka’s experience suggests that even where a strong social contract exists, it 
may not guarantee an optimal or equitable provision of public services. 
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Politics in the virtuous – or vicious – circle 
One of the key findings from the earlier review of the literature was that the relationship 
between service provision and state legitimacy does not hang free from politics. Politics was 
therefore placed at the heart of this study’s analytical framework, to give a more purposive 
account of what aspects of ‘politics’ – a broad category of explanation – are significant for 
understanding the services-legitimacy relationship. At a general level, Sri Lanka’s experience 
supports a return to the political core of legitimacy: here as elsewhere, legitimacy was 
manufactured through interactions between political institutions, elites and societies 
(Leftwich & Hogg, 2008). More specifically, three aspects of politics played a role in 
determining when higher education supported or undermined the state’s legitimacy. Political 
narratives articulated the connections between higher education and the state’s moral 
appropriateness in public discourse. Political ideas, particularly nationalism, provided a 
populist lens through which legitimacy values were re-interpreted. Political conjunctures 
created a legitimacy audience and an impetus to cater to it. However, the political 
manipulation of higher education to pursue legitimacy with the Sinhalese majority 
simultaneously undermined the state’s legitimacy among the Tamil minority. In this way, 
political interference simultaneously supported and undermined the state’s legitimacy, 
contributing to both virtuous and vicious circles of (de-)legitimation. 
The social contract provided a baseline of ideas about what the state was for, and what it 
should provide, but its rhetorical significance for state legitimation was manufactured over 
time, through political narratives. If, as noted in chapter II, and Gilley (2009, p. 75) suggests, 
the relationship between a state’s performance and its legitimacy depends on citizens making 
connections between their social conditions and moral values, this begs the further question, 
how does the connection between social conditions and moral values arise? Sri Lanka’s 
experience lends support to the idea that it at least partly arises out of a political process of 
persuasion and engineering. Across the junctures, this revealed itself in the political act of 
framing, justifying and defending policies and actions on the basis of legitimate ideas about 
what was right and proper for society. The ideas about social justice embedded in the social 
contract continued to provide fertile rhetorical ground for making legitimacy claims in the 
education sphere well into the post-colonial era. Accordingly, education was democratised – 
rapidly expanded - because the ‘common man’ deserved his place in society. It was 
nationalised because Western education was an alien imposition, unsuitable for Sri Lanka’s 
needs, and misaligned with Buddhist values. The state asserted control over the universities 
175 
 
because they were alternative authority structures, not serving the people but oppositional to 
it. What these justifications had in common was that they would deliver justice for the 
majority. As such, they provided a rhetorical safe-haven for political elites seeking their 
support. Popular perceptions of injustice were not only reflected in political discourse, they 
were perpetuated – and kept alive - through it. Political narratives are therefore significant for 
understanding how service provision becomes part of wider process of state (de-)legitimation. 
Indeed, if (de)-legitimation involves the categorisation of actors or institutions in or out of the 
‘domain of moral acceptability’ (Kelman, 2001, p. 59), then it is difficult to imagine how that 
process would take place without political narratives and justificatory discourses that 
articulate any explicit claim to moral acceptability. For service provision to influence 
legitimacy, it has to make a normative claim. Political narratives are the medium through 
which those claims are made. 
The promise and peril of legitimising ideas as the basis for legitimacy claims to a specific 
audience is that they can also justify actions that can alienate alternative audiences. 
Legitimacy can involve trade-offs, whereby perceived favouritism towards one group may 
support the legitimacy of the state in the eyes of that group whilst simultaneously 
undermining it amongst others (Zaum, 2015). In Sri Lanka, the same ideas that promoted 
rectifying injustices against one community also provided moral justification for oppressive 
and discriminatory practices against another. Rising nationalism legitimised the idea that it 
was morally acceptable to engineer university access. Here, the interests of the majority and 
the minority diverged. The interests of Tamils and other groups remained in a merit-based 
social contract, whereas the interests of the Sinhalese elites were in positive discrimination. 
The ostensible pursuit of legitimacy with one group – the Sinhalese – came at the cost of 
illegitimacy with another – the Tamils. Over time, particularistic policies that favoured the 
Sinhalese were seen to deny the rights, self-respect and well-being of the Tamil minority. 
This trade off dramatically illuminates Kelman’s (2001, p. 71) observation that processes of 
legitimation that ‘bring previously excluded groups into the system, by ending oppressive and 
discriminatory practices’ may simultaneously ‘provide moral justification to oppressive and 
discriminatory practices’. Indeed, the history of state legitimation alongside de-legitimation 
in Sri Lanka exemplifies the ‘problem of multiple audiences’ (Zaum, 2013). That is, it 
demonstrates that in multi-ethnic, divided societies where the state’s intended legitimacy 
audience may not be the whole society, making legitimacy claims to this audience can 
simultaneously undermine legitimacy among another group.  
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The special place of education in legitimacy politics 
Part of the motivation for this thesis was to give an account of the role of a specific service, in 
this case higher education, in processes of (de-)legitimation. This was in recognition that not 
all services have the same technical, political or social characteristics, and therefore may not 
be equally significant for state-society relations or for state legitimacy, in any given context. 
In Sri Lanka, certain characteristics of education gave it a special place in legitimacy politics. 
Education was, overall, a ‘lynchpin’ of post-independence welfarism
372
 and a major area of 
direct state intervention because of its significance for nationalisation and democratisation – 
that is, the incorporation of the masses into the state. Its political appeal also lay in its 
popularity, which was in turn based both on its material promise, associated social prestige 
and significance for group identity. One the one hand, this made higher education fertile 
ground for making legitimacy claims, and on the other, at times pivotal for legitimacy 
evaluations. The flipside of this, however, was that higher education was also persistently 
subject to political interference that was not always in the interests of the education system 
itself.  
University education acquired a special place in the social contract because of its intrinsic 
mass appeal. Since at least colonial times, access to university has been and remains highly 
coveted in Sri Lanka because it has been viewed as an avenue to break through social 
hierarchies and access (government) employment opportunities (Dunham & Jayasuriya, 
2000). The appeal of stable government employment is magnified in a context where agrarian 
livelihoods are otherwise deemed precarious. Social demand has been further amplified 
through the supply-demand gap and particularly now in the post-war era, through intensified 
rivalry for limited spaces. Moreover, the stakes from education attainment are arguably 
higher in a patronage-based, hierarchical society like Sri Lanka, where life prospects are 
often defined by who you know and what position of power they hold. Michael Roberts 
observed in 1979 (p. 72) that ‘it is a tested conviction amongst Ceylonese that it is of some 
advantage to have a member of one’s caste or community or a friend in a strategic 
administrative or political post’. This observation still resonates some 30 years later, in 
contemporary Sri Lanka, where the enduring power of education to open up avenues of 
employment and therefore influence makes it a highly coveted social commodity, not least 
from the perspective of navigating everyday life.  
                                                          
372 Jayasuriya (2010, p. 76) characterises considers it the most politically significant of all provisions under the welfare state 
for the ‘Ceylonisation’ of the nation. 
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Aside from its material rewards, university education is also coveted because it can enable 
poor families to raise their social status through their children’s educational achievements. 
Consistently high levels of social demand for degree-level education arise not only from 
material advancement, but from the social prestige attached to getting into university. 
Obtaining a degree is a significant accolade for a young person from a village. As one 
informant described it, ‘when students come from an outstation into universities, it’s a big 
event. The whole family will come. It’s very prestigious. Somehow the whole village gets to 
know. Everyone knows, somehow, this person has made it to university’.
373
 Likewise, the 
status of degree-holder, and the prospect of a government job, often features in adverts in 
dating columns. This is an indicator that to some at least marriage prospects are associated 
with educational achievement.
374
 It is telling that education reportedly survived through the 
war even in the most conflict-affected areas.
375
 Indeed, whether or not the children go to 
school is considered a baseline standard for the basic functioning of village life
376
. In Sri 
Lanka, access to education at all levels matters politically because it matters culturally. It is 
intrinsically politically salient because it is socially prestigious. 
Education also occupies a special place in the social contract because of its significance for 
group identity. Legitimacy theorists have argued that in general, groups are more likely to 
confer legitimacy when they feel institutional arrangements are beneficial for their identity 
and, crucially, for group self-esteem (Jost & Major, 2001). Likewise, in Sri Lanka, education 
was significant for legitimacy because the social dividends from higher education are not 
merely individual, but collective. As noted earlier, and explored in Chapter IV, educational 
de-colonisation was intimately entwined with a wider process of Sinhalese nation-building. 
Indeed, re-establishing the prominence of the Sinhalese language in education was 
particularly significant and symbolic for the restoration of Sinhalese identity as a whole. 
Likewise, to the Tamil community, a long history of educational advancement has been an 
important marker of group status. In turn, any perceived threat to the right to education – on 
the part of either the Sinhalese or Tamils - represents an affront to social status. The 
rhetorical content of the FUTA campaign illustrated exactly this; state retreat from 
                                                          
373 Interview with journalist, Colombo, April 26, 2016. 
374 Sunday newspapers regularly advertise ‘recent graduate with government job’ looking for brides. 
375
 ‘Education survives amid war in Sri Lanka’, Asia Sentinel, May 16, 2007. 
376 In the words of one key informant: ‘You know, as a researcher, if I’m going to a village, even a war-torn village, we’ll 
arrive and it will appear there are no resources, nothing. I’ll go with donor agencies, and the first question I’ll ask is: ‘do the 
children go to school’. Now usually they will say yes, and take me to a place, in a small shack or something, where the 
children are getting taught. Now, if the children are not learning in a village, that’s when you know that everything’s broken 
down in that place’. Interview with independent consultant, Colombo, April 29, 2016. 
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commitment to providing free higher education raises questions about its commitment to 
protecting the social status of the majority. Likewise, standardisation was interpreted not only 
as a denial of rights and entitlements but an intolerable attack on Tamil social identity. Since 
the right to education was entwined with the both the Sinhalese and Tamil identity, any 
perceived attempt to withdraw it is perceived as an attack on that identity. 
The material and identity-based appeal of free education was not lost on political elites vying 
to extend and consolidate a power base in a new post-colonial political order. For the same 
reasons as noted above, higher education was a significant legitimacy commodity. As 
elsewhere, over time, this helped create consistent political commitment to providing it 
(Mcloughlin, 2014). Decisions about higher education were always taken at the highest level 
of government (K. M. De Silva, 1981). These characteristics of education also made it 
politically susceptible to a certain kind of political investment, however. In general, the 
higher education system has experienced high rhetorical commitment but under-investment in 
practice. More specifically, it has suffered from a focus on expansion at the cost of quality, 
and from political interference to engineer access at the point of entry – the quickest route to 
social justice - rather than to level the playing field through investments in improving 
facilities and ironing out regional inequalities. In Sri Lanka, the narrow focus on access was 
partly a response to the low expectations whereby ‘not having experienced the good, the idea 
of agitating for the good was alien to their [the masses] way of thinking’ (J.E Jayasuriya, 
1976, p. 34). But a narrow focus on access is also a familiar political problem with education 
in general, since while expanding access can produce quick political returns, improving 
quality usually involves challenging vested interests, and the benefits take longer time to 
reveal themselves to the public (Batley & Mcloughlin, 2015). For these reasons, improving 
quality does not offer the same legitimacy capital as expanding access. In this way, the 
characteristics of education partly explain its operationalisation in the social contract. 
The type of political interference that higher education attracts perpetuates a minimalist social 
contract. So long as there is significant social prestige attached to accessing a state university, 
and the number of spaces is restricted, then the social and therefore political dividends are 
satisfied by engineering access alone. By the same token, any degree, irrespective of whether 
or not it is a good quality degree, serves the legitimacy function. Moreover, since the state 
periodically absorbs unemployed graduates, higher education also still serves the important 
social function of social mobility. In this way, a minimalist social contract – one that 
understands the right to education as access to education - can be served with relatively low 
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investment. In some respects, the minimalist contract is also self-reinforcing. Demand for 
quality improvements is partly deflected by frenzied competition over access. Standardisation 
and quotas provide a short-term, highly malleable political tool to correct regional imbalances 
in science facilities, without needing to address them in and of themselves. Political 
interference has followed a pattern of appeasement of the masses at the cost of the integrity of 
the education system. This has often had unintended consequences since the landmark 
extension of free education. As J. E. Jayasuriya observed in 1976, ‘the immediate 
consequence of the principle of free education accepted in 1945 was to give a bonanza to the 
well-to-do by giving them without payment the good education that had hitherto been paid 
for by them. The masses continued to receive free the poor quality education that had all 
along been free to them’ (J.E Jayasuriya, 1976, p. 537). The wider significance of this is it 
gives a different perspective on the influence of legitimacy politics on service provision. It 
has previously been recognised that a service can attract political investment when it upholds 
state legitimacy, and forms part of a social contract – in other words, that legitimacy salience 
can have positive effects on service provision (Mcloughlin, 2014). This case supports an 
alternative proposition - that service provision can be hampered by political interference 
precisely when it is a pillar of the state’s legitimacy. Indeed, contrary to how service 
provision is usually positioned in state-building models, it suggests that services do not have 
to be objectively ‘good’ quality to serve a political legitimacy imperative. 
Justifiability: A turn to fairness? 
As the analytical framework outlined in Chapter II, justifiability is considered a central 
building block of legitimacy. Perceptions of legitimacy are thought to hinge on whether rules 
or distributional systems can be justified against shared moral principles. Overall, the 
interaction between higher education and the acts of consent and dissent observed in this 
study lends support to the theory of justifiability as a core pillar of legitimacy. At a general 
level, legitimation processes typically involved a claim of justifiability – putting forward a 
normative rationale for action. Legitimacy was, in turn, evaluated on the basis of whether any 
given justification was considered normatively acceptable, or not. Acts of dissent were 
motivated, or at least aggravated, by an unjustified departure from a legitimising idea or a 
contravention of a legitimacy norm. Significantly, in political narratives and public 
deliberations, the normative justifiability of service provision was often expressed in terms of 
fairness and unfairness, or justice and injustice. Looking across the critical junctures reveals 
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further insights into how (different) perceptions of (un)fairness in service provision are 
formed, and why they can matter not only for perceptions of service provision itself, but for 
state legitimacy as a whole.  
A key point of debate raised in the literature review was whether service provision can 
influence legitimacy in a merely instrumental or material sense - that is, because it improves 
people’s lives - or whether it has to make a normative appeal. This study supports the latter 
interpretation. In Sri Lanka, legitimacy claims in the sphere of higher education were never 
based on appeals to material rewards alone. In the post-colonial period, the extension of new 
rights to higher education was a means of transmitting what Gupta (1995) has called the 
‘main myths and symbols’ of the state - in this case, of protectionism and social justice. As 
noted earlier, the provision of higher education represented social and political rights, state 
obligations, social status and group identity. Likewise, any assault on it was seen as a threat 
to them. In all the cases where education was used to claim or contest legitimacy, it was 
never the material value of education that was appealed to, but the right to it. When 
politicians were whipping up social demand for education during the 1950s, their political 
narratives were not about social mobility, or jobs, but always centred on the deeper social 
meaning of educational access for enabling a more just and fair society. When FUTA was 
defending the social contract, they were not making overt appeals to people’s self-interest, 
but reminding them of their rights, the state’s obligations to them, and ultimately, the 
significance of higher education for national esteem and heritage. Overall then, this case 
suggests that services can matter for processes of state (de-)legitimation because of the 
potential they offer for making value-based legitimacy claims.  
In the same way, legitimacy was not conferred or contested exclusively on the basis of lived 
experience or material interests. Even in the case of the insurrection, where perhaps it could 
be argued that blocked social mobility - a material interest - was a major motivational force, 
it was equally significant that this failing signalled unfairness, exclusion, and ultimately, 
broken promises. Likewise, the immediate and highly emotive reaction to the engineering of 
university spaces, before any effects could be experienced, were as much motivated by what 
these changes signified in terms of discrimination and unfairness as by the perceived threat to 
individual and group social mobility. It is not that values and interests are mutually exclusive. 
In Sri Lanka, as elsewhere, they interacted - individuals and groups contested legitimacy 
partly because the state violated their own personal interests and preferences, partly because 
it contravened normative principles (Kelman, 2001). The salient point for the wider debate on 
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the relationship between service provision and state (de-)legitimation is that services can 
matter for legitimacy evaluations in much more than an instrumental, material sense. Just as 
social motivations for the conferral or withdrawal of legitimacy extend beyond material self-
interest and maximising personal rewards, so too the role of higher education in mobilising 
consent or dissent extended beyond these concerns also (T. R. Tyler, 2011). In Sri Lanka, 
access to higher education was significant for aggravating processes of state de-legitimation 
because of its deeper, normative significance for fairness and social justice. 
Perceptions of unfairness and injustice in the process through which decisions about higher 
education were taken were a key area of legitimacy deliberation. The most graphic 
illustration of this is standardisation, which suffered a major justificatory deficit because it 
was introduced in apparent secrecy, and without due regard for norms of transparency or 
consultation. Post-war privatisation was similarly resisted, and resented, partly because the 
state was seen to be hiding it from the public domain. In both of these cases, a perceived lack 
of procedural transparency contributed to an environment of mistrust and, ultimately, a 
questioning of the state’s true motives. These findings align with the central tenet of 
legitimacy theory discussed in the earlier literature review – that the perceived fairness of 
decision-making process is a key aspect of people’s willingness to comply with it (Tyler 
2006). It is interesting to note that perceptions of procedural unfairness were sometimes a 
source of public questioning of legitimacy independently of the perceived fairness of any 
associated outcomes or decisions reached. The process through which both standardisation 
and military-style student leadership training were introduced was rejected by sections of 
both Sinhalese and Tamil society, whose material investment in these decisions was 
divergent. In this way, unfair process appeared to represent a common-ground threat to 
legitimacy, and a cross-group basis for contesting the legitimacy of state action.   
Perceptions of distributive unfairness in higher education were an equally potent, but 
arguably more group-based source of illegitimacy. Standardisation embedded special rights 
for the majority Sinhalese legitimacy audience at the expense of perceived violation of the 
universal principle of meritocracy. In so doing, it undermined the common interest principle 
that is considered an essential component of legitimacy (Kelman, 2001). Indeed, shared 
values gave way to group favourability, and immediately gave rise to perceptions of 
distributive injustice. In effect, the ostensible pursuit of ‘fairness’ for the Sinhalese in turn 
collided with, and undermined, Tamil minority perceptions of fairness. Policies that violate 
principles of universalism in this way need to find justification in an alternative normative 
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principle, based on a common social benefit (Scharpf, 2003). No such alternative justification 
could be found for standardisation, which was rejected as both amoral and illogical. Put 
another way, so-called ‘performance legitimacy’ may fail if it sends signals to citizens that 
‘government for the people’ (Scharpf, 1999) is government for only ‘some’ of the people. 
Indeed, standardisation suffered a double justifiability crisis, in the sense that it was 
perceived as both an unfavourable outcome and arrived at through unfair process. This 
combination is recognised elsewhere as a tipping point for legitimacy (Kelman, 2001). In 
relation to the wider debate between distributive and procedural fairness, therefore, Sri 
Lanka’s experience suggests service provision can be a source of both and, moreover, that 
legitimacy may be particularly compromised when they overlap. 
Sri Lanka’s experience suggests further refinement of the idea of outcome-based, or 
performance legitimacy, in two senses. First, there is a need to distinguish between 
perceptions and lived reality. As Davies (1962, p. 8) identified in his analysis of the cause of 
revolutions, a crucial factor motivating rejections of the state was ‘the vague or specific fear 
that ground gained over a long period of time will be quickly lost’. In this way, perceptions of 
distributive injustice and unfairness may matter as much as actual experience, or objective 
measures of inequality. Surveys of horizontal inequalities in African countries, for example, 
have found significant mismatch between measureable inequalities and perceptions of 
inequalities between groups (Langer & Mikami, 2013). Statistical analysis has also shown 
that perceptions of inequality are more influential in determining social stability than 
measures of inequality (Alexandre et al., 2012; Stewart, 2000). In line with these findings, 
this study suggests that objective reality (lived experience) is less significant than perceived 
reality (cues and signals from political leaders) for political legitimacy (Hanberger, 2003). It 
indicates, as per the wider literature reviewed in Chapter II, that perceptions of unfair 
outcomes may be a sufficient basis for contesting legitimacy. As Roberts (1979, pp. 77-78) 
puts it, ‘collective identity and nationalism everywhere have developed on the foundations of 
imaginary grievances as well as real’. Understanding the role of service provision in 
supporting or undermining state legitimacy may therefore benefit from de-coupling objective 
measures of provision and legitimacy, and inserting a politically constructed, subjective 
reality between them. A further, more substantive challenge to the idea of outcome-based 
legitimacy can also be made on the basis of the findings here. That is that service provision is 
not exclusively a question of ‘outputs’, but also an expression and manifestation of processes 
and values. Other studies have shown that in practice people do not evaluate state legitimacy 
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in such neat categories of outputs, inputs, or procedures (Gippert, 2016; Lindgren & Persson, 
2010). As such, service does not benefit from being instrumentally bracketed as exclusively a 
source of ‘output’ legitimacy as per the received wisdom in aid debates. 
Another qualification to the theory of justifiability is that justifiability is politically 
contingent. Across the three time periods, political conditions always formed the backdrop of 
citizens’ assessments of the state’s performance on higher education provision. The anti-
colonial struggle, the strong turn to nationalism and, later, creeping authoritarianism were all 
significant for first moulding higher education, and in turn shaping public reception of 
reforms. Prominent legitimacy theorists have argued that a degree of deprivation and inequity 
can be tolerated in a context where the wider political system is justified – that is, broadly 
perceived as fair (Jost & Major, 2001). On the other hand, the illegitimacy of the state, 
combined with the illegitimacy of its action, can be a potent combination and a tipping point 
for justificatory failure, and subsequent de-legitimation (Kelman, 2001). This is evident in Sri 
Lanka, where reactions to standardisation were rapid and acute because they were introduced 
in a context of wider perceptions of unfairness in the distribution of resources among 
different social groups. The significance of changes to rules governing access was amplified 
by this political context. It has been observed elsewhere that when a group is already 
excluded from access to services or access to power, services are evaluated in a context of 
wider mistrust and exclusion (Levi, Sacks & Tyler, 2009). Likewise, a key finding here is 
that the fairness of service provision is likely to be evaluated in, and cannot be divorced from, 
the perceived fairness of the distribution of resources and power in society a whole.  
Perceptions of fairness were also conditioned by the history of ideas and expectations 
embedded in the social contract. As argued in Chapter IV, post-colonial political conditions 
paved the way for political elites to make new legitimacy claims and promises. Over time, 
performance was assessed against these promises. The insurrection in the south was at least 
partly motivated by a mismatch between the promise of new rights, and the weak capacity of 
the state to deliver on that promise. It was exacerbated by the state’s failure to deliver against 
a set of rights to which people had been made to feel entitled. Viewed from this perspective, 
it conforms with Easton’s theory (1975, p. 445) that the frustration (rather than meeting) of 
expectations can jolt the ‘deeper loyalties’ of the members of a system such that their diffuse 
support falls into precipitous decline. A long period of social development and rising 
expectations followed by a sharp reversal in fortunes has been shown, historically, to be a 
causal factor in revolution (Davies, 1962). In a similar vein, both the FUTA mobilisation, and 
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the reaction to standardisation were also responses to the denial of rights and promises 
implicit in the social contract. In these cases, the apparent denial of previously held rights 
was, as has been theorised elsewhere, significant for motivating contestations around state 
legitimacy (Kelman, 2001, p. 58). The wider implication is that perceptions of fairness may 
be relative: relative to what has been promised, what is expected and to what has previously 
been experienced as a right.  
Another point of debate raised in the literature on the link between service provision and state 
legitimacy is the issue of attribution. Put simply, the question is how an (il)legitimate service 
or policy comes to influence perceptions of state legitimacy as a whole. This is an under 
theorised link in the virtuous circle argument (Schmelzle, 2011). This study suggests that 
perceptions of (un)fairness in service provision – whether distributive or procedural – matter 
for state legitimacy because they signal the wider fairness of the state. Standardisation came 
to symbolise not only the increasing exclusion of the Tamil minority from fair access to state 
resources, but also the limited prospect of using fair process to remedy perceived inequalities 
and redress grievances. Post-war state retreat from higher education sent a strong signal that 
the state was rescinding its commitment to social justice embedded in the social contract. In 
turn, claims of unfairness in service provision resonated because of these wider signalling 
effects. As illustrated in Chapter VI, in its stand against perceived unfairness and decline in 
the education system, for example, FUTA came to represent a wider struggle against social 
injustice and state repression. These findings suggest that service provision can become a 
prominent arena through which wider state-society contestations play out. This is not least 
because service provision conveys messages to citizens about the operative values and norms 
of the state.  
Bringing history back 
While each juncture speaks to wider debates about the relationship between service provision 
and state legitimacy, the deeper analytic value is arguably in the connections between the 
junctures, over time. Indeed, the driving rationale behind the historical approach applied in 
this study was to view the relationship between education and legitimation as a long-term 
process, and to identify temporal dimensions that may be otherwise lost in snapshots. In 
effect, the aim was to shift the perspective from static pictures, to moving parts. By widening 
the timeframe of enquiry, and tracing the relationship over time, two observations can be 
made. The first is the striking continuity of ideas that originated in the social contract, 
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travelled through time, and continued to set steering limits on state and social action. The 
second is the self-reinforcing relationship between legitimation claims, practices and their 
(un-)intended effects over time. As discussed below, historical institutionalism offers a 
fruitful lens through which to analyse these temporal dimensions of the services-legitimacy 
relationship.  
Legitimising ideas in time 
Looking across the three critical junctures, one of the most striking features is the continuity 
of ideas about the rights of the people, and the legitimate role of the state. The right to 
education has, over time, been an ‘insistent belief’ (Pieris, 1964, p. 448). As an idea, it 
represents the glorious history of welfarism that set Sri Lanka apart from its neighbours as an 
early developer. The provision of free education is no less than an matter of national heritage, 
and forms part of the national conscience. There is collective, sentimental attachment to it. 
The resilience of this idea in the face of structural change that threatens to potentially 
diminish its value, not least the devastating effects of war and the graduation from state 
dependency of the middle classes, is testament to its durability. The FUTA strikes were able 
to tap into the continued salience of the right to education as an idea across all social groups. 
FUTA contested the state’s legitimacy by engaging it in an ideational battle for the rhetorical 
moral high ground. Their defence of the past revived the language of the past, and a similar 
intrinsic mass appeal to the time of the making of the social contract. Together, this is 
testament to the strength of ideas in the binding of states and societies, and to the role of 
service provision in forming the idea of the state. Indeed, it is testament to the state itself as 
an idea.  
The three periods under scrutiny also provide insights into how legitimating ideas travel 
through time. In part, the idea of the right to education was carried by the living generation of 
beneficiaries: the children of free education, who continue to defend it. In historical 
institutionalism, ideas become more important when they are supported by powerful groups 
in society, for example political parties or elites (Campbell, 1998). Likewise in Sri Lanka, the 
social contract is persistently resuscitated through the threat of dissent from the core 
Sinhalese legitimacy audience of the state. At a broad level, this speaks to the debate raised in 
chapter III about whose views count for legitimacy, and suggests it is not so much the scale 
of dissent but the power of the constituency being represented that is significant. Likewise, it 
suggests the magnitude of a legitimacy challenge may be signified in the state’s rhetorical 
and practical response, which as both the response to the insurrection and to FUTA suggests, 
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might entail seeking to play down or discredit the normative basis of dissent as well as re-
asserting the state’s own basis for moral justifiability. This was most starkly illustrated in the 
post-war era, when the rhetorical response to FUTA entailed labelling it as a threat to 
stability, the assurance of which was one of the main legitimacy claims of the triumphalist 
regime. The idea of the right to education has been resilient not only because it is defended 
by a powerful constituency, but because it is actively promoted by political elites courting 
them. Their ability to narrate the extension of higher education in terms of national identity 
and social justice was significant for its normative appeal. Indeed, this illustrates Campbell’s 
(1998, p. 381) argument that ‘the ability of elites to transport an idea into influential arenas 
may turn on their ability to package and frame it successfully’. In Sri Lanka, the right to 
social justice in education provided ‘symbols and concepts that enable(d) actors to construct 
frames with which to legitimise their policy proposals’ (ibid, p. 398). In sum, legitimising 
ideas were framed and (re-)produced by elites, to political effect. They did not float through 
time, they were carried by people. 
The system of higher education has been shaped by its legitimacy heritage and legitimising 
ideas. In line with historical institutionalism, this finding challenges the rational choice idea 
that institutions can be explained because they ‘function’ to address the needs and incentives 
of powerful actors in the present (Pierson, 2004; Hall and Taylor, 1996).
377
 As chapter VI 
argued, the higher education system is in many ways dysfunctional from an educational 
perspective. It reproduces inequalities, is under-resourced, and the emphasis is placed on 
access rather than quality. It provides as a minimal, welfare-state model of higher education. 
To a degree, these dysfunctions persist because they serve a legitimacy purpose: regardless of 
them, higher education delivers the coveted right to education, satisfies social demand 
(primarily for access), and secures a path to social mobility. Institutional continuity is 
sustained through legitimacy, rather than functionality (Mahoney, 2010).
378
 In wider 
perspective, this suggests that services may simultaneously dysfunction technically, but 
function from a legitimacy perspective. In fact, they may dysfunction technically precisely 
because they follow a different, legitimacy logic.  
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 Some refute the basic premise of rational choice that ‘institutional arrangements are explained by their consequences’ 
(Pierson, 2004, p. 14). 
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 Mahoney (2010) puts forward a useful typology of four explanations for continuity and change within institutions. In his 
model, institutions are reproduced either through a rational cost-benefit analysis (the utilitarian explanation), because they 
serve a function for an overall system (the functional explanation) or because they are supported by an elite group of actors 
(the power explanation). Changes can be explained through changes in competitive pressures, system needs, or the relative 
power of elites. A fourth explanation, the legitimation explanation, holds that institutions are reproduced when actors believe 
they are legitimate. 
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Historical institutionalists argue that formative events can set a precedent about what is 
morally appropriate that can be self-perpetuating (Mahoney, 2010, p. 523). Likewise in Sri 
Lanka, critical junctures have been significant in establishing legitimising ideas and norms 
that continue to shape the sector. For example, while language based standardisation was 
widely rejected as illegitimate, the idea of differential treatment of different groups is 
legitimate and has survived since the crisis of the Sinhalese insurrection. Accordingly, as 
Chapter VII discussed, a system of district quotas (which replaced the system of language-
based standardisation) has operated since 1974 to engineer opportunities for access to 
education and positively discriminate in favour of the vital constituency of rural poor. In this 
way, the state has been tethered to the idea of positive discrimination, and the inherent 
favouritism it embodies, in a path-dependent manner. One legacy of casting a social contract 
as a way to rectify past wrongs for oppressed groups, and therefore hinging legitimacy on that 
promise, has been that rectifying those wrongs could not thereafter be left to chance alone. In 
broader perspective, this suggests in line with historical institutionalism that processes of 
state legitimation may be particularly sensitive to critical turning points when legitimacy 
claims are first made and norms are established. 
The higher education system is path dependent in the sense that legitimacy norms and ideas 
inherited from the past continue to set steering limits on the present. In particular, it has been 
argued earlier that the need to protect the right to education embedded in the social contract 
continues to place structural constraints on the Sri Lankan state. In his seminal piece, De 
Waal (1996, p. 201) argued that social contracts are ‘enforced by the people and adhered to 
by their rulers out of political necessity’. This point succinctly captures the durability of Sri 
Lanka’s social contract in education. The state has faced dissent when it (appears to) neglect 
its obligations to this contract. Post-war mobilisations to defend state investment in higher 
education illustrate that ‘the adoption of any course that steers too far from its colonial and 
post-independence inheritance’ provokes dissent (Wickramasinghe-Samarasinghe, 2006, p. 
333). Any attempt to detract from or re-define the contract have to be packaged inside rather 
than outside its core terms and align with its basic ideas – such as branding privatisation as an 
expansion of choice. In this way, ideas from the past continue to straightjacket the state, even 
a repressive, authoritarian regime. This illustrates a broader claim made by Hudson and 
Leftwich (Hudson & Leftwich, 2014, p. 88) that ‘ideas not only influence and reflect politics; 
they are themselves critical aspects of the structure of constraints and possibilities that frame 
developmental prospects and actors’ ‘room for manoeuvre’’. More broadly, it supports the 
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point made by Zaum (2013) that legitimacy – in this case legitimising ideas – can both confer 
power and act as a constraint on it. 
Cycles of performance and (de-)legitimation 
Sri Lanka’s experience suggests that the relationship between service provision and state (de-
)legitimation can be cyclical. Furthermore, it suggests how these cycles can be triggered and 
become self-reinforcing. Across the junctures, legitimacy was contested under conditions of 
crisis and social change: the insurrection, Tamil militarisation, and FUTA mobilisations were 
enabled by conjunctures of political conditions and major economic and demographic trends. 
These legitimacy crises were themselves critical junctures, as Krasner (1984, p. 243) 
describes, because they represented ‘a struggle over the basic rules of the game rather than 
allocation within a given set of rules’. In turn, they sometimes gave rise to new or escalated 
legitimation claims and practices. Immediately following the legitimacy crisis of the 
insurrection, for example, the state made hasty efforts to make up for its broken promises, 
and rekindle the social contract with the Sinhalese through concessionary measures. It re-
doubled its efforts to deliver social justice by escalating the political engineering of university 
entrance in their favour. In turn, legitimation practices that responded to legitimacy crisis 
sometimes set the state along a certain course from which it was thereafter difficult to 
reverse. Indeed, as Mahoney (2000, p. 513) argues, this potential for institutionalising path-
dependency is what makes critical junctures ‘critical’, in that ‘once a particular option is 
selected it becomes progressively more difficult to return to the initial point when multiple 
alternatives are still available’. The starkest illustration of this occurred when the state 
appeased the Sinhalese educated classes by absorbing unemployed graduates into the public 
service after the 1971 insurrection. This has carried forward a legacy effect whereby the state 
continues to absorb unemployed graduates into the public sector. In part, this path continues 
because there are high sunk costs in following it. In line with Krasner’s (1984) interpretation, 
these sunk costs are not instrumental or about vested interest, but more about upholding an 
accepted way of organising power: in this case, the state’s legitimate role and obligation as 
patron of the poor. In this way, cycles of performance and (de-)legitimation can be triggered 
by critical junctures that become self-perpetuating. 
The legitimacy crisis of the insurrection was also significant in shaping the system of higher 
education in the sense that it re-cast the student-state relationship in a new mould. Thereafter, 
students were labelled a potential threat to the state. As one academic observed ‘the students 
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are seen as movements. That all came about in 1971’.
379
 A former high-level government 
advisor explained that, after that, there was this attitude towards young people, that they were 
a challenge and a potential threat, and they can’t be trusted unless they prove otherwise.
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The persistent labelling of students as politically indoctrinated, infiltrated and unruly was 
used to legitimise measures to control them, most graphically in the post-war authoritarian 
era. Moreover, this label underlies an institutional incapacity to address student grievances 
concerning the state of higher education facilities. This, in turn, perpetuates hostile student-
state relations and is a significant source of continual unrest in the sphere of higher education. 
The account of a former chairman of the University Grants Commission (UGC) is illustrative 
in this regard. He recounted ‘now the UGC they merely view students as bad. They are 
labelled as bad. But we have to think about what they want’.
381
 This is an illustration of Nira 
Wickramasinghe’s (2006, p. 333) observation that ‘certain critical moments have punctuated 
the last half century and have, in no uncertain terms, moulded the shape of the post colony 
and the mental framework of its people’. More broadly, it shows how higher education in Sri 
Lanka continues to be shaped and constrained by its turbulent past, which was itself a product 
of political interference in the pursuit of legitimation.   
Looking across the junctures, it is possible to identify a self-reinforcing relationship between 
legitimation claims, practices, and legitimacy effects. The pursuit of the social demand model 
of education is a particularly salient example. It benefited from initially positive feedback 
effects in that the ethnic composition of university students altered significantly in a 
relatively short period, and a higher portion of Sinhalese was recorded as attending. Some 
historical institutionalists argue that positive feedback can make institutions ‘stick’, meaning 
that over time a change of course is less likely, and potential alternatives are lost (Pierson, 
2004). In a similar vein, the pursuit of the social demand model seemed to set the state on a 
path from which there could be no turning back. In part, this was because the democratisation 
of higher education not only responded to social demand, but also stimulated it. Sinhalese 
politicians propagated ideas about the need to rectify persistent, residual inequality in the 
system to maximise the normative appeal of this legitimation practice. In so doing, they both 
perpetuated these ideas of injustice, and hung political legitimacy on rectifying them. For 
more than a decade, the cycle between legitimacy claims and legitimacy practices was self-
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reinforcing, as politicians had to expand higher education in order to satisfy their own 
legitimacy claims. 
Across the junctures, it is also possible to trace the connections between legitimacy practices 
and their (un)intended consequences over time. Negative feedback effects from the earlier, 
post-colonial legitimation practices carried through to the later junctures. Free education 
provided a dividend to the rich who could now get the same education for free, whilst the 
poor were still served by a second rate education system. The switchover to education in the 
local languages without the attendant resourcing restricted educational opportunities for the 
Sinhalese to the arts faculties and therefore reproduced colonial educational segregation 
along linguistic lines. The escalation of control has taken many forms over the three periods 
in question, from repeated commissions of inquiry to examine suspected malpractices, to 
increasing political interference over admissions and high-level appointments, to a more overt 
militarisation. In turn, this has only created a backlash of further violence and dissent, both 
during the 1960s and in the post-war era. The higher education system is caught in a negative 
cycle of control-resistance: as the state seeks to exert its authority over the university 
population through oppressive or coercive means, so its legitimacy among students and 
academics is increasingly called into question. The knee-jerk reaction of state authorities to 
close the universities at the first sign of dissent is another legacy of the turmoil of the 1960s. 
It is now, according to some at least, ‘the first response of the authorities – if there’s a 
problem, shut the university down’.
382
 Furthermore, as a report of the National Education 
Commission in 2008 concluded, ‘government control of universities paves the way for the 
perception among students that the universities are a proxy for government and could serve as 
legitimate targets in anti-government activities’ (Weeramunda, 2008).
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 In this way, 
legitimation practices have had significant, negative and sometimes unintended 
consequences.  
The time that elapsed between legitimacy claims and practices and their feedback effects 
varied. On the one hand, the insurrection was the culmination of what historical 
institutionalists might call ‘a slow-moving process’ that unfolded over two decades. It 
suggests that the relationship between legitimation claims and effects is cyclical, involving 
the setting of expectations and then performing (or not) to them.
384
 Educated unemployment 
                                                          
382 Interview with academic, University of Colombo, October 7, 2014. 
383 The author of this report expressed frustration that the recommendation to hear student’s grievances were never taken up. 
384 Gilley (2009) arrives at a similar conclusion. 
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resulted from both the success and failure of earlier legitimation practices – that is, the 
success of free education, combined with the limits of democratisation, and the failed 
promise of nationalism. In contrast, the de-legitimising effects of standardisation were 
immediate, albeit also part of a slow-moving process of de-legitimation. These findings 
simultaneously support and refute Gilley’s (2009, p. 59) assertion that legitimacy is the result 
of ‘an ongoing historical process of performance and feedback, not of a sudden delivery or 
failure of public goods’. Part of the explanation lies in the nature of the connection between 
education and these two de-legitimations. In the case of the insurrection, the political 
manipulation of higher education helped create a structural problem of inequality and broken 
promises as a basis for legitimacy contestation, which took a generation to come to fruition. 
In the case of Tamil militarisation, the political manipulation of higher education signalled a 
more acute, normative contravention of principle that provided an immediate basis for 
legitimacy contestation. This serves to illustrate that services can both create the structural 
conditions for long-term de-legitimation, and exacerbate more acute, short-term legitimacy 
crises. In wider perspective, it also suggests legitimacy can be long in the making, but quickly 
unmade.  
Conclusions 
History, politics and ideas, particularly around fairness, have shaped the relationship between 
higher education and processes of state (de-)legitimation over time in Sri Lanka. Historically, 
the post-colonial social contract reinforced the ideational ties between state and society by 
establishing a set of rights, obligations and a new set of shared values based on social justice. 
Appeals to the rights and entitlements of the oppressed Sinhalese majority helped make the 
state legible to this, its primary legitimacy audience. Since that formative critical juncture, 
there has been a striking continuity of ideas about the right to education and the legitimate 
role of the state that have travelled through time. These ideas continue to set steering limits 
on state action and social mobilisation in the present. Over time, legitimacy crises have been 
significant in shaping important institutional characteristics of the education system, 
including a curiously hostile but simultaneously paternalistic relationship between students 
and the state whereby students are cast as oppositional but graduates are incorporated into the 
bureaucracy of government. In this way, the system of higher education has been, and 
continues to be, shaped by its legitimacy heritage and legitimacy politics. Furthermore, 
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looking across the junctures, it is possible to identify a self-reinforcing relationship between 
legitimation claims, practices, and legitimacy effects that were separated in time.  
The significance of higher education for legitimacy was neither intrinsic nor organic – it was 
politically constructed. Education was fertile ground for political legitimation because of its 
intrinsic mass appeal, which was in turn based on its material and social significance for both 
individual social mobility and group identity. Political narratives articulated the normative 
significance of higher education for legitimacy and therefore manufactured the connections. 
The characteristics of higher education made it politically lucrative for legitimacy claim-
making, but also attracted a limited type of political investment which services a minimal, 
access-based social contract. The effects of the political manipulation of education for 
legitimation sometimes had (un)intended consequences on legitimacy. At different times, the 
political manipulation of education for the purpose of legitimation created the structural 
conditions for long-term de-legitimation, and exacerbated more acute, short-term legitimacy 
crises. 
Ideas and values, particularly perceptions of fairness and unfairness, have been as significant 
as the material benefits from education in stimulating or exacerbating processes of (de-
)legitimation. Perceptions of (un)fairness in service provision were conditioned by 
perceptions of the fairness of the operative rules of the state, and of group inclusion and 
exclusion. Fairness is also relative to the history of political promises and commitments 
embedded in the social contract and, since different groups are incorporated into the social 
contract differently, can also splinter along group lines. Ultimately, perceptions of fairness in 
education – whether distributive or procedural – mattered for state legitimacy because they 
conveyed messages about the state’s commitment to fairness. Together, this illustrates that 
the idea of ‘outcome’ legitimacy is narrowly conceived, in two senses. First, perceptions of 
fairness may matter as much as objective outcomes for legitimacy evaluations. Second, the 
significance of service provision for legitimacy is as much a question of state process and 
shared state-society values as of one of state outputs.  
Collectively, these findings about the significance of history, values and politics raise specific 
propositions about when service provision may support or undermine state legitimacy. These 
propositions, as well as their implications for both the received wisdom and for future 





Conclusions and implications 
This thesis was motivated by the received wisdom in aid policy literature that the provision of 
vital public services can help to build state legitimacy. It develops a critique of this overly 
instrumental framing of the services-legitimacy relationship, and has highlighted its weak 
foundation in theory and evidence. Based on an examination and distillation of the wider 
theoretical and empirical literature, I derived a novel analytical framework for a political, 
historically-informed, qualitative approach to studying the services-legitimacy relationship. 
The framework bridged disciplines to ground the empirical enquiry more firmly in theories 
about how legitimacy is won and lost. I positioned the social contract, normative justifiability 
of service provision and temporal political conditions at the centre of a case study analysis of 
the relationship between higher education and state legitimacy over time in Sri Lanka. The 
methodology involved gathering and triangulating first-hand key informant accounts, news 
archives, official documents and historical texts to develop an historical narrative of whether 
and how higher education has been significant for processes of legitimation and de-
legitimation. The empirical focus was on critical junctures in the history of the Sri Lankan 
state when legitimacy was consolidating or unravelling. In looking across these junctures, I 
argue the higher education-legitimacy relationship in Sri Lanka has been historically 
conditioned, politically constructed, and hinges on ideas, values and perceptions of fairness.  
The major finding and claim of this thesis is that service provision can matter for state 
legitimacy. In Sri Lanka, access to higher education has both supported and undermined 
legitimacy, at different times, among different groups in society. That is not to say that 
services continually matter, matter to the same degree as other sources of legitimacy, or 
evenly across time or space. There can be no universal criteria for when services support or 
undermine legitimacy. The answer to the question driving this thesis - when does service 
provision support or undermine legitimacy? - is that it depends. What this thesis begins to 
develop, however, is a deeper understanding of what it can depend on. Specifically, it 
identifies ways that the history of state transformation, political manipulation of service 
provision, and normative characteristics of service provision can shape this relationship. In 
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this concluding chapter, I reflect on the contributions and limitations of the thesis, and put 
forward specific propositions about when service provision supports and undermines 
legitimacy that could be tested elsewhere. I make a case for refining the so-called received 
wisdom that service provision improves legitimacy based on an appreciation that the 
relationship is neither automatic nor instrumental. I conclude that future research on the 
services-legitimacy relationship might usefully expand the remit of enquiry: from the 
material to the non-material, from snapshots to longer-term and historically-informed 
observations, and by moving politics from background concern to the foreground of 
explanation. 
Contributions and limitations of the thesis 
It is worth beginning by acknowledging the limitations of this thesis, since its findings and 
claims should be read and interpreted in light of them. As outlined in the methodology, this 
research was limited in time, space and resources. A fuller coverage of history, a different 
approach to periodisation, or an alternative selection of critical junctures may have 
highlighted other dynamics in the relationship between higher education and state (de-
)legitimation in Sri Lanka. Furthermore, precisely because the study focuses on critical 
junctures when legitimacy is in flux, and its links with higher education are most explicit and 
observable, it is possible that the overall significance of higher education for state legitimacy 
is over-emphasised. Moreover, although the relationship was considered in political context, 
the significance of higher education is not positioned relative to other sources of legitimacy 
of the Sri Lankan state. It is therefore conceivable that this narrow account of the specific role 
of higher education in the making and breaking of the state’s legitimacy neglects the 
significance of other dynamics of state (de-)legitimation.  
In important ways, the selected case study cannot claim to be typical.  Indeed, such claims are 
unlikely to ever be credibly made in the social sciences. Sri Lanka was selected precisely 
because it is an outlier that appears to question any straightforward link between service 
provision and state legitimacy. Sri Lanka’s independence struggle and nationalist resurgence 
were intimately bound up with and found expression in post-colonial education reforms. In 
turn, the context of (perceived) ethnic inequality, and subsequent state-society conflict made 
the distribution of highly coveted goods such as higher education particularly salient for 
issues of state (de-)legitimation. In more stable environments where these lines of division 
and are not so apparent, service provision may not be so formative of state-society 
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contestations. The forging of such a strong, welfare-based social contract in Sri Lanka made 
performing to the needs and expectations of different groups significant for state (de-
)legitimation, but this is not comparable to contexts where no such social contract exists. Sri 
Lanka is arguably an acute example of when and why service provision can support and 
undermine a state’s legitimacy. For these reasons, the findings cannot be generalised from Sri 
Lanka to elsewhere.  
In a similar vein, higher education was selected as the sector of focus because it has special 
characteristics that have made it particularly politically salient. In Sri Lanka, it has had a 
particularly turbulent political history. In turn, the study attributes the special place of higher 
education in the social contract to its symbolic meaning and value in the wider project of re-
building a ‘Sinhalese’ nation. In particular, higher education was an arena where legacies of 
colonial injustice materialised visibly and starkly, where expansions of access could be used 
to incorporate the masses, and where the reassertion of national, Buddhist religious values 
could find expression. These characteristics magnified political investments in higher 
education, and gave it rhetorical and symbolic meaning beyond its material or social benefits. 
Collectively, these findings reinforce the earlier observation that ‘service provision’ is not 
one monolithic entity, and that different services can have different significance for creating 
relational ties and shared values between societies. For these reasons, the findings cannot be 
generalised from higher education to another service in Sri Lanka. Indeed, part of the 
contribution of this thesis is to give a more fine grained account that shows precisely that: the 
relationship between service provision and state legitimacy is specific not only to time, space, 
and social groups, but to specific services. In effect, the study illustrates but also elaborates 
on the ‘problem of historical specificity’ (Hodgson, 2001, p. 59) and that for these reasons, 
generalisations of the complex, historically contingent relationship between service provision 
and (de-)legitimation are likely to be oversimplifications.  
The findings of this study are indicative rather than demonstrative. The exploratory research 
design did not set out to rule out rival explanations of the observed shifts in state legitimacy. 
A descriptive study of this kind should not be oversold as causal evidence (Hakim, 2000, pp. 
148-151). At the same time, the thesis was never aiming for a generalisable theory. Given the 
underdeveloped nature of this body of literature, and the absence of ready-made analytical 
frameworks, it was aiming for a heavily contextualised, exploratory account of the services-
legitimacy relationship. There is a trade-off here between the rich, explanatory narrative of a 
highly contextualised in-depth study, and the limited generalisability of the findings to 
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different social settings and time periods (Brewer & Hunter, 2006, p. 134). Limited 
generalisability does not, however, preclude contribution to theory-building because as 
Mitchell (Mitchell, 1983, p. 207) explains, ‘the validity of the extrapolation depends not on 
the typicality or representativeness of the case but upon the cogency of the theoretical 
reasoning’. 
In other ways, the study raises but does not resolve some of the inherent difficulties in 
studying state legitimacy. One such challenge is the problem of differentiating the state’s 
right to rule, analytically, from the political legitimacy (or support, or popularity) of any 
particular government or regime. It was not always straightforward to differentiate the 
perceived rightfulness of a system of rules from perceived rightfulness of government action, 
or of particular rulers, because in practice they are connected. Nevertheless, the study 
suggests the significance of higher education for the state’s legitimacy can be distinguished 
from its significance for government legitimacy, in two ways. First, there was a degree of 
continuity of ideas that the state has responsibility to deliver free higher education to the 
poor, which has held constant through the transfer of power between political parties of 
different ideological orientations. Those ideas originated in the terms and conditions of the 
social contract itself, and though they have been mobilised into legitimation practices to 
different degrees, and with different levels of ideological zeal by political parties and leaders 
with different leanings, they were at a basic level incontrovertible. Ideas embedded an 
institutional logic that carried over time through shifts across the political spectrum: all 
political regimes have to navigate and ultimately safeguard, even if only rhetorically, this line 
in the sand. In turn, people evaluate not only the regime but the state itself, based on its 
commitment to navigate this line. Neither support for a regime, nor the coercive power of a 
regime, can compensate for contravention of the social contract, which rouses opposition 
even in the most hostile and (putatively) disabling environments. In the extreme cases of the 
insurrection and resort to armed separatism, legitimacy was not only withdrawn from the 
incumbent political party or regime, but from the state system itself. Indeed, they were partly 
motivated by a perception that regime change would not alter the fundamental institutional 
logic on which the state was operating, and hence the operative rules of the game, rather than 
the government itself, was violently rejected.  
Contributions of the thesis 
Notwithstanding the above limitations, this thesis makes methodological, empirical and 
theoretical contributions to understanding why service provision can matter for state 
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legitimacy. Methodologically, it departs from the major thrust of the literature in that it 
provides a qualitative, historical account of the role of service provision in processes of both 
state legitimation and de-legitimation over time. The temporal dimension allowed for 
capturing the dynamic interaction between legitimacy claims and legitimacy evaluations that 
may be separated in time. This study’s qualitative approach illustrates that inquiries into 
legitimacy can be conducted in the absence of survey data, by drawing on attitudinal and 
behavioural markers of legitimacy captured in the public sphere. The public sphere can reveal 
not only the motivations for shifting legitimacy behaviours, but also legitimacy claims and 
narratives, and public deliberations about their acceptance or rejection. The methodology also 
demonstrates the potential insights that can come from targeting research on legitimacy at 
critical junctures when legitimacy is shifting. Indeed, it identifies some of the salient 
characteristics of such junctures. Critical junctures of legitimation were here marked by new 
or escalating legitimacy claims and practices, accompanied by political incorporation and 
mobilisation of the society by the state. Periods of de-legitimation were signalled by rejection 
of the state’s legitimacy claims and practices, accompanied by acts of dissent – both violent 
and non-violent.  
Empirically, the thesis contributes a thick, narrative account of how service provision can 
become entwined in processes of state (de-)legitimation. The empirical chapters 
progressively explored why higher education became significant first to the making of the 
social contract, then later to the breaking of the social contract, between the state and both 
Sinhalese and Tamil citizens. In so doing, they lend empirical support to a number of key 
arguments made in the wider literature. The study reinforces the theoretical proposition that 
legitimacy matters for stability, by showing that the state faced violent dissent when it lost 
legitimacy among certain elements in society. It shows that services can become significant 
in both processes of legitimation and de-legitimation when they symbolise the state’s 
commitment to upholding certain social values, expectations and entitlements that underpin a 
social contract. Furthermore, it indicates why and how services are used and manipulated by 
states to pursue and reinforce their normative appeal and basis for legitimacy. Finally, the 
study indicates the effects that such political manipulation of services can have not only on 
legitimacy but on service provision itself. Higher education is politically contested, and 
continues to be a space of state-society contestation, partly because of its significance for 
historical processes of state (de-)legitimation that have carried forward important legacy 
effects on the functioning of the system.  
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Explaining Sri Lanka’s paradox of performance and de-legitimation 
The Introduction to this thesis outlined the puzzle of Sri Lanka’s experience of high 
performance and de-legitimation, which ostensibly appears inimical to the received wisdom 
that services and legitimation should progress together. In turn, an in-depth examination of 
the provision of higher education, notwithstanding its specificities, indicates some of the 
potential reasons for this paradox. Sri Lanka was an early developer and outstanding 
performer on welfare. The process of post-colonial state transformation embedded a social 
contract with a strong ideological and instrumental rationale to uphold the welfare of the rural 
poor. Legitimation claims ideologically and materially appealed to the majority Sinhalese. 
The state was built on the idea of rectifying colonial injustices. It embodied an idea of 
realising social justice for the masses. Educational injustice provided fertile ground for 
making legitimacy claims, and became a key arena in which the wider project of state 
transformation found rhetorical expression. This underpinned the democratisation, 
nationalisation and re-assertion of state control over education.  
Sri Lanka’s welfare-based social contract contained the seeds of its own destruction, 
however. The seeds lay not in its founding principles, but in their political interpretation, 
manipulation and operationalisation. The original legitimacy values set out in the free 
education reforms were non-discriminatory - based on universal rights and equity. Over time, 
through frequent political competition and rising nationalist ideology, the social contract was 
realised as an exclusive one. Legitimation claims and practices ideologically and materially 
appealed to the majority Sinhalese. The essence of welfare provision was nationalist, rather 
than universal. It was tied to group revival and identity. It embedded special rights for this 
legitimacy audience, rather than defending meritocracy. In part, this was because the political 
legitimacy audience was never the whole society, it was the Sinhalese nation.  
Nationalist-fuelled legitimation claims and practices that catered to the main legitimacy 
audience were often overblown. The failure to live up to utopian, nationalist, populist 
promises broke the social contract between the state and a section of this main legitimacy 
audience: insurrectionaries in the south. At the same time, the political imperative of 
servicing the social contract, and catering to the Sinhalese audience, created a strong 
imperative to violate the rights of other groups. Discriminatory policies had the opposite 
effect of helping to de-legitimise it among elements both within that majority and within the 
Tamil minority constituency. The social contract underscored a Sinhalese nationalist version 
of fairness which collided with Tamil perceptions of fairness, and (re-)produced and 
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symbolised Tamils’ perceptions of unfairness and discrimination in how the state was 
exercising power. Unfairness in the distribution of services was received as an assault on 
group identity. The virtuous circle of catering to the state’s selected legitimacy audience 
exacerbated a vicious cycle of de-legitimation with another audience.  
The sadness, and irony, of this is that the exclusive social contract, which was meant to lift up 
the rural poor through the provision free education has locked in institutional arrangements 
that have held back the Sinhalese, whose education and employment opportunities remain 
restricted by education in the swabasha. The political imperative of protecting free education 
for the poor, and with it a key source of legitimacy for the state, restricts the space for 
alternative policymaking that could address these structural inequalities. The only politically 
acceptable policies are the ones that support free university education and the values it 
embodies. In this way, legitimation has been, and continues to be, a strong influence over the 
functioning of the higher education system. The free university education sector is stuck in a 
low level equilibrium which functions from a legitimacy perspective, but is dysfunctional 
from an educational perspective. This reinforces and reproduces inequalities in social 
mobility and means that the social contract ultimately falls far short of its social justice ideals.  
The legacies of the dysfunctions of the social contract are visible on the streets and in popular 
imagination. Travelling around the capital Colombo, it is not uncommon to see trishaws 
adorned with the bumper sticker ‘I got two As for my A levels, but I’m still on the streets’. 
Then there’s the popular story of the woman who is taken ill on her journey to work, but her 
trishaw driver comes to her assistance and reassures her she’s merely experiencing 
palpitations. He is a cardiologist. These popular symbols and myths convey the felt mismatch 
between the education system and the promise of social mobility. The irony of legitimising 
values – of equity and justice - is that they do not have to deliver on their promises to 
continue to be politically useful. Catering to them rhetorically may be sufficient, particular in 
conditions where demand is restricted to access alone, and therefore legitimation practices 
have also been restricted to it. Sri Lanka’s education system requires sustained, long-term 
investment in infrastructure and quality. Yet one enduring legacy of the post-colonial 
manipulation of higher education for state legitimation is the opposite: extracting the short-
term political legitimacy dividends from the higher education system without making the 
attendant investments in it.  
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Legitimacy politics helps explain why higher education is so politically contested, and 
continues to be a space of state-society contestation. Education has been violent, contested 
terrain precisely because it represents a core arena where the social contract is animated and 
continually contested. Universities in Sri Lanka represent the state, and the state’s patronage 
of the universities represents its commitment to the patronage of the poor in general. As such, 
they remain spaces where the state seeks a controlling influence, where political contestation 
happens on a micro scale, where realising the core legitimising ideas of democratisation and 
equalisation continues to drive policy and ultimately where dissent emerges if the state veers 
too far from these terms of contract. The enduring significance of education for state 
legitimacy is also what makes it difficult to reform. Changing the politics of higher education 
would be difficult in light of this institutionalisation – that is, the entrenched interests and 
political malleability it offers. Furthermore, it is naïve to think that regime change could shift 
this underlying basis of legitimacy values. While legitimation practices can change, Sri 
Lanka’s experience is testament to the fact that legitimising ideas can be remarkably durable 
over time.  
When does service provision support or undermine state legitimacy? 
The aim of this study was to generate testable propositions about when service provision 
supports or undermines state legitimacy. Sri Lanka’s experience suggests the relationship 
between service provision and state (de-)legitimation is not direct or instrumental. Rather, it 
is mediated by values, politics and history. Legitimation depends ultimately on the making 
and acceptance of a claim to support based on a shared value or justifiable principle. 
Likewise, service provision needs to satisfy certain shared values and normative criteria in 
order to be significant for state legitimacy. When it does, it can become significant for 
expressing and reinforcing the key legitimising ideas of the state. Indeed, it can become 
formative to the idea of the state. However, service provision can also undermine legitimacy 
when it sends messages that the state is contravening shared values or acting on the basis of 
unfair rules and procedures. This process is not automatic, but politically engineered by elites 
who manipulate service provision to make legitimacy claims. These claims are articulated 
through political narratives that put forward justifications for the way services are provided 
and distributed. In turn, these legitimacy claims are evaluated in wider political context. 
Services can become tied to legitimacy at critical junctures of crisis and change. These 
critical junctures can be historically reinforcing and institutionalise path dependency not only 
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in the significance of the service for state legitimacy, but in the functioning of the service 
itself. 
Values 
The category of ‘performance legitimacy’ is misleading if it suggests that merely providing 
goods and improving wellbeing will necessarily improve legitimacy. There is arguably only 
one overarching ‘source’ of state legitimacy: that source, derived from the meaning of 
legitimacy itself, is a normative belief in the moral appropriateness of the state. By this 
reading, the pertinent question to ask about the services-legitimacy link is not when does 
service provision support or undermine legitimacy but more precisely, when does service 
provision support or undermine the norms and values that underpin the moral appropriateness 
of the state. 
If service provision is understood instrumentally as a matter of effectively delivering certain 
commodities or goods that meet basic needs, then it is difficult to see how it can be 
significant for forming the share values or normative beliefs that underpin the state’s right to 
rule. However, a central claim of this thesis is that the link between service provision and 
state (de-)legitimation is not instrumental. Service provision can support or undermine state 
legitimacy precisely because it represents more than an instrumental exchange between states 
and citizens. In Sri Lanka, state provision of higher education was never a merely technical 
exercise or a matter of outputs: it was a key arena for expressing the values of the state and 
for making moral appeals to the state’s legitimacy audience.  
The findings illustrate that service provision can express a range of values. In Sri Lanka, the 
rules governing access to higher education and the processes of decision-making associated 
with making these rules conveyed the state’s commitment to fairness. How higher education 
was distributed between groups transmitted values of social justice and impartiality. Higher 
education was also an expression and realisation of rights and entitlements. Indeed, over time, 
it was not the provision of education so much as the right to it that was significant for state 
legitimacy. Lipset (1984, p. 88) argued that ‘groups regard a political system as legitimate or 
illegitimate according to the way in which its values fit with theirs’. The moulding of the 
system of higher education has helped the state to express common values that made it 
legible to its legitimacy audience. However, the state’s values aligned with only some, rather 
than all, groups. In Sri Lanka, the pursuit of an ethno-nationalist set of values – and version 
of fairness - ultimately diverged from Tamil perceptions of fairness.  
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Specific propositions arise from these observations. At a general level, service provision may 
improve legitimacy when it supports and reinforces commonly-held values of fairness, or 
extends and upholds rights. That is, when it sends messages that the state is acting in ways 
that are considered morally and normatively appropriate. Conversely, it may undermine 
legitimacy when it violates social values, or produces perceptions of unfairness in process or 
distribution. That is, it can undermine legitimacy when it sends messages that the state is 
acting on the basis of rules that are considered normatively inappropriate. In divided 
societies, different understandings of fairness can be a source of contested legitimacy.  
Politics 
The findings from this study further suggest that the relationship between service provision 
and state (de-)legitimation is not automatic, but politically constructed. Precisely because 
service provision is an expression of social values, as discussed above, it is also fertile ground 
for making political legitimation claims. These claims are articulated through political 
narratives and rhetoric. In Sri Lanka, education proved particularly fertile rhetorical ground 
for making legitimacy claims because of its significance for social justice and rights. 
Nationalist ideology proved to be a particularly powerful source of justification for 
legitimation claims and practices in the sphere of higher education. Nationalism-fuelled 
political promises were, however, ultimately overblown: they presented a utopian picture that 
could not be fulfilled. 
Politics was also structurally important in that it helped generate conditions that were 
conducive to making legitimacy claims. Independence provided a new legitimation impetus 
for competing elites seeking to consolidate a power base in a changed order. In turn, critical 
junctures of legitimacy crises, themselves catalysed by significant political change, amplified 
the political stimulus to realise the legitimising ideas laid out in the social contract. In this 
way, the manipulation of service provision for legitimation was at least partly motivated by 
political instrumentalities. In turn, politics was an important aspect of the environment in 
which the fairness of service provision was evaluated.  
The significance of politics is that it can determine whether the services-legitimacy 
relationship is a ‘virtuous’ circle whereby services, shared values and legitimacy are mutually 
reinforcing, or a ‘vicious’ one, whereby values are violated, groups alienated, and legitimacy 
undermined. In Sri Lanka, the legitimacy claims and practices of the post-colonial state 
served the interests of the dominant group, but they did not fulfil the common interest 
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purpose that is an essential component of legitimacy (Kelman, 2001). Indeed, legitimacy 
practices in the sphere of higher education had the opposite effect of helping to de-legitimise 
the state among elements both within that majority and within the Tamil minority 
constituency. In this way, Sri Lanka exemplifies the ‘problem of multiple audiences’ in the 
making of state legitimacy (Zaum, 2013).  
Together, these insights generate a number of propositions about the influence of politics on 
the services-legitimacy relationship. Service provision may support legitimacy when political 
narratives articulate the connection between what is provided with shared values and 
principles. It may undermine legitimacy where common interest principles are abandoned in 
favour of particularistic policies. It may also undermine it when political promises of 
extending new rights or rewards ultimately go unfulfilled. Perceptions of unfairness, 
discrimination or favouritism in service provision may undermine state legitimacy in a 
context where that group already perceives the wider political system to be unfair.  
History 
The fairness of who gets what services, where and how may be evaluated in the context of 
expectations of rights or entitlements that are historically embedded in a social contract. In 
Sri Lanka, higher education was tied to values, rights and entitlements during the making of 
the post-colonial social contract. This set a threshold of expectations on the part of citizens 
and obligations on the part of the state. Perceptions of (un)fairness in service provision were 
historically contingent in that they depended on what groups previously had, and what they 
believed they were entitled to. Legitimising ideas can be remarkably resilient over time. In 
Sri Lanka, providing access to highly coveted, university-level, state education remains to 
this day a central condition for the state’s legitimacy among its core legitimacy audience of 
rural Sinhalese. In turn, contraventions of those rights and expectations have been significant 
for the unmaking of the social contract, and have contributed to processes of state de-
legitimation. The idea of free education as an intrinsic birth right cannot now be contravened 
by any government or regime without the risk of violent dissent.  
The proposition that arises from this is that the relationship between service provision and 
state legitimacy depends on the history of state provision and of expectations of it. 
Specifically, service provision can matter for state legitimacy when it has already been 
established as a condition of the social contract, and where its value and meaning resonates 
across space and time. When services are historically embedded in a social contract, the 
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state’s political legitimacy may hinge on whether it continues to fulfil the terms of that 
contract. Failure to live up to the conditions of a social contract, or to political promises, may 
undermine state legitimacy.  
Refining the received wisdom 
The received wisdom that services can instrumentally build legitimacy does not hold up to 
scrutiny. The evidence base is weak in at least three senses: it is inconsistent in its findings 
(meagre positive support, but far from proving the intuition), confined to a few contexts 
(largely multi-country studies), and is not of a sufficient size to infer policy implications. Sri 
Lanka’s experience indicates that the allocation and distribution of highly demanded public 
services can be significant for processes of state transformation and (de-)legitimation, though 
not in the instrumental, transactional, or short-term sense depicted in aid-oriented, state-
building models. It suggests that what is needed is an altogether more imaginative account of 
the mechanisms of influence between services and legitimacy, for good and for ill. This 
contrasts with the positive orientation of the aid debate which, stimulated by the need to 
demonstrate aid results, has been pre-occupied with proving, even quantifying, the 
exclusively positive effects of service delivery on legitimacy. 
The small body of evidence, together with the findings from this study, raises substantive 
challenges to the received wisdom. The first is that it is overly reductionist. The narrow 
instrumental interpretation of the role of service delivery in processes of state legitimation 
reflects the difficulties donors face in ‘getting beyond capacity’ (Teskey, 2012). It also 
reflects a liberal conception of the state, which assumes functioning institutions and a social 
contract between state and society. However, service provision is never an apolitical pursuit 
and likewise performance legitimacy is not reducible to objective indicators. Rather, 
performance is assessed against a backdrop of historical expectations and political relations, 
and influenced by prevailing norms and values. For these very reasons, legitimacy is unlikely 
to be ‘built’ from outside through instrumental improvements in material conditions alone. 
Indeed, it may well be futile to intervene to seek to build legitimacy through services in 
contexts where the liberal peace-building model does not apply – that is, where there is no 
social contract, and no ideational or material incentive for elites to create one either. 
Moreover, such interventions may exacerbate conflict where it is seen to support a balance of 
power that favours some groups over others (Zaum, 2012). Blindly delivering services in 
those areas is akin to building without foundations. There is no basis in this thesis for 
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thinking that short-term improvements can build moral glue between states and societies in 
divided societies where power structures are perceived to be unfair. Nevertheless, 
development agencies are locked in a tension between recognising these social complexities, 
and the bluntness of the aid instruments available to them.  
More broadly, building legitimacy presents a paradox for aid agencies. The technical armoury 
available to external actors is not easily attuned to changing long-standing, and often highly 
durable, legitimacy values. On the other hand, because aid always involves choices about 
where, who and what to invest in, all external interventions have potential to (de-)legitimise 
some actors and institutions over others. Legitimacy can therefore be risky territory for aid 
because it can be slow-grown and yet extremely fragile. The key question for aid is how to 
balance the goal of enabling legitimate, developmental institutions to flourish, whilst 
avoiding the potential for undermining them. While this thesis cannot address practically 
address these questions, it can suggest approaches to addressing them. At least part of the 
answer may lie in taking a step back from the focus on instruments to greater concern with 
analysis. Aid policy sometimes arrives at the diagnosis and prescription for legitimacy 
without properly analysing its symptoms and underlying causes. In practice, thinking 
politically about legitimacy could mean incorporating a legitimacy lens into political analysis 
and more explicitly risk-assessing the potential impacts of aid on legitimacy.  
The findings around the centrality of fairness raise dilemmas for aid to service delivery in 
fragile and conflict-affected states. Fairness embodies a set of values – around equity, merit, 
rights - that are by nature context-dependent, and for which there can be no universal criteria. 
The dilemma for aid is that, as leading agencies already recognise, different groups within 
society have different criteria of fairness and that, crucially, an equal distribution of 
allocation may not be perceived as fair (Alexandre et al., 2012). Moreover, expectations of 
fair outcomes - or distributive justice – may look different in contexts where patronage or 
caste systems are so engrained that unequal treatment is tolerated (Fisk & Cherney, 2016). 
People may accept values that discriminate against them as well as for them. Regularity and 
predictability may be found as much in formal institutionalised procedures as in the informal 
rules of clientelism. What is fair in any given society is an open question. For these reasons, 
translating fairness into replicable criteria for service delivery is not straightforward.  
One message is that an empirical perspective on understanding what legitimacy is, and where 
it comes from, is vital. Aid policy literature has delineated the various sources of legitimacy 
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available to a state, variously categorising them into values, performance, international 
recognition, and so on. Categorisation is useful for organising ideas but, as Adrian Leftwich 
wrote, ‘classification is not explanation’ (Laws & Leftwich, 2012, p. 22). This research 
illustrates that local values are at the heart of explanations of where legitimacy comes from. 
An alternative, empirical approach to legitimacy requires suspending any preconceived 
notions about whether people or institutions should be considered legitimate or not, and on 
what basis. That is not to say this is straightforward: aid often consciously and 
unapologetically comes with its own set of values. At a minimum, however, more research is 
required on the moral and normative criteria by which citizens are likely to individually and 
collectively judge service delivery arrangements in any given context. Understanding group 
perceptions of fairness in relation to service delivery is significant for understanding the 
likelihood of service provision contributing to (de-)legitimation and (in-)stability. Indeed, it 
may be particularly significant in divided societies where perceptions of fairness may differ 
between groups. This type of research could provide a firmer basis for understanding whether 
and how the norms and values on which external agencies build services align with or 
contradict the local norms against which they are likely to be evaluated. 
Aid actors could pay more attention to the role of services in forming the normative, not just 
the material, basis for state-society relations. This case study, along with other research in 
this field, illustrates that it is not necessarily objective measures of access or uptake – the 
technical criteria against which services are typically measured - that matter for the link 
between legitimacy and services. Indeed, apparently to the contrary, free higher education in 
contemporary Sri Lanka serves its legitimating purpose without necessarily offering an 
educational service of optimum quality. Perceptions of unfairness and violations of values 
may matter more than these indicators. In effect, perceptions may matter more than reality. 
This points to the significance of understanding how service delivery reforms are likely to be 
perceived by different groups – that is, how it affects group equity, rights and entitlements 
and values around fairness – as well as how equitable services are in objective terms. It calls 
for attention to the communication strategies, political narratives and deliberative processes 
around service delivery, as much as the hardware of infrastructure investment. It also 
suggests a need to de-couple the idea of services being important for legitimacy from whether 
or not they are objectively good or bad according to aid criteria. 
Finally, the received wisdom needs to be examined in the reverse. The most significant effect 
of the received wisdom on mental models in aid has been that it has closed off the alternative 
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possibility - that service provision might actually undermine legitimacy. Indeed, while the 
expected legitimacy dividends from short-term investment in service delivery seem unlikely, 
short-term violations of values might rapidly undermine legitimacy. This case study presents 
evidence of that possibility, but it is just one case. This case study shows how perceived 
unfairness in service provision can contribute to processes of state de-legitimation and do 
harm to the stability that international actors seek to support. Services are a tangible, every 
day and ‘real’ aspect of public policy where discriminatory procedures or unfair allocation 
can have immediate consequences, providing a stimulus for popular mobilisation. They send 
signals to citizens about the operating rules, values and moral justifiability of the state. Where 
they send signals that prospects for well-being or social mobility are closed off, that the state 
is not committed to distributing services and goods fairly, or that the chance of ever having 
an impartial government seems impossible, they can undermine legitimacy. The potential for 
aid to do harm to legitimacy through aid investment is therefore of greater concern. The 
emphasis should shift, or at least incorporate into the debate, a discussion and perhaps even 
research on ways of avoiding the risks of doing harm to legitimacy through the provision of 
services in ways that undermine the moral and normative basis for the state’s authority.  
Implications for research  
Any exploration of why services matter for state legitimacy is likely to benefit from historical 
and political analysis. One of the contributions of this thesis is to develop a replicable 
methodology for such an approach. In turn, its findings support the case for an expansion of 
the remit of empirical enquiry into the services-legitimacy relationship, and of applied 
methodology, in three senses in particular: from the material to non-material, from snapshots 
to long-term observation, and from politics as background to politics as the locus of 
explanation. 
The potential mechanisms through which service provision might support or undermine 
legitimacy extend beyond improvements in material conditions and lived experience of 
receiving services. Services are important for the development of shared ideas about the 
responsibilities of the state, the rights of the people, as well as for group identity and self-
esteem. They are value-based, and those values are ultimately derived locally and based on 
historical legacies. Likewise, the crux of any qualitative approach to studying legitimacy is to 
understand the ‘shared ideas of politics’ (Gilley, 2009, p. 141). Legitimacy scholars view 
state-society relations not as instrumental or functional or transactional, but as evaluative and 
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underpinned by moral validity. In the same way that legitimacy scholars look to ideas, 
consensus, justifiability, reasoning and values rather than interests to explain state-society 
relations, research on the services-legitimacy relationship might usefully do the same. 
Specifically, it can look to shared ideas about what people believe the state is responsible for 
providing, shared ideas about what different groups believe they are entitled to, the social 
prestige and group identities associated with access to services, and the underlying normative 
and moral framework against which services are judged. Different perceptions of the fairness 
of service provision could be explored elsewhere, for example. These specific areas of 
investigation would more directly connect the study of the services-legitimacy relationship 
with the central concerns of legitimacy theory.  
The second call to expand the remit of enquiry relates to the timeframes of research. This 
thesis embodies a critique of the endeavour to measure that pre-occupies political science 
research on legitimacy, with its primary emphasis on identifying links between variables. 
That is not to dispute the merits of measurement, or of identifying correlations. We need 
snapshots in time to measure legitimacy, to observe changes over time, and to identify cases 
for further exploration. Adopting a longer-term perspective on the role of public services in 
processes of state (de-)legitimation may allow for connecting political legitimation strategies 
with their (sometimes unintended) effects over time, which may be lost in research snapshots. 
The literature on legitimation claims and legitimation effects is often dealt with separately: 
this thesis has demonstrated the analytical insights that can come from bringing them 
together. At a minimum, the enduring legacy effects that history can apparently have on the 
services-legitimacy relationship suggest a need to put contemporary observations about the 
services-legitimacy relationship in historical context. There is a strong rationale, as Charles 
Tilly (1984, p. 79) puts it, to ‘work at getting the history right before generalising’. 
Focusing on critical legitimacy junctures – particularly periods of time when new claims to 
legitimacy are made and social contracts are made, or when they are unravelling and dissent 
emerges – presents an opportunity to examine the services-legitimacy relationship in 
historical context. During these times, the criteria for legitimacy – whether they be values 
around the (mis-)use of power, or fairness in procedure or outcomes – are often articulated in 
the public sphere through the narratives of political actors, demands of dissenters, and 
through media debate and deliberation. In this way, the salient criteria by which the state 
wins or loses its right to rule, and the threshold of the acceptable use of power, can suddenly 
be thrown into stark relief. What is otherwise a difficult and slippery phenomenon can be 
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more keenly observed at these periods in time. During either legitimacy juncture, new rules 
and rights are negotiated, and the significance of service provision for state-society relations 
may be more keenly observable than during more settled periods when the terms of exchange 
are accepted.  
The final call to expand the sphere of explanation is to look to politics, not as background or 
passing explanation, but as cause. Crucially, correlation between legitimacy markers and 
measures of performance cannot take us to the political heart of performance legitimacy, nor 
can it identify the political processes of contestation involved in its making and unmaking. 
The case presented illustrates the benefit of a politically-situated account of the services-
legitimacy relationship. It shows that conditioning political structures, and in particular the 
perceived fairness of the wider distribution of power in society, form a backdrop against 
which those claims and practices are judged by citizens. For these reasons, research into the 
services-legitimacy relationship does not benefit from divorcing indicators from the wider 
political environment in which service provision is evaluated. Moreover, the influence of 
service delivery on legitimacy cannot be studied independently of the broader stock of 
legitimacy a state has at its disposal. Indeed, service delivery may be particularly significant 
precisely because it gains political salience through an ongoing process of (de-)legitimation. 
While sources of legitimacy outside of the service delivery arena may not be the focus of the 
examination, researchers may still need to be cognisant of them so that the contribution of 
service delivery to processes of state (de-) legitimation is not over-stated.  
Above and beyond these calls to expand the remit of enquiry, this thesis supports the case for 
more research, of any methodological or ontological ilk, on the links between service 
provision and state legitimacy or legitimation. This research agenda remains significant for 
international aid agencies seeking to understand under what circumstances service provision 
can fulfil the dual imperative of meeting basic needs and state-building, and whether aid 
interventions can ever convincingly claim to do both. It also has significance far beyond the 
aid debate. Understanding the role of service provision in building social contracts and in 
processes of state (de-)legitimation is relevant for addressing some of the key problems 
facing service provision in developing countries, particularly divided societies. Among the 
most acute are weak social demand and weak political incentives for delivery. Tracing the 
role of services in the making of social contracts could help to develop understanding of how 
certain expectations and ideas about the state are formed, or not, as a basis for social demand. 
Understanding when services are susceptible to political manipulation in the pursuit of 
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legitimacy, and what impact this has on whether or not services are provided to different 
groups in society, is an entry point for understanding inequality in provision. Analysing the 
political legitimacy logic behind service provision may be significant for understanding the 
room for manoeuvre in policymaking, and the risks to social stability of withdrawing those 
services without compensatory measures. In sum, there is a pressing case for incorporating 
the role of legitimacy politics into the fundamentally political problem of who gets what 
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